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CHAPTER I 
IlJT~WiJtJC T IOIJ 
.A. 1.'he L:oti ves n.nd Purposes of the ~1eseo.rch 
One cf the most sicnific~t traits in the 
philosophical thou::;ht of today is the nevi emphasis 
pl~ced upon the historical. The historu of nhilos-
. •· 
ophy is no loncer ree'.lrded as a. ch!l.otic heap of the 
ruins of once li ·r inc; and strutrnling systems r:hich 
Vl'l[;Cd a. "bellum omniu.'Il contra omnes", one tem}Jorar-
ily supersedint; e.nother until all nere des troy ed. 
The present generation of thinkers has learned to 
thini-: of history in terms of dialectic, i.e., !lS a. 
pro ere ssi ve m2nif estn. ti on of the structure and 
movement of thoufht. This new evo.luation ~as first 
d ei:'ini tely formulated by He[;O 1, v:bo ss.id: "Die 
Tha.ten der Goschichte der Fhilosophie sind keine 
.Ab enthev.er, ••• nicb t nur cine Samr:il ung von z ufrill-
igen Begebenheiten, Fahrten irrendor Ritter, die 
:.:ii ch flir si ch herumschla.Ben, !lb sichtslos a.bmili1en, 
und a eron 1.iirks'.:.!Ilkei t spu.rlos verschrmnd en i st. 
.... ,,,.'. ... "'"1 
11 
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~~en so wenig hat sich hier Einer etwa.s a.usgeklii.gelt, 
dort ein Anderer nach WillkD.r, sondern in der Bewegung 
des denkenden Geistes ist wesentlich Zusammenha.ng. 
Es geht verniinftig zu."l It is doubtless owing to 
Hegelian influence that "There is now in Germe.ny a 
re vi val .Qf dialectic proceeding fr an mo.ny sides 
and unc anmonly strong. n 2 Professor A. Liebert, who 
makes the latter statement, adds: "This philosophy 
of dialectic is positively the most powerful and 
most hopefUl movement in our renaissance of meta.-
physics." 3 That the dialectical conception of the 
history of philosophy is not confined to Germany is 
revealed by the following statement from the programme 
announced by the Revue de Histoire de la Philosophie 
when that journal was founded four yea.rs a.go: 
"L'histoire de la philosophie •••• n'est au fond qu' une 
"" reflexion qua la raison fa.it sur elle-meme •••• 
"L'histoire de la raison •••• est une indispensable 
condition de la philosophie."4 My purpose is to 
approach from this point of view the system of 
Rene Descartes ( 1596 - 1650 ) and that of George 
Berkeley ( 1685 - 1753 ). The study purports, therefore, 
1. Werke ( Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1833), 
Vol. XIII, p. 32. 
2. A. Liebert, "Contemporary German Philosophy", 
Phil. Rev. 38 (1929), P• 556. 
3. Ibra::- -
4. Rev. de Hist. de la Phil., 1 (1927), p. 4. 
!' 
• 
not only t.o trace the historical influence involved 
but also to draw a philosophical c.anparisnn of the 
two thinkers with the purpose of showing their 
inner relatedness. 
Were there no other reasons, the importance of 
these tw-0 thinkers wnuld warrant such a research, 
if the dialectical conception of history be accepted. 
In each case the metaphysical genius of the man is 
so brilliant, his ability to discover and to form-
ulate significant problems so acute, and his influ-
ence on his successors so pronounced, that only 
the adjective "epoch-making" d.oes him full justice. 
Descartes' right t~ his time-honored title of 
"founder of modern philosophy" is still unchallenged. 
Today, with the 300th anniversary of his death 
approaching, be ccOiltinues to hold aJmost a magic 
spell over philosophical thought. It is true that 
" there are critics like Whitehead e.nd Hoernle who 
argue that Descartes directed philosophy into 
wrong channels, and hence call him the "father of 
all evil in modern philosophy", 1 but even they must 
1. R.F.A.Hoernle, Studies in Contemporary 
Mete.p}lysics (New York:-Ha.rcourt, 
Brace and Co., 1920), p. 240. Cf. 
A.N. Whitehead, Science and ~ 
Modern World ( N. Y.: Macmillan, 1925), 
p. 202 et passim. 
f I
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adnit that ~s a matter of history the problems 
ra.ised by iJescartes ure the ones around which 
philosophical discussion of the modern age h~s 
revolved. The stat us of .iierkeley is not q_ui te 
so settled ~ question. This is because for more 
than a century his thou:::-ht v:a.s almost universo.lly 
misu..~derstood, ~na not until the first complete 
edition of his v.o rks o.ppeo.red in 1871 did men 
becin to appreciate the true significance of 
Berkeley. Since that time a remarkable revival 
of Berkeley has taken place, until todny both 
friends 1 o.nd foes 2 of idealism regard him a.s the 
or it:irn:i tor of tba. t powerful specula. ti ve movement. 
In Germany no edition of Berkeley's Principles 
appeared until 116 years after his c.1 ea.th. 1iearrnbile 
Berkeley wus referred to, o.s by K!J.11t, as the "good" 
but misBuided bishop v:ho denied the existence of 
the external ~orld. But during recent decades 
academic dissertations and other critical o.nd 
a.pprecis.tive \':orks on Berkeley he.ve appeared there 
by the score, and it is to Gorman schol~rship, o.s 
1. .E.g .. , M. ','; .C'.:'.lkins, The Persistent 
:Problems of l?hilosophy (nev; York: 
hlacmill'.;.Il, 1917), p. 400; ~nd 
A.C.YJiudson, The Philosophy of 
Person2lism (Hew York: Abinc;d on, 
1927), p. 142. 
2. E.g., R.B.Perry, Present Philosophic~l 
Tendencies, (New York: Loncm~ns, 1921), 
pp. 119 ff. 
7"""'W'"Z' WM 'r+ ~ 
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represented by Theodor Lorenz, Benno ~rdmann, 
Rudolf Li:etz, '.lfld others, th'.l.t one must turn for 
the most thorouch discussions of Berkeley. Yet 
even Y:hen .Berkeley is unuerstood, it is rerhaps 
eztr:ivn.:;s.nt to e:~ect r.'ith John 3tll.2rt :.iill th!lt 
11 i t riill be rec oc,nized that of all r.ho, from the 
e'.:l.rliest times, h~ve applied the powers of their 
minds to mctaphysic'.11 inquiries, 110 is the one of 
the 13rea.test philosophic 3enius. '' 1 The follo\':er of 
Berkeley m2y hn.ve to con tent himself with tho 
pronouncement of Leslie Stephen, "Berkeley, a.cutest 
of EnGlish metaphysicians and most sraceful of 
philosophic v:ri ters" 2 or v:i th th!lt of Erich 
Cassirer, "Die Berkeleysche Philosophie konnte •••• 
als das musterGultige psychologische 8yetem in dor 
3 Geschichto der Philosophie gel ten". At any rate 
it v:ill be recognized universall;y today that in 
studying .L3erkcley one is dealinc; v:i th problems that 
lie in the heart of modern philosophy. And \\'hen one 
pauses to consider that Descartes,. as well as 
Berkeley, has been c ailed "the found er of modern 
iue:ilism", e.g., by Kuno Fischer ~nd by Foui116e, 
1. J.S.Mill, Three B:;o21s '.1l1d Berlrnley's 
Life and ~iritin~s ITev:-york: Holt, 
1884):--P'. 262. . 
2. L. Stephen, 1£nc:lish '.i1houpht in the 
Eichteenth Centur~ (London: Smith, 
.iHder and c., i9o·. 2 vols.) I, p.86. 
3. Erich Cassire~, Berkeleys s1stcm 
(Giessen: Tope.lmann, 1914 , p.8. 
5 
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a rel2tion is susGested that ch!lllonees attention. 
This relation, however, has heretofore 
escaped specific attention. It has been knoYn to 
exist, but scholars have been content to hint at it 
rather than to explore it. Arnone the first to dis-
cover this connection nnd to m2ke a. sienific~nt 
9.llusion to it, was Kant. In the first edition of 
the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in the fourth 
paroJ.ogiEm of the Dialectic ( A 377), Kant, vii thout 
mentionine any n3.llles, classifies idealism into t'l:rn 
varieties, doematic n.nd sceptical. The former, he 
says, is characterized by nn e.bsolute deni:il of the 
existence of matter, the latter makes matter problem-
atic. Kant dismisses the former swnmarily; against 
the latter he !lrc;ues that we have immediate kno\7ledge 
of the existence of the external world because it 
is determined by the very forms of self-conscious-
ness. In the second edition of the Kritik, in his 
"lliderlegung des Idealismus", Kant returns t.o this 
comparison in a. more explicit form: "Der Idealismus 
1 ( ich verstehe den materi!llen) ist die Theorie 
1. I.e., as distinguished from KJ.nt's 
o~n critical idealism. 
6 
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welche das D~sein der Gegonstande im Hawn ausser 
uns entv:ed er bl ass fiir zweif elhn.ft und unerwei slich, 
t' •t• L' oder fur falsch und UJll.loglich erklurt; der erstere 
ist der problematische des Cartesius, der nur eine 
cmpiri sche Behauptung ( ass er ti o), n'tim1ich: Ich £.!.!!, 
,, ,. 
fur uni::;ezwcifel t erklart; der zweite ist der 
dogmatische des Berkeley, der den Hawn, mit allen 
den DinGen, welchen er als unabtrennliche Bedingung 
anhiingt, fur etwas, was 9.11 sich selbst unmoglich 
sei; und de.rum auch die Dinge im Raum fux blosse 
~inbildune;cn erkltfrt" ( B 274). Here Kant, whose 
own posttlon has been suspected of :Berkeleian 
affinities is forced to take more adequate notice 
of Berkeley. The "Yiiderlegung" consists in the 
argument that :Berkeley erroneously supposes space, 
if real at all, to be a property of things-in-
themselves, whereas space is actually knov.n only as 
the property of phenomena. Without entering into 
the details of Kant's interpretation, the points to 
note, for the purpose of this study, are: ( 1 ) that 
so important a thinker in so monumental e. work 
lini:G .Jesca.rtes and :Berkeley together e.s represent-
ing two varieties of the S!lIIle type of thought, 
7 
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( 2 ) that Kn.nt, disregarding Descartes' mechanical 
philosophy, seizes upon the idealistic teachine of 
Descartes as fundamental, a.nd ( 3 ) that Kant 
represents Berkeley as drawing an uncompromising 
conclusion from the idealistic premises suggested by 
Descartes as possible. 
Numerous other thinkers, historians of 
philosophy and students of Descartes or of Berkeley, 
have made similar references to the problem at hand. 
Only the most instructive of these need here be 
tr::i.nscribed. Antedating even Kant's reference, is 
that of Thomas Reid. Reid, himself oricinally a dis-
ciple of Berkeley but turned apostate because of the 
threatened loss of a ccmmon-sense hold on reality, 
cl~ssifies Locke, Berkeley, and Hwne as belonging 
to the "idealistic school" of Desc!lrtes. 1 As 
against ~hat he holds to be the cardinal error of 
the school, viz. the Cartesian principle that real-
ity is known only through "ideas", Reid claims 
that ne a.re immediately conscious of external re!lli ty. 
Kuno Fischer states the relation on the 
S...ime grounds even more clearly: "Nichts d a.rf nach 
1. T • .Reid, \"lorks (Charlestown: Etheridge, 
1813-1815), Vol. I, p. 268. 
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Descartes fvr i'.'!lhr celten, n.ls das zwcifellos eer!isse; 
unscre Se lb stce\'.'i sshei t \'.'Elr Grund und Vorbi ld g,,ller 
..Srkenntnis. nun sind r:ir bloss unserer Vorstelluneen 
oder Ideen m1mittelbar e:;er:iss, d?..her sind cliese unsere 
alleiniccn ~rkenntnisobjcctc, die oinzie sicheren; 
es ~icbt 8.usser uns oder unubh~ncie von dom vorstell-
c!1don Geiste nichts l~enles, k8ine i.i.n.torie ::?.ls cin 
vom Geist w1abh2ncices Dine: o.lle Objccte sind nur 
vorgestellt, d!lhor keine Jubstc.nzen, keinc 
selbst~dic;en fur sich bestehondcn ~.:cscn, so11dern 
Phtlnomone. 3ubstn.ntiell sind nur die wahrnehmenden 
oder vorstcllenden ·iiesen, es giobt d:-iher nur Geister 
und Ideen: {1ieser 3:itz ist das Grundthemn., Welches 
.Berle cl ey in seinem Id eo.li smus !:'.usf uhrt; \vir bet3er,nen 
diesom Jt,mdpunkt, v:enn wir die du.rch den 
cartesiunischen Satz der Selbst5e~issheit ce~iesene 
:-u ch tune in eerad er Lini o verf olgen. 111 
According to b1 ouillee, v:bo ::;ives a 
thoroueh-coing ide~listic interpretation of 
DeEcQ.rtes, Berl:oley simply o,bundons o.s superfluous 
the r.:g, teriu.l sub stance v:h ich Descartes "~vai t si 
1. Ge schic:h te c1 er nouern 1?hilos o/r. ie 
(Heid clbore: \!inter, 1897), 
Vol. I, P• 445. 
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" / " 1 gr~nde peine ~ tiistinBuer de 11 rensee neoe." 
"Voili ci one, climin~e la subst£.nce, cette id~e 
obscure '.lu-plus ha.ut point, cettc ontit~ scol:..stio.ue 
,, 
conservee pa.r .Uesca.rtes contrn.irement 0. ses prorres 
principes. Ji l::i. substc.nce, pourr2i t-on cl ire a 
) t t . 'l""d t / uescn.r-es, es une cnose uu a~ u e vo re rensee, 
/ 
p:ir e0nse~uent un inconnaissable, comment, des 
/ distinctions (lUi sont do.ns votre pensee, pourroz-
' ' / vo us e onclure !l a es distinctions reelles a ans la 
s11bst'.lnce inconnue? Vous qui nvez mis en d oute 
.le monde ext;rieux lui-meme p::i.rce qu' il n' est pus 
. /,. t t . d t / immeoic. emon c anpris '.lns vo re riensee, 
/ ' allez-v ous cone lure de votre pen see a des 
-- ' 2 qui lui sont encore plus etrangores?" 
c crnment 
:.mbstn.nces 
H .K.SI11i th, v:hose Studies in the Cartesian 
Philosophy is one of tho first criticnl e~positions 
of Descartes in 2nt;lish, recards Berkeley's 
philosophy 11 n.s being the 011tcome of a consistent 
3 d evelopmont of De sea.rte s' principles". "Descartes 1 
three fundamental principles", he asserts, "viz., 
his doctrine of representative perception, his 
1. A. Fouill~e, Descartes (Paris: Hachette, 
1893), P• 19~. 
2. Ibid,, p. 194. 
3. N.K.Smith, .;)tudies in the Cartesian 
Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1902), 
p. 216. 
_,,_~·-· .. ~. 
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spiri t11alism, '.ll1d his r!ltion'.1listic.: viov: of caus'ltion, 
1 
all cor.1hine to c a:lpel its o.ccept!1nco." i":i thout 
p'lusin[; in the present connection to consult or to 
critieize further the viev:s of this author, suffice 
it to rem'.lrk that v;hile dmith h!l~ D. clo::ir insisht 
into the iru1er connection bet~een De~c~rtes and 
Berl:ele~1 1 espoci'.:lly on the t_;round s of the Occ::?.sion-
3.listic elemonts of Descartes rihi<.:h rec.:oived their 
tr nest e;·:pressi on in Berkeley, his treatment of the 
proiiler.1 is vitiated by undue emr.>h!lsis on the 2lleced 
ir11Jortwce of "represent!ltive perception" in DeGcartes 
'.lTIO by the f'1.ilure to crasp the si:~nifi<.:'.J.l1Ce Of 
Berkeley's theor~1 of "notions". 
~.s. li:J.ldane, the ~nglish biogr~pher of 
..Jc sc ::.u-tes, in pointinc out the anti tho tic 8.l cl eve 1011-
men ts i ssuine from .iJe scartes, re.r::a.rk s: "On the one 
h'.:..nd, 2 it developed into m2teriBlism of the kind 
rihich h3.s ch!ll'a.cterizeu the physiolo,::y founded on 
his prelimin3.r~1 reso!lrches; on the other, it h~s led 
3 to ·urn id e'J.lism of ..Berkeley." 
The bi ogrn.phers and students of Ber}:eley, 
1. Ibid. 
2. The thou~ht of uesc!ll'tes. 
3. ~.S.h~ld3lle, Descartes, His Life ~nd 
Time (London: 1mrrg,y, 1905},P .17 7. 
11 
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no less than those of Descartes, have avowed the 
im,Jort ance of the rel et ion. Jor..nston, ":hose 
Development of Berkeley's ~hilosoph~ is the most 
scholarly work on Berkeley in English, goes so far 
as to describe Berkeley as a genuine Cartesian 
Occasion8.list who "c'lrries out more consistently 
than Malebranche the presuppositions involved in 
1 
DescA.rtes' fund1I'.lental thesis. l!.etz, whose 
critical study of Berkeley's life and philosophy 
corresponds in German to the work of Johnston in 
English, ree3.rds Berkeley's "Erbgut van Descartes" 
,, " 
as "die Passivitat, Tragheit, und Unwirksamkeit des 
• ,, It ,, 
Korpers gegenuber der Kraft, Aktivitat, Wirkensfahig-
keit des Geistes, damit die scharfe Gegenuberstellung 
2 
van res cogitans und res extensa." 
Of particular interest to the present study 
, 
is Joussain'e Expose Critique de la Philosophie de 
Berkeley, a work representing the best recent French 
scholarship on Berkeley. The author brings an 
intimate and up-to-date knowledge of Descartes to 
bear on his correlation of Cartesian with 
1. G.A.John~ton, The Development of 
Berkeley's Philoso~hy (London: ¥acmillan, 
1923), p. 68. 
2. R.Metz, George Berkeley, Leben und Lehre 
(Stuttgqrt: From.~ann,1925), p. 134. 
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Berkelei~'1 thoueht. L'ido!llisF.Je do ..Berkeley", he 
g,ffirns, "se trouve en c:erme d'.lTIS l'a.ffirm'ltion de 
I' \ A 
.Jesc3.l'tes que · l 'ospri t est plus aise a c onn'.li tre 
que le corps.'" 1 On this and other })assa;es in 
1Jes0artes the '.lllthor coes on to co;:u;10nt: ".Da.ns s~ 
I ' preoccup~tion d'arriver a une 8..bsclue certitude, 
\ 
.De sc a.rte s incl inc a cone evoir le rn ond e so nsi b lo 
c o:nr.rn une sir:iple mod <J.li t; de l 9. sub st 'lnc e pcns'.ln te. 11 2 
I 
But Jouss~in, unlike ?ouillee, observes fund :i.rnontal 
differences as \':ell as resemhlances. Thus rihcn 
.iJ0sc o.rto s cone ei ve s of th inking sub st£ll1c e in term$ 
of pure Lmd erstn.n uing, v1h ilc Berkeley tends to 
\ " identify it ~ith perception, " •••• a cet egard la 
\ 
philosophie de Ber~:eley diffcre de cello de 
I 
.Dosc£i.rtcs cor:-.me l'cmpirisme '.illS'l'.1iS differe de 
l:i phi losophie fr '.lTIC -:.ise en cenoral, ou cormnc le 
~ 
\ 
drame Sh!ikesperien, mutg,tis nmtandis, diffore de 
I 
' notre tragedie classiQue. Elle est concrete, 
I 
eprise des formes sensibles, tnndis q_ue l'autre 
se pl;i t dans les abstractions. 113 .1!1 urther oppos-
ition results from a difference in tho practic~l 
I 
1. A. Joussain, Expose Critique de la 
Philosophie de Berkeley (~aris: 
Boivin, 1920T;" p. 209. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 209-210. 
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st!lrtin~-point. Desc~tes, proceedi1Je; from the point 
of vie~ of a m1thern2tical physicist, reduced m2tter 
to r:iere ezten sion, a purely qU'lil ti t'.1 ti ve d etermina-
tion. Berkeley, on the oth8r h'.ln6, Dho ~as a 
psych olo:-~i st !1rrl not o. phy si ci st, started from the 
n.ctu!:.l data of eonsciousness, i.e., sonse-riU!llities. 
I / 
"Il en resulte quo le du'.llisme de lo. subst'.lnce etonduc 
et de 19. substance :.r:ens!l.Dte devie11t chez lui l'opposition 
de l'esse est ~ercicere et de l'esse est percipi, 
I 
de l'objot 9ense exist~nt d'.lns le eujet, ct du 
1 
sujet pens'.lnt e:{iSt:J.nt en soi." Both, ho\•:ever, 
arrive at the S91Ile f'undrunent'.ll i;.orld-vier:; the 
reduction of the material \'.·orld to the status of a mode 
of ment9.l g,ctivi ty, mind o..lone beinc '.:ble to maintain 
itself n.s subst3.I'.lce. Hence results in both think~rs 
'.lI1 emph'.lsis on the \'lill, so thg,t both are, in the 
last ann.lysi s, voluntn.ri sts. In this respect 
Berkeley is !l batter Cartesin.n thn.n liL:i.lebranche. 
~1his reviev; of previous investic;o.tors 
v:ho hJ.ve acknov:ledt;ed the existence of the problem 
under investic!ltion m!ly v:ell close '.'.'ith n. notice 
oJ.'. L11e recent terse sta. toment of it in Don.n I.:nud son's 
1. Ibid., p. 211. 
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Philosophy of fer:on:.lism, pp. 119-121. Sho~ine 
that Descartco seriously ir.ipu~~ned the ontolo;dcal 
reality of the mritcrial \'iOrld by a theory of knov:ledce 
,·:h ich "c cnt!:l.i ned n othinc thn. t vms ir~c c1J<->i stent r:i th 
n.n id ealis tic v:orld-vier:" and by ad mi ttinc:; the 
possibility of uJ1ivers:J.l deception n.s regards the 
\',orld of sense, Dean Knudson poil1ts out thn.t it was 
Berkeley ~ho dre~ from these premises tho i~ealistic 
conclusion ~hich llalebrenche declined to draw. 
It is '.l:·p!lrent from this survey that the 
influence of l.lesco.rtes on Berkeley is a ,:-;cnuine 
problem, persi stcntly recognized b~r tbinl:ors of 
v1ri o us countries m d periods, '':ho h'.J. tre chanced to 
touch upon it in pursuinG other studies.. But not 
one of them h::s !l tt empted to \':ork it out in its 
full import. The ¥:ark of previous investi:.:;ators, 
the most si.~nificruit of \':hom are listed !lbove, is, 
in f :.c.; t, so sc '.J.nty tbn. t it furnish os only inc id enta.l 
SU>._:-;gestions r'.lther than n.ctual source-m!lteriD.l i'or 
one v:ho c oncentrn.tes on the problc!"'.l. N.1:.Smi th, 
i"ho considers Berteley's philosophy "speci'.:..lly 
'j. _:nii'icwt" as illustr2.ting the cute ane of the 
principles of JJescartes, devotes six paces to the 
15 
,. 
,, 
I 
I 
I 
comparison; Jous::::~in and ~1 ouillee each hE::.ve four; 
all the others h~ve even less. Johnston's eisht-
pfl::_::e section on the "Influence of C!:!.rtesi~nism" on 
Ee!'~:eley is devoted 9.lmost entirely to 1.!J..1.ebranche. 
I h~ve discovered but one specific rese'.lrch that 
borders v.pon m~, topic, n'lfnely, 8. dissert'.ltion 
~ritten ~t the University of Edinburgh in 1876 by d 
. 
VI. CunnirF:-hc.r.i on The Inflne11ce of Descn.rtos on 
~ ~ ~~~~~
I.i.et:;.phy sic ~l Snecula ti on in .En:~l a.nd. This study 
is va.lu::.:.ble i11 out liniric 1.he sen ern.1 a eve lorr.iont 
of CrJ.rtosi2ni:.:m in .bn:~land, :rnd I shD.11 have 
roo.so11 to tur'-1 to it in 2.nothcr c onnoction. Hore :r 
it must ue noted tho.t Cunninc;ham' s y:robler.i is much 
·brc'.lder t!1::i.n thB.t of the present \';ritcr, '.lnd that 
he !:!. llows only fifteen pB.f;eS to Berkeley, \':hose 
philosophy he h~s era.sped only very suporfici~lly. 
i 
I 
! 
IJe:·:t to ti10 importo.nce of the thinkers o.nd of the 
proulem, therefore, Y.'e mny v:ell list tho s<.:o.nti1iess 
of pre•rious rcso'.ll"ch 8.S !l further motive for 
under ta.kine:- the present study. 
'.i.'hat this problem h!ls so long 1<1in 3.lmost 
U..'1.tou.ched is due to 1..he pernicious influence of 
certain convenient "but misloo.dine 13.bels usually 
It ia custom~ry to speak of o.. sh'.lrp c1c~v~s0 of 
modern rhilosorhico..l thoe~ht into the t~o r~r~llel 
schools of ration~lisrn and empiricism. This division, 
';.hi ch r:::::.s }~'r'.lctico..lly unl-:110\'.n before I:2nt, r:o..s r.1'.lde 
pror:iinont by the crea.t criticist, 1 \'.'ho sou~ht to 
present his philor: ophy n.s '.l s;ynthcsis cf the v:.lid 
results ci' tli e w nflictin3' systems of the p'.lst. It 
\':as seized upon ~nd emph1sized by such influcntic.l 
histori'.lns as .3uhle, S.1ennemo.nn, .i!1ischer, ~nd 
Ueber\•:ec;, J.no after then by numerous others. llore 
sh:J.rply 'Lh'..:.n by '.1Ily one else the line is dr'.l\'.TI b~r 
K1mo j'ischer in r.hosc ;)onderous volu:nes in t!ie 
history of mod crn philoBophy all rre-K'll1ti'.:'.:.11 thinkers 
c.re pl:::.ced under the o !mner either of ":2rn.piri smus'' 
or ''nation'.llismus". The forr1or, '.llso c'.lllod 
"J:foalismus", is so.id to O\'Je its origin to .I!,rancis 
Bacon; the latter, often called "Idca.lismus", 
orif-:;inJ.tes il!i th Desc!ll'tes. Thus :C1 ischer cn.n 
conveniently aiacuss the complex developments of 
philosophy in the seventeenth and ei~hteenth 
1. Cf. Vaihin3er's Commentar, p. 26. 
Cf. a.lso G. Geil, Uber die 
Abhun~igkeit Locke's~ ~esco.rtes 
(~trassburg: Heitz, 1887), pp. Sff, 
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centuries ruider the rubrics of "Desce.rtes und seine 
.::>chule" '.l!ld "Ba.con und seine Sc hule". 
It follows that :i!'ischer, v·ho is forced by 
this architectonic to treat Berkeley as belonGing 
to the "school of .Ba.con", cannot do justice to his 
ovm insight, mentioned above, of the close relation 
b et,·;een Desca.rtes and Berkeley. U or have others 
v:h o he.ve labored under the S9lile labels been ::ihle to 
see in .Berkeley much more than a link between Locke 
n.nd Hu.me in the famous trio of British empiricists. 
These philosophers as champions of ordimi.ry sense-
experience are supposed tc be diametrically opposed 
to Descartes, the rationalist who spurns sense and 
proceeds to lose himself in pure imageless thought. 
The arbitrariness of this classification suggests 
itself, on the one hand, when vrn ca.tcb a glimpse 
of tho .Deso a.rte s who, as his early biographer Baillet 
1 tells us, frequents butcher-shops to see pigs stuck, 
and \7ho, when asked to shoVJ his library, points to. 
a calf which he has dissected. The methods of Bacon 
himself c.ould not have been more empirical, and 
certainly the positive contributions of Descartes 
to empirical science were incomparably greater than 
1. A. Baillet, La. Vie de Descartes (Paris: 
Hortemels,-Y691),-Vo1. I, p. 197. 
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those of Bacon. Indeed, Jun0ma.nn, v1bo r:ith German 
thorouehness has investigated especially the scientific 
side of Descartes and written a scholarly "Einfllhrung 
in seine \'ierke", is led to call Desca.rtes' system 
"E.:mpirischer Idealismus" e.nd to m'.lke the confident 
assertion: "Sofern unter .Empirismus jcne Denkrichtung 
verst'.lnd en wird, die die .Brkenntnis d er \'Jirklichkei t 
'.lls eine ~'olge direkter Einv:irkung derselben auf das 
crkennende Subjekt annimmt, ist Descartes unbedinet 
~:;;:iirist. nl The S'.Jffic thesis has been more recently ma.in-
ta.ined by R.M. Blake in his articles on "The Role 
of Experience in Descartes' Theory of Method" in the 
Philo sophica.l Review. 2 Blake gives conclusive proof 
that vii th .Descartes the physical scienc:s "rest upon 
a solid J..y empirical ba.si s" 3 and explains Descartes' 
dispa.ra6ement of the senses as emphasis on the right 
method of empirical inquiriJ. On the other hand, 
recent scholarship on Berkeley, notably that of 
Johnston, has traced the progress of Berkeley's 
original exuberant empiricism toward a constantly 
deepening acknowledement of the rational elements 
, . 1. K. Jun~ma.nn, ~ Descartes~ Eine 
Einfuhrung in seine \ierke (Leipzig: 
~ckardt, 190?), p. 120. 
2. Vol. 38 (1929), PP• 125-140 and 201-218. 
3. Ibid., p. 131. 
.• ....... ·· 1 - _,___ _ 
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in kno~ledge. Thus from both sides critical study, 
brushine aside traditional classifications, has 
broucht the Continental "rationalist" n.nd the Bnglisb 
"empiricist" much closer to each other. It is one 
of the purposes of the present rese:;.rch to complete 
from first-rate data, hitherto unobserved, this 
"Ur.l\':ertune", ~nd thus to lay bare an important 
historical c cnnecticn v:hich h2S lone been obscured 
by !ln artificial distinction. 
\ihile the direct relation betvrnen Descartes 
wd Berkeley has escaped notice, this is not true 
of the indirect influence of Descartes on Berkeley 
thro uc;h Loe ke and 11alebra.nche. The intim!l to 
relation bet~een Locke ~nd Berkeley is too ~ell 
kno\'TI, both from .Berkeley's O\m numerous rcferences1 
!lnd fran the r.orks of countless comrnenta.tors, to 
require, for the -present ;:iurpose, 21JY fu:rther 
statement th2n ~n assent to the conclusicn of 
Johnston: "That the mind of Locke exercised an 
almost ma.e;isterial influence on Berl:cley is indis-
2 put2blo". The other side of this indirect connec-
1iLn, viz., the influence of Descartes on Locke, 
1. 3sp. I, 26,37,39. All references to 
Berkeley are to the sec ona edition 
of bis ~omplete Works ( Oxf ard: 
Clarendon Press, 1901, 4 vols); 
edi tea by .A.C •. Praser. .Rom:m numernl 
indicates the v olwne, Arabic numeral 
the pa.e;e. This procedure v.ill be 
consistently used. 
2. Op. cit. , p. 32. 
• 
has likewise bee~ 1uite conclusively est£J.blished. It 
h S b e en ~- 11 c Cl • • .._ f . f . . t . l . t . t . 1 '.l .., ... UOJCCL, 0 SJ!OCl. lC cri 'lC9. inveG icn.·ion 
by G. Geil, D.SomCTcr, G.V.Hertlinc, B.Erdm'.lnn, V. Dclbos, 
:ma J. '.rhilly. '.l'he cener!ll result of these studies 
is to revc'.ll th2t Locl:e's ·debt to Descn.rtes is ure!lter 
thiri h~s forr:ierly been supposed. Co~s!derine Locte's 
trouendous influonce on Berkeley one is justified 
in sec!:inc to tr!lce in the 19.tter the fortunes of 
the Co.rtesi'.m elements modio.tcd by the forr:ier c.~d 
thus pressing still fn.rther n. line of in~uiry ~hich 
h~s pro·ved to be fruitf'nl. An indirect rclf:'.tion 
betr:ecn ..Jeccartes '.llJd 3crkeley throu.c-h E2lebr'.lnche 
hc.s '.llso been c:cmer!llly n.cL: .... rior:ledced. Tllus r:hcn 2n 
'lnthor of s. ~3ystem'.ltic exposition of Bcrl:clcy, e.e., 
Johnston or Jousss.in, v:ri tes '.l chapter on Borf:oley' s 
relation to Cn.rtesi£>.nism, the resv.lt is a comp~ison 
of .Llerkeley JJJld I.1alebr:J.Ilche. Already in 1713, the 
ye2r of the publication of Derkeley' s JJi".!lo1rnes, a 
Jesuit publication C!llled Berkeley a "malebranchiste 
de bonne foi"~ Yet Berkeley himself, as we sh!:!.ll 
see, stoutly denied this connection. The question 
-.~'.'l'>Js ·,,hether Bertceley \';as justified in this 
g.ttitude R.nd nhether his repudiation of Descartes. 
1. For titles of these studies, see 
Bibliography, p. 208ff. 
2. Mer-10ires de Trevoux,1713, f'• 922. 
·;.;;uoted by L.Robinson in '.lrticle 
"Un Solipsiste au XVIIIe SiC°c le", 
L'Annee Philosophique, 24 (1913),p.15 
--------~--··---·· 
21 
d 
. 
I 
I I: 
I 
' ~Ii 
f 
• 
I slu.11 g,tteopt to sbor: ths.t .Derkeley'n hostility to 
1.ln.lebr'.llche results from the f!let that Berl:eley 
d evelOJ)ed U1e es sen ti !ll eler.1ont s of lJe sc;arte s 1 ptilos-
ophy over as::iinst l.~J.lebrQ.nche, \'.'ho introcl uced :1n 
alion interpret2tion~ If this study is successful, 
it r·ill en!.!ble us to ev!:'..lU!:'..te '.lller: r.h::.t is i'und~rrnnt::ll 
in .Deoca.rtes '.lild it r:ill present 13erl:elcy in !l nev: 
light as that philosopher of the eie:hteenth century 
1::ho Grasped the basic thOUfht of .Descartes o.nd 
a irec ted it into its proper ch a.nne 1 of la. ter develop-
men t. But such a purpose c •:mnot be a.cc or:rpli shed by 
indirect methods or l)y trite material. It \':ill be 
s OU[;h t by r:1e a.n s of 9.. critic '.lJ. exposition of import-
~1nt data in the :primo.ry sources, heretofore una.pproa.ched 
from the present point of view. 
In concluding this prelimina.ry survey of the 
setting of the problem at h!Jlld the reasons pronpting 
the research and the pv~poses it hopes to achieve 
m!ly be SUillr.lo.rized as follows: ( l ) In keeping Y.i. th 
a di'.llectical concepti_on of the history of philosophy, 
the inner relatedness of two such important systems 
as those of vescartos ~nd Berkeley deserves to be 
singled out for specific study. ( 2 ) ',ihile this 
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rel~t 1o:i has 1:J3e~ rec,Jg~ized by m.u:i.er:.ius 
i~7Jsti~1.tors, bcgin~ing with Reid a~d Kant, no 
ona h'l.s yet ~ade it the obje~t of ~ system~tic 
and thorough-goine study. ( 3 } The pro0lem h1.s 
been obscured by an artificial clas~ific~tion which 
m1.kes Descartes a "rationalist" and Berkeley ~n 
"e~pirici3t". The prese1t i~vestigqtion intends to 
show the fu!1dainent 1.l unity of thought which under-
lie a these labels. ( 4 } The indirect influence. of 
Descartes on Berkeley through Locke ~nd Ualebranche 
has beon generally acknowled0ed and offers a ~~trix 
for the study of the dir·3Ct relation. ( 5 ) A 
fresh and thorough study of this probla:m will lead 
to a new appraisal of what·. is fund=i.rne!ltal in 
Desc.'1.rtes and what is Berkeley's true historical 
position. 
B. ~ Sourc•~s '1.nd t"'.:le !!..~t!!.9.~ of the Rese1rch 
I. The Writings of Desc~rtes. The first 
main source for our study is furnis!ied by the '.Vorks 
of Descartes. These represent a most varied 
collection of apecul~tion on almost all imaginable 
sub,jects and are by no means of uniform i:-:'lport:tnce. 
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They mg,y be classified under three main he!ld s as follows. 
( l ) ~ v1orks published .£iL Descartes 
himself. a.) Although Descartes completea the outlines 
of his philosophic!ll system while he was n. very young 
m9.n, his first published work did not make its 
appearance unti 1 the au th or was rn.st forty. This 
was ~SS9.i s PhilosoI?hig_ues, published in Leyden in 
1637 md conte.ini11g a "Di scours de la 11ethode 11 and 
three 11 essns 11 in the new method, nllIIlely, "Dioptrique", 
I 
"Lleteors", and "Geometrie". An authorized Lutin 
translation, revised by Descartes himself and 
omitting the geometry, appeared in .Amsterdam seven 
years later. b.) In 1641 appeared in Paris .rlenati 
Descartes 1ledi t!ltiones de Primn. Philosophia. The 
subtitle c.nnounced: "Ubi de Dei existentia et a.nimae 
immortalitate. His udjunctae sunt variae objectiones 
doctorum virorum in istas de Deo et anima demonstra-
ti ones cum responsi onibus a.uctoris". A second 
edition appeared in Amsterdam the follmvine year 
under the revised title Meditationes de Prima Philos-
-
ophi'.l in guibus Dei existentia et animae humanae a 
corpore distinctio demonstrantur. This edition adds 
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to the Objections those of the .Jesuit Bourdin and 
contains also Desc!J.I'tes' important letter to Dinet • 
.A ~,rench translation of the 1:edi t!ltiones, with 
important revisions 81ld corrections by the author, 
was published in 1647. c.) Rena.ti Descartes 
.Principia Philosophiae appeared in .Amsterdam in 1644. 
/ 
An approved ~rench tre.nsla.tion by the Abbe Picot, 
with a ~refa.toriJ letter from Descartes to the 
trc.nsl e.tor, 'lppeared in 1647. d.) The la.st v:ork 
published by Veacartes was ~Passions De L'.Ame, 
\•:hi ch appeared in Arnst era am in 1650, the ye!lr of the 
author's death. These four ·works, both their Ls.tin 
and their ~rench versions, are of the first importance 
to our study. Hardly less import!lnt is !l polemical 
\';r i ting Hota.e in ProGramma, published in Amsterdam 
in 1618 and directed against Descartes' apostate 
disciple .::t.er;ius. Of less sienific[ll1ce is !ll10ther 
polemic Bpistola Renn.ti Descartes ~ celeberrimum 
virum Gisbertun VoetiQ~, .Amsterdam, 1643. 
( 2 ) Posthumously edited frn.;:z-ment s .• Upon 
his death in Stockholm in 1650, Descartes left amonr; 
his iE~fers numerous unpublished tracts on various 
suo joctn. Some of these have been irrevocably lost, 
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and others, due chiefly to :J.n ~ccident v:hich occurred 
in their tra.nsportn.tion from Stockholm to P'.lris, 
v:ere left in such a state of c on:fusion as to en.use 
ecli tors no e n:1 of trouble. The fate and con tent of 
.Jescartes' essays on music, on f encinr:, !lnd on the 
construction of encines, and ol the comedy 2nd the 
verses v:h ich he v:as oblit;ed to viri te for the Queen 
of J~eden, need not concern us except ns they 
illustrate the rn..r1ee of the rihilosopher's interests 
!lnd ability. Of direct importance, on the other 
he.na, are the f ollov:ine posthumously edi tea Y:orks: 
I ' o. .. ) Le 1.iond e, ou ~l.1rai te ~ 1£ Lumiere. This little 
fr'.lgment is n.11 th!.lt remains to us of Descartes' 
pretentious Le I.'iond e, the publ icg,tion of v:h ich he 
suppressed upon hearing of G2lileo's condomn!.ltion 
by the Inquisition. b.) ~Description du Corns 
, 
Hum!lin, a phyGiolo8ical treatise. c.) Traite ~ 
L'Hor:ime, a more eener3.l study of a simil2r nature, 
evidently \'.Ti tten orit;inally to be a part of the 
I I 
lgrc;er Lo Eonde. d.) Lo. Recherche de la Veri te 
' par ~ Lumieres Naturelles, !1D unfinished di2logue, 
.i11t0ncied, as I3!J.illet tells us, to form t1·:0 volumes. 
This, like Berkeley's Three Dialogues, is a popular 
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o:-::posi ti on ot· iJ!e theary of knov·lede;e in ch'.1rr;iing 
litarn.ry style. The d~to of its composition is at 
present a subject of controversy :-~mone; :I!'rench 
Descartes-scholars. o~) Reruln.c ~a Directionem 
In;.:oni i, a very i!:!por t'.1!1t youthful r: ork on the 
method 'lnd the sources of kno·:~lec.1130, rec~ded by 
scholars tod -:;;y o.s inv2l u2ble in shor.·ins the orizins 
of ~osc'.3.Ttes' basic principles. f.) Desc~tea' 
diary of the years 1619 - 1621, knorn 2s Co5it'.1tiones 
Pri vn. t20 1 c ontn.ininc; !2Il1one other thi nGs the s~:otch 
entitled "Olympica" i·:hich descrihns the J.t.i_t:nor's 
momentous experience of November 10, 1619, an 
incident that ~ill be discussed later. This frag-
ment:lry r.'ork, r:ith its curious resemhl'.lnce to 
Berkeley's Commonpl'.lce .Book, is of peculiar 11alue. 
It has been preserved only throu5h the transcriptions 
of Baillet 2nd of Leibniz. 
( 3 ) Letters. The third prim2ry source 
of the philosophy of Descartes is his correspondence. 
'.i1ho extent of this m2teriiil is such n.s to take up 
fully half the space of Adam 2nd '.i.1~.mnery 1 s huge 
oc.ltion of .iJesca.rtes' Oeuvres. Descartes, 1·:ho v.'as 
lo th to publish books, ]Jref erred to a::-:,oru1d his 
'· 
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philosophy to his friends by mc!l!ls of p!linstakincly 
• 
th oro u::;h s..rri scholr!.r ly lotter s. 1.:uch of Desc artc s 1 
thinl:inc on relicion n.nd '.llr:10st n.11 of his viev1s on 
ethics must be a eri ved from this source. Especially 
inform!].. ti ve 9.Xe his letters to his most intin'.lte 
friends, I.iercennc, Cha.nut, IJyd arr;c, I.:esln.nd, Huyghens, 
:md others; to hi~ royal :pupils Princess ~lizo.both 
of .l':J.19.tinc rmd .,ueen Chri stino of Sr:cd en; imd to 
the i~n2.lishmen, the LQrq_uis of lJer:c!lstlc and Henry 
I.: ore. 
~ho st~ndurd edition of Descartes' works 
is the cri tic!ll and complete tr101ve-volurne 
Oeuvres de ~escartes, published in 1897 - 1910 by 
Charles .Adam n.nd ?'.lul T:innery under tho authorit~r 
of the .i!1 rench 1.iinister of :i?ublic Instruction. It 
is to this edition that my quotations r.ill ccn-
sistently refer, n. Rom2n numer'.ll i11dicati113 the 
volume '.lDcl '.ln Ar2hic numeral tho I''.lf;e. Only a 
portion of j)escarte s' writings has b eon tr:insla tod 
into Enclish. The cost comprehensive ~nclish edition 
is Hg,ldane and .doss' Philosophical Lorl:s ~Descartes, 
l;<J.mhride;o, 1912, in tr:o volumes. This includes the 
Rules, Discourse, I.Iedi to.tions, Objections, l?rinci-ples, 
... 
Sc'.U'ch for '.fruth, Passions, a....'YJd Uctes ~r::linst ~.l?rogr:::.;r1rne, 
::rnd I h::.ve ±'otmd it ver~r helpful. Sucb import;:;.nt 
m~teri2l 2s the Dioptrioue, the Cocitationes £rivatae, 
the physiolo~~ic2.l treatises, ~nd, aoovc 8.11, 1Jescartes 1 
phi lo s op.hicc.l corr esp 011d enc e, is still c.. VG.i l~ble 
only in ~he orisinal 12nGuqces of French Bnd Latin. 
II. The ·1iri tinrs of .i3erke ley. Bert:elcy, 
like iJesca.rtes, ·"had no inclin::i.tion to trouole the 
v:orld ,·,ith l~r3e volumes. 111 Hence his \',TitiJJ>?S, lH:e 
those of .JJesce.rtes, c cnsist chiefly in short and 
concise trs.cts. But, ur1likc the :b1 rench philosopher, 
Berkeley did not hesitate to publish even the less 
Sifnificant portions of l1is v:ork. Consequently, 
\'!i th 'l single outstanding exception, viz., the 
Comr:1onr:l3ce Book, Berkeley left no treg,sures to be 
posthurr..ously edited. Yet Campbell :?raser, v:ho 
9 
bec81Ile .Derkeley' s Baillet and Clerselier.... more 
than a hundred Jreurs after 1.he death of the philosos-
opher, h~s brought to light interesting posth~ous 
material viliich deserves to be noticed ~fter a 
brief survey of tbe works published by Berkeley. 
1. Letter to Johnson, cluoted by 2',raser, I, ix. 
2 .. Clerselier ·was iJeE:wa.rtes' first editor, 
'.!S B'.lillet wn.s his first liiocrs..pher. 
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Berlceley' s li terc..ry !:!.Cti vi ty opened in 1707 
Yiith the rublication of two sr1ort rne.thematic'.ll tr~cts 
in Lo.tin, Ari thmeticg, A.bsg,ue Alr~ebr!l Aut 3uclide 
Dornonstr'.lt!! o.nd Eiscellwen. IIn.them9.ticn.. The sitnif-
ic!lnce of these ls in t=;hor·ing Ber~:eley's c2:rly 
att'.lchment to ~1thematics. In 1709 !lppcared the 
first of .Jerkcley' s important philosorhical r:ri tings, 
An l!;ss'.ly Tonards £He\•: Theory of Vision, in which 
the youthful philosopher introduced his imm'.lterial-
istic "new principle 11 to the st'.lc:e of philosophical 
discussion by apply inc it to '.1 specific psycholoErical 
problem. This ~as followed a yenr l'.lter by Berkeley's 
m11in pbilosophiccl \':erk, A 11ren.tise Concerninr: tj;e 
Princi-cles of Hmo.n Knowlodr;e. The ti tle-p'.l5e adds: 
11 \ . '.herein the chief causes of Brror and iJifficul ty 
in the Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, 
A t.h ei sm, and IrreliG ion, are inquired into." This 
r:or k, li Im Desc a.rt es' Medi ta ticns, ranks !lrlOllC the 
finest cln.ssics of philosophical literatv~e as 
reprc sen ting '::i thin an amazingly brief c omp!.3.SS g,11d 
yet in the most lucid style o. complete and profound 
sy ster.1 of philosophy. In 1712 s.ppeared Bcrl:oley 1 s 
.Discourse on Par=sive Obedience, , .. 'hich conto.i ns the 
30 
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most '.J.dequ!lte st!lte~ent which the 2uthor e;i:.ve of his 
moral principles. l.leo.rn-:hile the ne\·: thPcry of tl:c 
.::;ss!l.~' '.J.11d the '.i'reo.tise hD.d sufferca much frcm mis-
W1derst2ndinc. lience s.ppeared in 1713 n. popul:.r 
ex:1~osi ti on of it in Three Dio..lor-:ues betr:een Hyl::.s 
n.nd :thilonous. "The desicn of \':hich," oa.ys the 
~uthor on his title-p!lce, "is pl2inly to ae~onstrate 
the reality <md perfection of Hum!ln KnO'l.'.'lod 1-:e, the 
Incorporeal n!lture of the 3oul, !lnd Lhe Immedi~te 
Providence of n Deity, in opposition to 3ceptics 
2nd Atheists. Also to open a method for rendering 
the Jciences more easy, useful, and compendious". 
In 1721 Berkeley published a. Latin essay Do 1.:otu 
~hich ~!ls vritten ~ith a view of obt~ining a. prize 
offered iJy the ?a.ri s A.cud emy of 3ei enc es for the 
best essay on this subject, but which r;a.s a.pp9.rently 
never entered into the contest.. ~'his essay is of 
particul'.J.r value, not only because it 2ppeals 
e:cplicitly to .Descartes as n.n n.uthority, but n.lm 
been.use it shows that when Berkeley is forced to 
clothe his thought in the accepted philosophical 
terminolo~ he is much more of a. Cn.rtesi m thn.n ,. 
v:hen in his Enc;lish wri tines he "sides v:i th the 
• 
mob" 1 a.g1inst the leo.r!1ed. In tho SQme yeur ::.s 
~ 1~otu a.ppeo.red an Esscy t ov:ard s preve11tinc the 
nuin of Gre!lt i3ri tain, shov.ine Berkeley's pred cm-
in~nt interest in pr'.lcti.ca.l aff!lirs. Berkeley 1 s 
next l~roduction, his largest and, in the author's 
lifetime, his most popul!lr ~ork, was Alciphron, 
.2£. .:!12.£. !.linute Philosonber in Seven Di'llor:ues, 
"containing 3.TJ Apolocy for tb e Christian .Relic"i on 
a.g~inst those \"'ho arc. called .i!1 ree-thinkers". '.i.1bis 
was first published in 1732. It was followed the 
next year by a truct on 11he Theory of Vision Vindi-
cated 'lnd Explained, in v.'hich the :rr.etaphysical 
implications of the earlier psycholocical work are 
developed in t;reater detail. Upon sett ling d cvm 
to his bishopric at Cloyne, Berkeley returned to 
the subject of mg,themn.tics in tv;o pamphlets, ~ 
.A.ne..J..yst, £!:_!!Discourse addressed to~ Infidel 
Mathematicio.n, 1734, and A Defense of .C,ree-thinking_ 
in Llathemg,tics, 1735. But his purely practical 
interest also cume to the fore, in The ~~uerist, 
a series of penetrating questions on social and 
uc:onornic subjects, published in three parts, in 
1. I, 7. 
. !'""'""''.::.:..."'=·1 .. 
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1735, 1736, and 1737. Berkeley's fin!ll work was 
Siris: A Ch!lin of Philosophical Reflexions a.nd 
Inquiries ConcerninB the Virtues of Tar-water, 
and divers Other Subjects co. nnected to13ether a.nd 
a.rising one frcm unothe-r. This curious book, the 
work of .Berkeley's mature thinl~ing, is significant 
in shov:ing his connections v1ith the history of 
philosophy and in revealing the fact that he had 
ma.de "real progress in lrnoVJledge" 1 by dedicating 
"his age as Viell a.s youth, the later growth as well 
as first fruits, a.t the altar of Truth."2 
Of the more slender material published 
by Berkeley, short essays, letters, etc., the 
following deserve to be mentioned as having contrib-
uted to our study: fourteen Essays in~ Guardian, 
published in 1713, a. Discourse Addressed !_,£ Ma.gis-
tra tes a.nd l,Ien in Authority, published in 1736; and 
! ~ to the '1'iise, addressed to the Roman Catholic 
Clerey of Ireland, published in 1749. There a.re 
certain other writings of .Berkeley, of a. similar 
nature, which have been published posthumously. 
l.iost of these a.re included in b,ra.ser's t·;:o editions 
1. III, 299. 
2. Ibid. 
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of Berkeley, of 1871 and 1901. Of the m!lterial 
thus ma.de n.vcl b.ble, the following h!lve shed lie;ht 
on the present inquiry: Description of the Cave of 
----
Dunmore ( IV, 73 - 84), The Revel!ltion of Life and 
-- ---
Immortality, ( IV, 85 - 94 ) , Journn.l in ItaJy 
( IV, 219-318), and Qt. Infinites ( III, 408 - 412). 
Other posthumous sources include Berkeley's 
Correspondence~ Perciv~l, edited by B. R~d; 
Berl:e ley 's corres r;ond ence VJi th his Americ~n 
disciple, 3n.mue 1 Johnson, c ont!lined i.n the Lives 
of Johns on by Ch:md ler !J.nd by Bc1rd sley; tv:o L'.ltin 
letters from Berkeley to Le Clerc, published by 
Theodor.Lorenz in Archiv fUr Geschichte der Philosophie, 
17 ( 1904 ) , 160 - 170; and two La. tin le.tters from 
Berkeley to the . .Sicilian poet Campailla, published 
by J.D. Bruce in Nation, 97 ( July 10, 1913 ). 
I have reserved for specin.l mention the 
most sicnific~.mt of Herkeley' s posthur:iousJ.y edited 
writings, the Commonpls.ce Book. Fraser's l)ren.test 
contri bu ti on v.'9.S his discovery and publication of this 
philosophical diary, v:ri tten by Berkeley during the 
yoaro 1705 - 1708. It is an intim!lte private 
journ:3.l, never intended for publi~o.tion, to which 
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the youthful philosopher confided his tho urh ts o. t tl1e 
time of their inc e:oti on. This \'; ork, v1h ich reveals 
in a most direct 8.nd m1mist8.l:o.ble r:<J.y the orifins· 
of .Berkeley'c philosophy, is of· absolutely the 
first imriort!ll1.ce for the purpose of' the present 
study. It v:as the numerous references to Desc~rtcs 
a.mon6 the jottin~s of the Co;;i.monplo.ce Book tho.t 
first !:lroused my curiosity o.nd led to the research 
the fin:1l results of ~·:hich I r.m nov~· prescntint:;. I 
observed tho.t ~l~le Berkeley showed a marked inde-
pondence frcm previous thinkers and v·:as especie.lly 
c a.reful to d eto.ch himself fr an o.llegio.nce to modern 
thinkers, his e.ttitude tmvard Descartes roser:1bled 
his unique relation to Locke in be inc '.3..11 eJ-:cepti on 
to this r;enera.l procedure. I nn.s later strene;thoned 
in this opinion by finding a similar observation 
on the CoII1.E1onplace Boole by .i.d'.:llnson: "There is no 
sign of any intim'.l te kn owl edee of ancient or 
scholastic thoueht; to the doctrines of 3pinoza, 
Leibnitz, Llalebranche, Norris, the attitude is 
one of indifference or 1 ac~: of a.ppreci ati on, but 
U1e lu..Llue.nce of .Jesc!lI'tes '.lnd specially of Locke 
is evident throuehout."1 
1. R.Ad !lI:lSon, article, "Berkeley", in 
~ncyclopnedia Britannica, 11th ed., 
Vol. III, p. 779. 
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But .C'rn.ser' s version of the Co!'.'..rronpl'.lce Book 
must be supplemented by lei. ter critical v. ork upon it 
b~r Lorenz, B. b:rdr:rn.nn, Andreas Hecht, .Jl]O Raymond 
Gourg. It v::.s Lorenz r:bo first sav: the chaotic 
n'.lture of tne order of the annotations in ~raser's 
version wc1 r:J'.1de vn.lua.ble suesestions tov:ard ::i 
1 
restoration of the true order. He n.l so discovered 
some serious discropa.ncies betr:een .!!1ra.ser and 
Ber~~eley' s ori15inal manuscript. 2 One of these 
pertains directly to our study l).rn1 must here be 
noted. The entry in I, 16 ( nur.iuer 463 in Erdm:mn's 
en mneru t ion should 1.Je ch:1nced from .?ra.:::;er's "Ask 
a rn.rn, I mcn.n ~philosopher", etc .. , to Lorenz' "Ask 
a rn:::..n, I mean '.1 Cartesian". 11he r.'ork becun by Lorenz 
v:as carried out systerne.tically 1.Jy B. bi~drriB.nn, r:ho 
has civen a critical ~na comprehensive exposition 
of Berkeleys PhiloGophie im Lichte seines ~issenschaft­
lic hen ~agebuchs, 1919. Zrdrriann's study not only 
eng,bles one to see the true order of the develop-
ment of l3erkeley's thouzht by s.n accura.te enumeration 
of the entries in the CommonplD.ce Book but presents 
:J.lso !:', valu2ble interpretation. Andreas Hecht has 
1. Archiv f. Gesch.d.Phil., .13 (1900), 
541-549;-.r4ll901), ~93-318; 
17 (1903), 159-170; 18 (1905),551-556. 
2. note th~.t Ji1raser·was sixty years of Q.ge 
v:hen he first edi tea the Corru:-ionplace 
Book from obscure manuscrirts bound 
to.geth er in the v,T ont:; order. l!1raser 
v:as ninei-y when his second edition 
appeared. 
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carried this research to its completion with 
the publication in 1926 in the "Philosophische 
Bibliothek" series ( Leipzig, Felix Meiner ) of a 
scholarly German edition of the Commonplace~' 
baaed on the above-mentioned studies. An earlier 
French work, Le Journal Philosophique de Berkeley 
by R. Gourg, 1908, gives a French translation of 
the diary with an interpretation arid a correlation 
of it with Berkeley's later philosophy. 
III. Secondarl material. 
( 1 ) ?hiloeophicRl. First in the list 
of secondary sources must be mentioned the 
philosophical writers who flourished during 
the half-century between the death of Descartes 
and the beginning of Berkeley's philosophical 
activity. In so far as these writers are known 
to have been influenced by Descartes and, in turn, 
to have influenced Berkeley, they afford, next to 
the primary sources themselves, the b~st sta~dar~s 
1 
of comparison. Of the Continental philosophers 
under this category the foremost is Malebranche, 
, ' 
whose Recherche de la Verite, a work well•known 
to Berkeley and frequently consulted by him, 
1. Of the lees prominent Continental 
philosophers, Berkeley was ac~uainted with 
Le Clerc (I,87) and De Vrie~ (I,58). 
3? 
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c~rries speci'.ll import~nce4 A more remote source 
is Spino7'a, to \':r.Dm tiiore a.re eleven references in 
.3i:;rkeley, SL{ in the Cornr:1onpl2ce ~ ( I, 52 - 54), 
one in the .Di'.llo,~l.!§S I, 425 ), three in ilciphron 
( III, 178, 312, 362 - 3 ) , and one in .::liris ( III, 293 ) • 
Spin oz~, ri ho \':a.s re13o.rd ea by Berkeley ~s ~n atheist 
and free-thinker, exerted only n~e'.ltive influence. 
Leibniz, v:hose s~1stem J.E.Erdmmn tries to comiect 
with th'.lt of Derkeley, 1 was practically isnored 
by Berkeley. There are scattered references to 
him in discussions pertaining to ma.thematics and 
physics ( CoIT'.rrionpla.ce Book: I, 85; De 1.lotu: I, 503 -
507; Of Infinites: III, 511 - 12 ), but in reea.rd 
to soneral philosophical position he is styled a.n 
atheist ( Theory of Vision Vindicated, II, 383 ) • 
A more positive influence seems to have been 
I 2 
exerted by J?ascal and b1onelon, r:hose v:ri tines 
3 fou.nd a. yila.ce in Berkeley's librn.ry. But it is 
.2:nGlish rs.ther th8.11 Continental philosophers that 
r1e must consult to find the Cartesic.n influences 
mediated to Berkeley. Locke's Essay, first of all, 
1. Geschichte dor neueron Phil.II, 2, 
pp. 173 f:r:- ~ I 
2. Berkeley's hi3h estim~te of Jcnclon 
is sho\'.'Tl in 211 essey in the Guardi'.1!1, 
IV, 166-169. 
3 • .::lee belO\", p. 63. 
-., 
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must c c:nYinu'llly be '.J.t h<rnd, ro'.ldy tc) he c~.llco in 
ci ther :is 9. source of inform8.tion or as n 1:1c'.lns of 
cor:ip'.lrison. .:i . nother i;;iport~t sou.roe is Henry ~' 
especi2lly his letters to ~escartes. dtill QOre 
im1:iort'.l11t is t:he ~1hilo~rnphy of Hobbes, \'hose u11ique 
si2;nii'ica..Y1co i' or the present irn.i_Uiry vJill 2:ppoc.r 
l::i. ter. 
( 2 ) Historica 1. noxt to the r.o rks of 
philosophers, tho best socond'..U'y sou.roe of inform-
ation is constituted by historic~l studies of the 
influence of C:irtesi:inisr.1 in .Lnclancl. '.l..1his source 
is rather me2cre, for it represents as much a 
pioneer field in hif3torical research n.s the procont 
study u oos in :•hilosophical. "As yet", Y.'ri tes n. 
recent iirresti3'.J.tor, "no ono ho.s g,ttcr:-rptcd an histor-
ical stuu.:,r of .::;nt;lish C'.U'tesi'.ln.i.sm. 111 The writer 
to ·::bom I ·'.ll.l most indebted u.nder this hoo.cl is 
Bouillier, the 3.U.thor of a ceneral Eictoire £.£. lg, 
I 
Philosophie Co.rtcsienne, v1ho traces fo.ithftllly the 
vary inc fort.mies of Cartesi::mism in all 13.nds. It 
is he ,,·:ho cives the most det!liled account of the 
1. J.Iarjorie lJicolcon, "'l1he .C.:3.rly 3t!lp,e 
of Go..rtesianism in 2:.:n;rLmd" in 
~, ' . ~·.h. 1 1 26 7 1°•)Q) ~57. · ~ ~ l 0 o 1 \ v~~ ' P• v 
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r:o rt of .-1.nto i11 8 Leer and, the ~1 r'.1nci 8c '.lll monk fr oci 
.Joun.i '.llld oo.nbcr of ·c,he Catholic mission to .'.::n~lG...l1d, 
''.ho beccJ'1e the chief propn.c2ndist of Cn.rtesio..nism 
?hrou,··h Bouillicr one leo.rns to 
-u 
!lpprecin.to the e;reat ])Opulari ty of Ijalebr2nche in 
.1c.:nclJ.nd d urinG .3crke ley 's youth. It is in tore sting 
to note th:it t.here v:ere b·;o trunsl11tions of the 
.i.tec.:herche in .i.'.:ncli i3h and that I.~n.lebr:J.nche r:2s the 
favorite µhilosopher of the ~uakcrs. In John 
'.L1ulloch' s H2tion!ll 'i1heolo 1:::y '.lnd Christian Philosophy 
in .En:~l111d in the 3eventeenth Centttry there is 
valuable mn.terin.l on .Descartes' influence on the 
Cambrid cc r ln.toni sts. ·1:. Cunni1Jrrh2IJ1 in his Influence 
of .J.Joscartes .££ l.:etaphysical Specul!l.tion in 5n:~lo..nd 
h.::i.s !:.:. stimul2ti1Je; Heceli '.ll'1 approach to the history 
of philosophy in General und. contributes numerous 
interestinc: i ter:rn to the b'.lcl::ground of the present 
study but c anp::i.rati vely little to the study itself. 
Leslie 3te nhen' s Bn"':lish '.l'hou,..,.h t in the Eighteenth 
Century contains a. sv0gestive com~?!lrison of the 
t,Emcral ter..oer of the En;_;lish 8.nc1 the Continentsl 
phi loso:phic '.11 mind '}.11cl an enli :::h tening discussion 
of Jerk:elcy's relation to the rnoch'.ll1ic1l side of 
.. 
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Cartosio.nism. J. 3eth in :i.::nr:lish l'bilosophcrs 
points lil:er;ise to the motiva.tion, furnished Ly 
C::i.:rtesi'.:.11 rnoc;i1'.lIJiS!:-i, v:hich m'lde for Ler~:cley's 
idolcism. 3orley in his History of :Ln;~lish ?hilosonhv 
o.pproci ates full~1 the sicnific['...-rice of .Dcsc:?.rtes, 
v:hose influence on Enclish thou.cht be regards as 
ereater than th2t of !lllY other Continental 
philosopher up to the time of K!ll'.lt and HeGel. Others 
·r.ho h:ive furnished incident'.11 suggestions are Lyon, 
C1rrn.u, '.lnd ;{emusat, in the writint:ss listed in the 
bi bli ocraphy. 
• '.i.1he most recent wri tor in this field, gnd 
one to V!hom I ov:e more than to !3.TJY of the others, 
·with the exception of Bouillicr, is Professor 
Marjorie Nicolson of Smith Colle50. Her article 
"'.i.1he .Early Stage of Cartesimism in EngL1ndn in 
~tudies in Philolo~y 26 ( 1929 ), 356 - 374, points 
beyond Legr!ll'.ld's Institutio Philosophiae, which 
appeared in 1672, to the 1650's. The author shows 
the very first importation of Cartesianism into 
Encln.nd throueh the mediation of Sir Kenelm Digby, 
'ch: earliest translations of Descartes' works and 
their uncritic~l popul~rization, the teachine of 
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·Cartesian Philosophy at Cambridge, and 'the influence 
of Descartes on the style of English literature. 
General works in the history of philosophy 
offer very little material. J. E. Erdmann constructs 
a parallelism between Berkeley and Leibniz and 
dwells on the theological character of Berkeley's 
thought. Wlndelband stresses the subjective and 
nom1nal1stic aspects of Berkeley, calling his 
system "sensualiem of the inner sense" or "psycho-
logical nominaliam". Thia author points out the 
Augustinian emphasis on the inner life, which is 
characteristic of both Descartes and Berkeley. 
Ueberweg and ~· Fischer follow the distinction 
between rationalism and empiricism too closely to 
grasp the problem of the present study. The former, 
however, haa supplemented the meagre account of 
Berkeley in his history with a German translation 
of Berkeley's Principles, containing valuable notes 
by the translator. The latter, on the other hand, 
has given in the first volume of his Geschichte der 
neuern Philosophie one of the best expositions of 
Descartes' system. Falckenberg finds in Berkeley 
a "subjective idealist" and compares him with 
Fichte. Hoffding is at his best in his appreciation 
11 
I· 
,9 
of Berkeley's theory of vision. Vorlander finds 
that Descartes' apparent materialism is in reality 
"wissenschaftlicher Idealismus". 
( 3 ) Special studies. Of the enormous 
literature of studies in Descartes, from which I 
have drawn information, space will permit me to 
mention only the outstanding authors and the field 
of Descartes-research in which I have found each 
of them most helpful. For the titles of the works 
I must refer the reader to my bibliography. 
a.) Life: Adam, Baillet, Haldane. b.) System of 
philosophy: Hamelin, Gilson, Chevalier, Fischer. 
c.) Idealistic elements: Boutrou.x, Liard, Fouillee, 
Cochin. d.) Natural science: Jungmann, Milhaud, 
Dimier, Leroy. e.) Religion and ethics ( including 
relation to Augustine and Scholasticiem ): Gouhier 
Espinas, Blanchet, Bierendempfel, Loewe, von Hertling. 
f.) Theori of knowledge: Natorp, Belz, Smith, Owen. 
g.) Psychology: Koch, Jascalevitch. 
Turning to the secondary material on 
Berkeley, it is unnecessary here to repeat my 
acknowledgments to the investigators in the partic-
ular field ot the ~ommonplace Book. Other cr1tlcaJ. 
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st uci i es in specific :t'i eld s of .2erke ley-research 
h1ve n.ppen.red in such great numbers vithin the 
p~st three or four decades that the literature on 
Berkeley nov.r B.lmost rivals that on J)esca.rtes. 
'.i1he studies in l3eri~eley, hov~ever, unlike most of 
the above-mentioned v:orks on Descartes, are '.lS yet 
lgxgely confined v:ithin the limits of purely academic 
reseB.rch wd are ino.ccessib le to the :public at l:irge. 
Thus of the 25 r;orks 1:hich I shQ.11 list presently, 
15 a.re doctoral dissertations, nine of them in 
Germw universities~ three in A.'Ilerican universities, 
trio in ~1 rench, '.Jrid one in 9. S·.·:edish ru1i versi ty. 
iollo1·.in0 the same procedure n.s in the preceding 
para.Graph, I shall n:u'.1e only the 'luthor n.nd the 
special field to ~hich he has contributed inform1tion, 
reservinc the titles to the bi bliot;raphy '.1nd a 
discu.ssion of content, \'.here it is of outst~ding 
merit, to the appropriate connections in i.he m'lin 
body of oy study. a. ) Life: Fraser, ·Stock, :Penjon, 
Gilrrnn, l.In.hou. b.) System ~ 2: v:hole: Jouss'3.in, 
1.~otz, Johnston, Cn.ssirer. c.) Theory of kno1·:1ea i::;e: 
.:'urnc.:hutz, Tc\':er, Cl2usEien, A.ridree. a.) l.iet'.lphysics: 
:i!1r ce dm~n, 3ch a.ef er, C n.hn. e. ) Ps;ych olo CY: Loer;-y, 
Huxley, Li:ill. f.) nelir:::ion 2rnJ ethics: .A.rmstront;, 
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Hudson, .:)1)Qroert, Tischondorf, 3chr:ab. g.) Position 
in history: Clel'.1!1ci. 
IV. I.~ethod. 'ihe pl·1n of the })reseIJt study 
is first to Jisposc, in D. f3incle uho.ptor, of ·::.Jl the 
indirect ci.Hmnol s \·;hereby Cn.rtesin.n· influence 
re o.ched 3erke ley. 1'hi s chn.p ter r:i 11 be pre liDine.ry 
to g_ study for Y.hicb one searches in V!lin in any 
bibliosrs.phy either of Descartes or of 13orkeloy, 
D'1mely, the direct compo.rison of' the tr;o philosophers 
in the li~ht of ex~licit references to Descartes 
in the .,-:orks of Jerl(eley. ~'here g,re, of cou.rse, 
countless r::o.s sn.ce s v:hich c ho.llcnge at ten ti on from 
this point of vie~, for ~erkeley was continually 
de::i.lin~-: r,·i th proiJler:is bequeathed by ..i.Jescartes ::ind 
there nere thus inescap::ible affinities in thou:ht 
.:mci lc.11,;uat;e. .But after elirnirrn.tin.s ':lJJ that mic:ht 
be considered as dou.btful, I find that there a.re 
63 pass2ees in 3erkeley that h3vo 2n wimist~kable 
referon co to .iJcsco.rtes. Of ·these, 34 are in the 
Co1.'l!:ionpl'1ce ..3ook, viz., the follov.ing entries, 
enumerated accordin0 to the true order as sstn.blished 
uy Lorenz 9.!1d ~rdmo.nn: 20t 55, 235, 271, 281, 408, 
438, 463, 467, 640, 642, 643, 681, 697, 728, 731, 
- -. ' - ~- ·--· ~- t 
45 
ii 
I 
1-
• 
..,__.:___.~- .... -----~::---.,.,,,- --- _ ... ;..,,.;;.,,---=--·---=~--...,_.:_""'.,-.· ------- ---·· ·--·--·" 
773, 775, 776, 777, 780, 784, 785, 786, 787, ?88, 791, 
795, 8Cl, 808, 809, 833, 851, 866. T~onty of these 
r.10ntion by ni::me ei t11er .Jescartes or sane one of 
his •:·orks, i:.hile the others point c.!lc:J.rly to 
ch~r1cteri::::tic tea.chines of ..Jescartes. s:'ho rem:J.ining 
p1ssa..Ges ~re scattered throu:h v2rious writinfS of 
Derlrnley 'J.S f ollor:s: Hew '.i.'h0 ory of Vision, I, 128n., 
136, 138, 146, 164, 172, 207, 208; Principles, 
I, 243, 262, 265, 286, 298, 312; .0i~lo::nos, 
I, 421, 446, 485; .Jo I.lotu, 507. 511. ul~; Letter 
to Jo.i:rnson, II, 20; ~1 ree-thinY.:in;:: in 1.hthem.atics, 
III, 70, 93; 3iris, III, 2Z2, 238, 240, 251, 270; 
I.ii8cell·lJ1e~ tbthem'.ltic2, IV, 61; .Description of 
the C'.J..ve of .Junnore, IV, 82; :Lsso.y s in the Gu~,rdi~n, 
IV, 248. dixteen of these t~enty-nine refer 
spoci iic ally to .Jo sc8Xte s or Carte si !311, the others 
to mJique C'.lrtcsL:n doctrines. ~i.111e proper eva.luo.tion 
of '.111 these r cf er enc es, in the b ac l':Q'I'O u.n cl '.l:f:'f ord ed 
by the sections in ~escartes ~hich they indic~te 
:J.nd ln triG li~:h t of the 3'oncral philos ophicg,l 
prin<.:i!'lcs oi' both philosophers, ~ .. ill co11sli tute 
the o~in body of my research. After n preliminary 
ccmp'lrison of the antecedents wd :J.ims of the t\•:o 
QP c•"_.._:~ 
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thinkers, the study will proceed to a specific 
consideration of their approach and method, theory 
of knowledge, theory of reality, philosophy of 
religion, mathematics, and ethics. A fu.I.l 
exposition of Descartes• thought under these 
headings will, of course, be out of the question, 
but I shall give at the opening of each chapter 
a concise statement of Descartes• views, intro-
d ~ing details only when compelled to do so in 
the process of comparison. The study will close 
with a compact statement of its findings in the 
backgrotllld of the problems left by each of the 
philosophers to his successors. 
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CHAPTER II 
CHANNELS OF mnmECT INFLUENCE 
I. Locke. While Gail's too enthusiastic 
portrayal of the •Abhangigkeit Lockes von Desoartea" 
must be tempered down by the work of other invest-
igators, notably von Hartling and B. Erdmann, yet 
it is difficult to disprove Geil's major contention 
that the "sone men" whose opinion on innate ideas 
Locke ref utes1are the Cambridge Platonists rather 
than Descartes and his f ,ollowers. At any rate, it 
is plain that while Looke was somewhat reticent in 
affirming the connection, he was aotually very 
deeply influenced by Descartes. Where the field 
is so controversial, however, due caution must be 
exercised in drawing inferences that are not 
vouohed for by unmistakable evidence. With Locke 
it is difficult to lay hold of such evidence, for 
his position wavers or is ambiguous at important 
points. 2 In spite of these difficulties, it is 
possible, in my opinion, to affirm that through 
Locke Berkeley received as his starting-point the 
l. Essay, I, 2, 1. 
2. Compare, e. g., the meaning of "idea" 
in Essay, II, 1, 1 and II, 7, _7 or 
representative perception in II, 8,8 
and II, 23,6. 
48 
i 
l 
' i 
' 
. ! 
following Cartesian o:onceptions: ( 1 ) the 
distinction between primary an:l secondary qualities, 
the latter being conceived as of mental origin, 
( 2 ) the psychological method of constructing a 
world-view out of the immediate data of conscious-
ness, i.e., the conception that ideas are the sole 
objects of knowledge ( the "new w1zy of ideas", a 
connection pointed out already by Reid ), ( 3 ) 
metaphysical and epistemological dualism, 
exemplified on the one hand in the representative 
character of knoWledge and on the other in the 
distinction between the mind and its ideas, { 4 ) 
aaknowledgment of the difficulty of a-pprehending 
material substanoe as a metaphysical reality 
apart from the mind, ( 5 ) the conception of a 
non-material God who is the source of ideas; 
( 6 ) the concept of "reflexion", "the notice 
1 
which the mind takes of its own operations", 
based on the Cartesian "lmnen naturale", ( 7 ) the 
conception of "power" as unintelligible without 
2 
reference to spirit, ( 8 ) the fundamental 
importance of the e~istemological problem in any 
1. Ess~, II, 1, 4. 
2. Ibid., II, 21, 4. 
49 
inquiry ab'Oo.t reality. 
II. Malebranche. The connection between 
Malebranche and Berkeley is very important, for 
Malebra.nche stands to Descartes in fo.lly as 
intimate a relation as Berkeley does to Locke. 
This connection mo.at be studied in more detail 
than the one through Locke, for "the influence of 
Descartes", the theme of the present study, is, 
a.a regards Malebranche, an indisputable fact. 
Berkeley's youthfo.l philosophi~a·l works were ha.rdl.y 
off the press before his kinship ~~th Malebranche 
was noticed. Such was the opinion, at lea.st of 
V/histon and of Samuel Clarke upon their perusal 
of the gift-copies of Berkeley's Principles sent 
to them by the author. They supposed Berkeley to 
be, like John llorris, a. disciple of Ma.lebranohe. 
At such a. comparison, however, Berkeley himself 
was incensed. "As to what is said", he wrote to 
Percival, "of ranking me with Father Ma.lebranche 
and Mr. Norris, whose writings are thought to be 
too fine-spun to be of any great use to mankind, 
I have this to answer, that I think the notions 
I embrace are not in the least agreeing with 
50 
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theirs, but indeed plainly inconsistent with them 
in the main points, inasmuoh as I know few writers 
I take myself at bottom to differ more from than 
from them. Fine-spun metaphysics are what on all 
occasions I declare against, and if any one shall 
show anything of that sort in my Treatise I will 
willingly c.arrect it."1. 
That Berkeley had good reasons for this 
assertion cannot be doubted. In the Principles, 
section 148, he had discussed Malebra.nche's 
dootrine of"vision of all things in God"2- and 
found it "incomprehensible" .In the Dialogues he 
now proceeded to guard himself more expliaitl.y 
against Malebranchist interpretation. "I do not 
understand how our ideas, which are things alto-
gether passive and inert, oan be the essence, or 
any part ( or like any part ) of the essence or 
su.bstance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible, 
pu.re, active being."3 In the third edition of the 
Dialogues he finds it necessary to make a still more 
thorough denial of affiliation with Malebranche: 
" •••• some men imagine that I run into the enthu.s-
iasm of Ma.ll.ebra.nche; though in tru.th I am very 
1. I, 354-55. 
2. Cf. Recherohe, III, 2, ch. 6. 
3 • I, 426. 
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remote fr\On it. He builds on the most abstract 
genera1 ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He 
asserts an absolute external world, which I deny. 
He maintains that we are deceived by our senses, 
and know not the rea.l natures or the true f ,arms 
and figures of extended beings; of all which I 
hold the direct contrary. So that upon the whole 
there are no Principles more fundamentally 
1 opposite than his and mine." 
In view of these statements of Berkeley, 
it is absurd to speak, as Cunningham does, of the 
period in· Berkeley's life when he wrote the 
Principles and the Dialogues as the "Malebranchian" 
one, and to attribute the development of Berkeley's 
views to a "still deeper readiDg of Ma.l.ebranche'!. 2 
Even Bouillier, 3 wbo overlooks no opportunity to 
point out Cartesian influences, acknowledges three 
important differences between Malebranohe and 
Berkeley: ( 1 ) Berkeley builds on aamnon sense; 
Malebra.nche repudiates it. ( 2 ) Malebranche sees 
all things in God; for Berkeley, God produces them 
1. I, 427. 
2. Op. cit.,pp. 148-149. ,. 
3. Histoire de la Philosophie Cartesienne, 
3d ed. Ti5'ar1a: Delagrave, 1868), 
Vol. II, pp. 513 ff. 
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in us. 1 { 3 ) Malebra.ncbe retains the sense-
world only because of faith and revelation. 
2 Berkeley has a real meaning for creation, 
and holds that on Malebra.nche's principles the 
sense-world would have been c~eated in vain. 3 
Joussain, 4 in his accurate and well-documented 
discussion of this matter points out the follow-
ing additional differences: { 1 ) For Berkeley, 
the only real motion is that which is perceived 
by the senses and signifies divine activity. 
For Malebranche, real motion is not a modification 
of sense-qualities, but a modification of extension, 
a replacement within its constitutive parts, 
independent of our perception. ( 2 ) Ma.lebranche 
bas two kinds of extension: a..) sensible, equivalent 
to perception, and b.) intelligible, equivalent 
to matter. Berkeley haa no place for the latter. 
{ 3 ) For Malebranche, the union of mind with 
body is an obstacle to the union of mind with God. 
Sense-qualities are purely subjective, while the 
eternal truths seen in God a.re objective. Berkeley 
holds to a direct communication with God in sense-
1. It is because our activity thus plays 
a most important part in Berkeley's 
·thinking that he can s~: nwe move our legs 
ourselves •••• Herein I differ from 
Ma.lebrancbe." I, 24. 
2. Cf. I, 471 ff. 
3. Cf. I, 427. 
4. Op. cit., pp. 212 ff. 
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perception and regards Malebranche's whole 
intelligible system as an abstraction. ( 4 
Malebranche has difficulty in connecting by means 
of ideas things that are within the mind ani those 
that are without. For Berkeley, there are no 
things outside the mind and hence there is no suoh 
problem. 
A c!llsideration of these differences would 
seem at first sight to suggest that if the death 
of Malebranche was not actually br.ought ab .. out by 
Berkeley, as the legend would have it, s uah a. 
transaction would at least have been philosophically 
appropriate. Yet there is a legendary element also 
in the philosophical differences. They are so 
acute because they rise out of so mu.ch that is held 
in common. That Berkeley was acquainted with 
Ma.lebra.nche both early and well, and felt his 
influence strongly, does not admit of dispute. 
There are fourteen ref erenoes to Ma.lebra.nohe in the 
Commonplaoe Book alone, and others are scattered 
through Berkeley's later writings. In the 
· I I 1 
.decherche de .!!! Vari te, a w1ork in which Berkeley 
1. Esp., Liv. I, oh. 9. 
r: . - -~·· -··-" .. - .. '---- ---··-- --
was well versed, Malebra.nche antioipates Berkeley's 
theory of vision by attributing the uncertainty of 
visual perception to a false interpretation of what 
is seen and by enumerating visual signs of dLstanoe. 
The general philosophical content of the Cartesian 
legacy which Berkeley received through Malebranohe 
can here be stated most conveniently by means of 
the following terse swmnary by Metz: "der Geist 
als die einzige wirklicbe Ursaohe; keine sinnliche 
Vorstellung von einem geistigen Wesen, keine 
Erkenntnis der Seale durch Ideen; main eigenes 
Ioh und die Tatigkeit meiner Seele offenbaren 
\I 
sich mir direkt durch ein inneres Geflihl oder 
Bewusstsein; Verstand und Wille alB die beiden 
Vermogen der Seale, jener ein leidendes, dieser 
ein tatiges; Gott ala denkender und wollender 
Geist, als der unaufborlich bandelnde und den 
Menschen die Ideen zur Perze~tion mitteilende 
Geist, daher das GefUhl der fremden Verursaehung 
derjenigen Ideen, die uns ohne unser Zutun 
zustranen; Gott als der Ort ail.ler Ideen, an dem 
sie aufgehoben sind; er kennt sie wohl, d.h. er 
hat sie intellegibiliter aber er perzipiert sie 
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nioht sensibiliter; die unaufhorliche NeusobOpfung 
der sinnlichen Ideen durch Gott zmn Zweck der 
Mitteilung derselben an die endlichen Geister; die 
sch0pferische Tatigkeit des endlichen Verstandes 
bezieht sich nioht auf die Sinnesideen daduroh 
gewB.hrleiatet, dass sie Gottesideen sind."1 ' 
It is expedient to refrain from a detailed 
discussion of these significant points of agreement 
between Malebra.nche and Berkeley, not nnly because 
of spatial limitation but also because in most 
of these points a direct relation ca.n be traced 
from the thought of Berkeley to that of Descartes 
himself. Berkeley and Malebranche are at one in 
those matters wherein they kept unchanged what 
they drew from this canmon source. The chief cause 
of difference is that MeJ.ebra.nche, for all his 
religion a.nd idealism, developed the mechanical 
and mathematioal side of Descartes, while Berkeley 
developed the spiritual side. In Malebra.nche 
Descartes' "res extensa" became a virtual 
apotheosis of geometry, while Berkeley drew out 
the implications of the "res c~gitans" as active 
1. R. Metz, op. cit., pp. 134-135. 
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and willing self. Malebranche constructed fr.an 
Descartes• mathematical conception of matter a 
Platonic realm of ideas, a world of pure objective 
essences, whereas Berkeley marked an advance from 
Descartes• thinking substance toward the Kantian 
conception of the creative activity of thought. 
Volitional activity is certai~ly the predomina.nt 
note in Berkeley, while Ma.lebranche's emphasis is 
on static reas.on. Which of the two represents the 
basic teaching of Descartes? My whole dissertation 
will be the answer to this question. I wish here 
to antioipate to the degree af pointing out that 
this problem receives its crucial formulation and 
is solved on its highest plane when the question 
is raised of the application of extension to God. 
Malebranche, who sees his intellectual world in 
God is forced to answer this question in the 
atfirmative, whereas Berkeley's a.newer is 
emphatieally negative. .And herein Berkeley shows 
himself to be the true follower of Descartes, who 
gave the same answer to Henry More, the Cambridge 
Platonist. 
III. The Cambridge Platonists. Beside 
l 
l 
· l 
l 
I 
I 
Locke., there were in England daring the time af 
Berkeley two powerful antithetical streams of 
philosophy, both directly influenced by Descartes, 
toward which Berkeley was compelled to define his 
attitude. The one was the Platonism of the Cam-
bridge school represented by More. Cudworth, 
Gle.nvill, and Ge.le; the other was the materialism 
of Hobbes. Cambridge was the home of early Cartes-
iani an in England. There the teachings of Desoartes, 
proscribed at Oxf ard, received an enthusiastic 
welcome. Henry More, perhaps the greatest of the 
· Cambridge Platonists, at first fai~l.y idolized 
Descartes. In one of his letters to him he called 
1 himself "cu.ltor devotissimus", asserting that 
other philosophers were pigmies when compared 
2 
with Descartes. What attracted him most was that 
he found in Descartes an ally of rel.igion: "Neo 
carte solum lectu iucunda est haec Cartesie.na 
Philosophia, sad apprime utilis, quicquid aut 
mussitent, aut deblaterent alij, ad summum illum 
omnis Philosophiae finem, puta Religionem."3 
1. Descartes' Oeuvres, V. 246. 
2. Ibid., V, -237. 
3. Ibid., V, 249. 
I' 
ii 
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More des ired to unite Ca.rtesianism with Platonism 
as the body e.nd soul of one magnificent religious 
philosophy. But Descartes' unoompromising mechan-
ism in the material world and his refusal to allow 
extension in the world of the spirit led More to 
abandon this attempted synthesis. In his last 
important work, the Enchiridion, More derides the 
Ca.rtesi9Ils as "Nullubiata" ( the spirit is "nullubi", 
nowhere ), and even goes so far as to identify 
Descartes with atheists. But More c.ontinued to 
teach Des~a.rtes• Dioptrigue and Meteors after 
ab and .ming the Cartesian metaphysics, and the 
Physics of Rohault, a Cartesian, was regarded at 
Cambridge as the standard work on the subject 
until the appeara.nee of Newton's Principia.. Cudworth, 
like More. at first saw in Descartes a friend of 
religion, but later felt the need of a subordinate 
agency, a certain "plastic nature" between the 
material world and God. The tota.1 absence of 
final causes from the former and the resulting 
bald dualism caused the Cartesians, according to 
Cudworth, to have "an undisoerned tang of the 
. 1 
mechanic atheism hanging ab~ut them". 
1. Free Will, III, 38. 
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The Cartesian influence mediated by the 
Cambridge :Pla.tonists is to be f:.0und in Norris a.nd 
Collier rather than in Berkeley. Norris was, 
indeed, a.n avowed disciple of More a.a well a.s of 
Malebranohe, and Collier was anxious to establish 
his O·onnection with "the great a.nd excellent Mr. 
1 Norris". It is significant that the idealistic 
elements in Cartesianism were powerful enough in 
their indirect :Platonized form to give rise to 
Norris' "intelligible world" and t-0 Collier's 
theory of the non-existence of matter. In Berkeley 
similar results are reached fr,an the d ireot influ-
ence of Descartes' Meditations and in a Lockean 
f·orm. To the influence of More and Cudworth 
Berkeley was in his early period quite impervious, 
for he had res~lved to abstain from "the lofty and 
:Platonic stra.in". 2 There is but one direct 
reference to More in Berkeley. It is in the 
Commonplace Book3 and in it, significantl.y enough, 
Berkeley takes sides with Descartes against More 
in the important controversy concerning extension 
1. Clavis, p. 123. 
2. I, 83. 
3. I, 82. 
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in God. nThe learned Dr. Cudworth" does not enter 
Berkeley's system until its Platonic stage in 
Siris, where he figures prominently. 1 
IV. Hobbes. The most important connection 
between Berkeley and the Cambridge Platonists is 
their common opposition to Hobbes. The philosophy 
of this great English thinker is of unique signifi-
crn.nce for the present study. A clear understanding 
of the relations between Descartes and Hobbes on 
the one hand and Berkeley and Hobbes on the other 
is here of basic importanoe, for whatever opposition 
there was in England to Descartes was due mainly 
to an identification of his thought with that of 
Hobbes. and Berkeley's whole philosophy was one 
sustained polemic against Hobbes. To show that the 
true Descartes is fundamentally different from 
Hobbes and that Berkeley understood the true 
Descartes, is to rid the subject under investiga-
tion of a grave source of error and to prepare 
the wa:y for the establishing of the main thesis. 
Hobbes was the first English thinker of 
note to become acquainted with Descartes. This 
1. III, 242-246,292,297. 
11 
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acquaintance, at least in its literary aspeat, 
appears to have been brought about by Sir Kenelm 
Digby, the English "adventurer, alchemist, 
- 1 physician, genius, end charlatan", who was a 
member of the group surrounding Mersenne, Descartes' 
most intimate friend and adviser, in Paris. Digby 
corresponded with Hobbes, and one of his letters, 
preser'f'ed in the oommonplace book of William 
San.croft, later .Archbishop of Canterbury, reveals 
that through this channel the influence of Des-
oartes was first exerted on English philosophy. 
This letter, dated October 4, 1637, the year of 
the publication of Descartes' first work, the 
Essais Philosophigues, contains Digby's recommend-
ation of Descartes as one who had "oarryed the 
palme from all men living"2 and the interesting 
bit of news that Digby was sending Hobbes a copy 
of the newly published Essais. Hobbes had already 
in his early European travels become acquainted 
with Mersenne. When the manuscript of Descartes' 
Meditations was in Mersenn&'s hands and he was 
collecting Objections and Descartes' Replies we 
1. M. Nictolson, op. cit., p. 357. 
2. Ibid., p. 358. 
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thus have a most trustworthy and direct source of 
comparison between these two philosophers. In view 
of the peculiar importance of this comparison, I 
must be permitted to reproduce here in condensed form 
the substance of Hobbes' sixteen objections and of 
Descartes' replies to them. 
1. Objection: The method of dollht is neither 
original nccr necessary. 
Rep!y: I make no pretence of originality, 
and the method employed is a good prelimin-
ary for my own positive approach. 
2. o. To argue fran "sum cogitans" to "sum 
cogitatio" is tantamount to arguing from 
"sum ambula.ns" to "sum a.mbulatio". A 
subject is implied in every activity, but 
this is better conceived as corporeal. 
R. A substance is known only as the subject 
of activities, but the activities of 
thought must not be c:onfused with corporeal 
activities. 
3. o. Self-certainty is no basis for the cer-
tainty of other objects. 
R. Apart from my thinking of them, I cannot 
affirm the existence of objects. 
4. o. :Mind may be nothing but motion in certain 
parts of the orga.nisn, and thinking only 
a stringing tcgether of names by means of 
copulas. 
R. In reasoning we unite not names but things 
signified by names. To say mind is motion 
is as absurd as to say earth is heaven. 
5. o. We have no idea of God, becauae there is 
no image corresponding to such an idea. 
R. An idea is not dependent upon an image 
but signifies whatever is immediately 
perceived by the mind. 
6. o. How does the fear produced by the onrush 
of a lion differ from the idea of the lion 
as it rushes on us, causing us to run? Since 
this motion of running is not thought, we infer 
that the only kind of thinking there is in 
fear consists in an idea or representation of 
the thing feared. Brutes do nDt affirm or deny 
and yet they "think" in this sense. 
R. There is a difference between seeing a lion 
and seeing and fearing it. LikeWise to see a 
man running is different from affirming to 
oneself that one sees him running. 
7. o. There is no idea of "soul" but only an inference 
of a principle of animal motion. 
R. This opinion is due to an erroneous identific-
ation of idea and image. 
a. o. Sense-perception gives us an idea of the sun; 
astronomical reasoning on the size of the sun 
furnishes no idea but mere inference. 
R. What the objector says is not an idea is exactly 
what I mean by idea. 
9. o. There is no idea of substance or of degrees 
of reality. 
R. This is to disregard my meaning of idea as what 
is perceived by reason or in any other way. 
Reality admits of degrees of more or less in 
the sense that substance is greater than mode, 
and ca:nplete substance greater than incomplete. 
10. o. The attributes assigned to the name of God 
proceed neither from ourselves nor fran external 
ob Jects. Beyond the boundaries of ourselves, 
such terms as "independent" and "infinite" a.re 
negative in meaning. The idea of God has 
neither origin nor determination. We cannot 
infer from the idea of a creator that the world 
has been created by God. There are n·o innate 
ideas, for what is innate is always present, 
and a person in dee.'P dreamless slumber has no 
ideas • 
• ) R. The attributes of God do not proceed from 
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external objects but are obtained by extending 
indefinitely the ideas we form of our own mental 
action. Such a mighty power is comprised in 
the idea of God that whatever other things exist 
must be conceived to exist only as created by 
God. Innate does not mean "always present" but 
denotes the faculty, always possessed by the 
mind, of summoning ideas. 
o. Since we have no idea of God, there is no 
proof of his existence or of his w~rk of creation. 
God is inconceivable, as the Christian religion 
teaches. 
R. To say that we cannot conceive God is only 
to say that we cannot comprehend him adequately. 
12. o. Error is not a mere defect, for inanimate 
things cannot err. In order to err, there must 
be a faculty of reasoning or imagination. 
Further, it is contradictory to base error on 
freedom of the will. 
R. Although in order t~ err one must have the 
faculty of reas\O!ling, error as a lack of this 
power is nothing real. I do not assume anything 
a.bout freedan that is not a matter of universal 
experience. To will and t~ be free are the 
same thing. 
13. o. "Mental illumination" is no proof; it may lead 
one t,o hold obstinately t:0 a false opinion. 
Truth is not dependent on the will, for what 
is proved by valid argument must be accepted 
whether we will or no. 
R. Mental illumination means clearness of cogni-
tion, and although not all who claim to have 
it actually do have it, yet it is different 
from bigoted opinion, to say that we assent t.o 
truth whether we will or no, is to use the 
concept "unwilling" in an ambiguous way. 
14. o. Essence as distinguished frmi existence ia 
only a union of names by means of the w:.0rd "to 
be".·Essence is to existence as the image of 
man is to man himself. 
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R. The distinction between essence a.nd existence 
is known to all. The substitution of names 
for ideas has already been refuted. 
15. o. To say that God cannot deceive is to over-
look the fact that physicians may deceive 
their patients, and parents their children, 
with a good purpose. 
R. This is beside the point, for the question 
concerns an intentional and real deception 
on the part of God. 
16. o. If truth is dependent on God, an atheist 
cannot tell the difference between sleep-
ing and waking. 
R. An atheist may infer fr.om past experience 
of dreams that he is now awake, but he 
cannot be sure that his inference is true. 
The antithesis between idealism and 
materialism, and between theism and atheism, could 
hardly have been more sharply stated than in this 
clash of the two early champions of the two opposed 
types of thinking. Descartes feels Hobbes' thought 
to be s.o totally repulsive that he is goaded to 
forsake his customary courtesy in dealing with his 
objectors. He calls Hobbes' views frivolous and 
bigoted, and believes that he and Hobbes have so 
little in common that it is useless to carry on a 
discussion. It is beside the purpose to dwell here 
on the fact that Hobbes incorporated into his 
philosophy Cartesian views on the mechanism of the 
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physical world and the theory of motion. As regards basic 
metaphysical principles Descartes haE defined his at-
titude toward Hobbes as thorough-going and emphatic 
repudiation. In view of this fact it is not surprising 
that when Samuel Parker confused Descartes with Hobbes 
and succeeded thereby in banishing Cartesianism from 
Oxford, Antoine Legrand wrote a stirring Apologia pro 
Renato Desca.rtes contra Samuelem Pa.rkerum. But 
neither need one be surprised at the charge of atheism 
against Descartes, for this accusation was wont to be 
hurled at any formidable opponent on such slight 
grounds that it was directed against Berkeley himself 
by one of his early critics. 1 
The attitude of Berkeley toward Hobbes leaves 
no room for conjecture. The words with which Berkeley 
repudiated the greatest English metaphysicia.n who 
had preceded him are unsurpassed in vigor. Berkeley's 
a.vowed purpose was to "deprive of their grand 
support" and "drive from their fortress" the "Epicureans, 
2 
Hobbists, and the like", so that they would have 
3 
"not even the shadow of a pretence". Apart from the 
-nomina.listic tradition of Occam, which Berkeley, like 
1. Beattie, quoted by Fraser, III,403. 
2. The emphasis is mine. 
3. I,310. 
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Hobbes, had inherited but which he gradually outgrew, 
the two held practically no principles in common. 
Among the seventeen occasions when Berkeley mentions 
the name of Hobbes one searches in vain for a single 
complimentary reference, but finds instead such 
descriptions as "horrible" I, 50 ), "silly" ( I, 
52 ) , "grand mistake" ( I, 50 ) , "wild imaginations" 
( I, 425 ) • 
Now comes the crucial question: Did Berkeley 
share in the wide-spread misapprehension whereby 
Descartes was confused with Hobbes, or did Berkeley 
understsn~ the true Descartes? Fortunately, Berkeley 
was in the habit of listing on numerous occasions 
the thinkers whom he lQoked upon as supporters of 
Hobbes. In the CommonElace ~ the philosophy of 
"Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa" is regarded as a "declared 
1 
enemy of religion". In the Dialogues Berkeley speaks 
of "those wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes, and 
2 
Spinoza: in a word, the whole system of Atheism"; 
in Alciphron he names the Epicureans, Hobbes, and 
3 
Spinoza as "staunch free-thinkers"; in the ~heory 
1. I, 52. 
2. I,425. 
3. II,178. 
. ,..,,.... 
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of Vision Vindicated the -roll-call of atheists is 
- 1 
"Hobbes, Spinoza, Collins". Now the name of Descartes 
is conspicuously absent from these lists, even though 
Spinoza is named consistently and even Leibniz is 
once included. It never once occurred to Berkeley to 
associate Descartes with Hobbes and atheism. But, 
thanks to the Commonplace ~' this negative evidence can 
be corroborated by positive proof of the greatest 
importance. Berkeley's diary informs us that of a 1 1 
t h e w r i t i n g s o f H o b b e s o r o f 
D. e s c a r t e s , B e r k e i e y h a d s t u d i e d 
m o s t c a r e f u 1 l y , a n d h a d b e e n 
i n f l u e n c e d m o s t d e e p 1 y b y , 
69 
Hobbes o b j e c ~ i o n s t o D e s c a r t e s ' 
' 
M e d i t a t 1 o n s a n d D e s c a r t e s ' 
r 9 p l 1 e s t o t h e m • Of the eleven references 
to Hobbes in the Commonplace ~. eight are drawn 
from these objections. In four of them the exact source 
2 
is stated by Berkeley himself; in the other four 
3 
it can easily be established by internal evidence. 
In all eight B e r k e l e y a g r e e s w i t h 
D e s c a r t e s ' a s a g a i n s t H o b b e s • 
1. III, 293. 
2. I,49-50: numbers 785,788,787,788. In 
enumerating the entries in the Common-
place ~ here and elsewhere I follow 
&dmann. 
3. I,50: n.789,796; I,52: n.812,814. 
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It is especially significant that in three instances 
Berkeley associates Locke with Hobbes and takes sides with 
1 
Descartes against Locke. All of these references deal 
with the concepts of the self and of God. Against a 
denial on the part of Hobbes and a wavering on the pa.rt 
of Locke, Berkeley accepts emphatically Descartes' 
views on the independent reality of the thinking and 
willing subject and his conception of God as unextended. 
These topics will be fully discussed later. Here the 
evidence which has been introduced has proved con-
elusively that Berkeley knew and accepted the Descartes 
of the Objections of Hobbes, was free from the error 
of considering Descartes an atheist, and was willing 
to follow him in preference to the highest of other 
authorities. To draw from the fact that both 
Descartes and Berkeley differed from Hobbe.s the 
conclusion that Berkeley was a Cartesian would be, 
of course, to commit the fallacy of negative premises, 
and hence the task of positive demonstration ~s still 
to be accomplished. But we have already learned to 
look upon Descart~s in the light in which Berkeley 
first saw him, a.nd we have observed that Hobbes, 
their common enemy, served to clarify and to establish 
1. I,49~ n.786; I,60: n.787; I,52: n.815. 
Cf.I,82: n.300. 
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significant common interests. 
V. Molyneux. There is another indirect connection 
between Descartes and Berkeley which has hitherto been quite 
o.nobserved. This is the Cartesian influence mediated 
by William Molyneux. This gentleman is known from 
the writings both of Locke and of Berkeley, as well 
as from his own Dioptrics, as the friend of Locke 
and as the formulator of the famous optical 
"problem of Molyneux~~ It is less known that he was also 
the translator of Descartes' Meditations and an 
enthusiastic admirer of Descartes. In the "Preface 
to the Reader" of his edition of the Meditations, 
to which he appends the Objections of Hobbes, 
Molyneux describes Descartes as "illustrious", ~in-
comparab len, "excellent", "prodigious", "extraordinary", 
the "wonder of his own and succeeding ~gas", "ae-
qual'd by none", and encourages most ardently a 
study of Descartes by "all ingenious Enquirers after 
l 
tru.th and Learning". According to Molyneux, Descartes 
l. The quotation is from the unpaged preface 
of the cited work, which was published 
in 1680 (London: B.Tooke). I have 
been fortunate in being able through the 
courtesy of Widener Library, Harvard, to 
use an original copy of this na.re and 
interesting book which is, for the pre-
sent study, of inestimable value. It 
was this book, more than anything else, 
which was the vehicle of Descartes• 
influence on Berkeley. 
j' 
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has accomplished the following: "He hath •• not only 
proved but Mathematically demonatrated that God is the 
Fowitain and Original of Truth; Hie sharp Wit, like 
Hannibal's Vinegar, hath eaten t.hro the Mazing and 
overtowering hills of Errors, a Plain and Pleasant 
Way to the Divine seat of Knowledge." Not even the 
elder Huyghens 1 eulogy to Descartes, where Nature herself 
was asked to head the funeral procession, inasmuch as 
she had lost the only light whereby she could make her-
1 
self known to men, can quite rival the following tribute 
to Descartes by Molyneux: "Such is the ~'xcellence of 
these six Meditations, that I cannot resemble his 
Performance herein better than to the Six Days Work of 
the Supream .Architect; and certainly next to the 
Creation of all things out of nothing, the Restauration 
of Truth out of Errors is the most Divine Work; so 
that ( with reverence be it spoken the Incomparable 
Des-Cartes does hereby deserve as it were the name of 
a Creatour. In the first Meditation we are Presented 
72 
with a Rude and Indigested Chaos of Errours and Doubts, 
till the Divine spirit of the Noble Des-Cartes ( pardon the 
Boldness of the Expression ) moves upon the confused face 
of these waters, and thereout produces some clear and 
-. ~--1 
1. E.Boutroux, chapter, "Descartes and Cartesianism" 
in Qqmbride:e !;lf'.'dern Histor:.v. Vol.IV,p.787 
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distinct Li~ht: by which Sun-Phine he TiroceedR to 
bring for th "l.nd cheriRh other Brnnche!=J of Truth~ ti 11 n.t 
l~.st by Rix D~yr;i Labour he E1=1t".'.bliRhes this Fc.ir 
Fabrick ( as I may call it ) of the Intellectual 
73 
World on found at ions that shall never be shaken. Then 
sitting down with rest and satisfaction he looks upon this 
1 
his off-spring, a.nd :Pronounces it Good." 
It was Vl-i th such recommendation that 
Descartes came to Berkeley. For it is fairly certain 
that it was Molyneux'sDescartes, preface and all, 
published in 1680, that was in Berkeley's bands 
when be was making bis Cartesian entries into the 
Commonplace Book. That Berkeley used the English 
translation of the Meditations and not the La.tin 
original is suggested by the entire absence of La.tin 
from references to this v.ork. In this respect the 
latter references di ff er conspicuously fr 1an the 
references to Spinoza and to other authors in Latin, 
as well as from Berkeley's quotation from Descartes' 
Discourse. Nor is .there any dDubt that Molyneux' a 
translation was available at Trinity College, the 
scene of Berkeley 1 a youthful philosophizing, f.or 
the translator, himself a resident of Dublin, was 
l.Molyneux,op. cit.,loc.cit. 
i.J. __________ _ 
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closely connected with the College. In fact, the 
College became the means of a personal relationship 
between Berkeley and Molyneux. For it was to 
Trinity College that Molyneux sent his son to be 
educated, and Berkeley, Mio was at that time a 
Fellow of the College, became the tutor of this 
youth. An intimate friendship developed between 
the young teacher and his pupil, and when, after 
the death of the older Molyneux, Berkeley dedicated 
his Miscellanea Mathematica to the younger, he paid 
a fine tribute to the father of his pupil: "Tanta 
fuit patris tui, dan viveret, apud eruditos 
existimatio, ut me rem 11s pergratam facturum 
arbitrer, si filimn, sui acmninis ac solertiae 
1 
haeredem, ·ipsum reliquisse pa.lam fa.ciam". Molyneux, 
it might be added, was the founder of the Philosoph-
ical Society at Dublin, with which Berkeley was 
associated. These ctmilections between Berkeley and 
Molyneux, together with the connection between 
Molyneux and Trinity College, strengthen the im-
pressi~n derived from the Commonplace Book that 
Berkeley used the Molyneux edition of the Meditations. 
Upon a close comparison of the Commonplace ~ 
1. IV• 41 • 
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with the work of Molyneux in the light of Descartes' 
original text of the Meditations and of various 
tr9.Ilslations of it, this suggestion becomes a fact 
that admits little dispute. In entries 786 (I, 49) 
and 788 (I, 50) of the Commonplace Book Berkeley 
uses the loose 9.Ild dilatory expressions of Molyneux 
instead of the exact sense of Descartes' own words, 
and in entry 785 (I, 49) he copies two lines from 
Molyneux verbatim: "We know not a substance immediately 
by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject 
of several acts." But the conclusive proof is 
furnished by the fact that Berkeley in entry 784 
copies a glaring mistranslation of Descartes by 
Molyneux and attacks Descartes on the basis of this 
error. I discuss this latter point fully in Chapter 
VII, p. 113. 
The establishing of this relation between 
Descartes ar.rl Berkeley through Molyneux is valuable 
in two respects: ( 1 ) It explains the position of 
Hobbes as a link between Descartes and Berkeley. 
The Molyneux translation, which omitted the work of 
the other objectors, served to focus attention on 
the controversy between Descartes and Hobbes. 
( 2 ) It shows that fr.an the moment of his earliest 
acquaintance with Descartes, Berkeley was led to 
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rage.rd him as an extraordinarily great philosopher. 
Descartes entered into the thought of the youthful 
Berkeley bringing with him superlative credentials 
frmi a. man whose word carried great weight with 
Berkeley. In view of Molyneux'a eulogistic preface 
it is not surprising that Berkeley learned to s~ 
"the celebrated Des Cartee" a.nd was susceptible 
t.o influence from Descartes. 
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CH.APTER III. 
GENER.AL COJ1CPA.RISON OF DESCARTES AND BEPJCELEY 
I. Comparison~ Men and~ Writers. 
' \ , 
"C'est a un type de philosophe tout a fait oppose 
, 
au type carte sien que Berkeley appartient", 
l 
writes a recent French stude'nt of Berkeley. The 
writer does not proceed to give reasons for his 
judgment, but his opinion may well be said to 
represent the impression which anyone derives 
"prima facie" from a comparison of Descartes and 
Berkeley. The contrast appears most significantly 
in the two Latin mottoes adopted respectively by 
the tvro philosophers. Descartes' life was governed 
by "bene vixi t bene qui latui t", while Berkeley's 
motto was nnon sibi sed toti mundo". In his 
Discourse Descartes says that the practical end 
which he sought in life was "le parfait repos 
2 
d'esprit", explaining that he esteemed such a 
frame of mind above all other things. To obtain 
this end he fled from France, his native country, 
1. R. :Maheu, article, "Le Catalogue de 
la Bibliotheque a.es Berkeley", 
Rev. d. Hist. de la Phil.,3 (19290 
p.J.96:- - -
2. VI, 69. 
---------- -----··---------- ·---- ···--- - --
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and lived as a recluse in Holland for twenty years. 
When he was induced by royalty to leave his 
retreat he had occasion bitterly to regret it. 
A current biographicaJ. study of Descartes dwells 
even on a certain "oisive" quality in the 
philosopher and speaks of "cette torpeur •••• cet 
\ ~ 1 
abandon a soi-meme, oette paresse." Compare this 
with the extremely busy sociaJ. and practical career 
2 
o:f Berkeley, who, as one of his biographers claims, 
touched contemporary life at more points than any 
other man. Unlike Descartes, who wrote to his friend 
Me sland trying to dissuade him from going abroad 
to convert savages as long as there were atheists 
3 
at home, Berkeley spent four years o:f the most 
vigorous period of his manhood in a missionary 
enterprise. Descartes lies in bed until noon, 
pondering over first principles, and when forced 
to change this habit of 0 life, takes ill and dies; 
Berkeley rises between three and four in the 
morning and summons his family "to a lesson on 
the base-viol from an ItaJ.ian master he kept in 
4 
the house". Descartes corresponds with the Jesuits 
1. G. Cantecor, "L'Oisive Adolescence de 
Descartes"~ ~· d'Hist. de la Phil., 
4 ( 19 30 ) p • 9. 
2. A.J .BaJ.four, "BiographicaJ. Introduction" 
in Works of George Berkeley, edited 
by G.Sampson (London: Bell,1908) p.x 
3. IV, 345. 
4. Joseph Stock, Memoirs of George Berkeley,D.~. 
(London: Murray, 1784), p.38. 
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on the metaphysics of transubstantiation; Berkeley 
writes to Dean Gervais, "I am writing to a 
philosopher and divine; so shall turn my thoughts 
. r--
to i;>olitics." ( underscoring mine ). This contrast 
might be stated as follows: Descartes was above 
all a speculative thinker, most at home in the 
realm of pure thought, whereas to Berkeley life 
vms "deeper than logic", and philosophy was sub-
servient to practical interests. 
I have not evaded this contrast between 
the personal habits of the two thinkers, but 
have sought rather to heighten it, for only a 
very superficial observer will claim that it has 
any important bearing on the real question at 
issue. From the time that Plato and A1cibiades 
were both pupils of Socrates and yet in their 
private interests resembled neither their master 
nor each other, philosophy has made bedfellows 
of men otherwise quite different. :Moreover, the 
contrast itself would be misleading, if one failed 
to consider that behind it lies an imposing array 
of similarities. Both Descartes and Berkeley are, 
1. Ibid., p.175, 
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first of all, patent examples of unusual precocity 
of speculative genius. Unlike a slowly maturing 
Locke or Kant, each cherished secretly already 
in his early twenties a "new principle" that only 
waited for a suitable opportunity to be sprung 
on an astonished world to change the course of 
the· history of philosophy. Each considered his 
discovery to be so plainly true and in such 
harmony with the sane judgment of mankind that 
-1 
it needed only to be understood to be accepted. 
Hence both appealed from the judgment of the 
learned to the unspoiled common sense of the 
masses. As a consequence both wrote in the 
vernacular and are admired for their literary 
excellence as well as for the content of their 
thinking. The words which Balfour uses in 
comparing Berkeley with the fashionable French 
philosophers of the eighteenth century apply 
"a fortiorin to a comparison between Berkeley 
and Descartes: "The same impatience of authority 
in matters of speculation, the same passion for 
clearness and simplicity, the same dislike 
1. Compare the Preface of Descartes 1 
Principles (IX,1-20) with Berkeley's 
letter to Johnson ( I,215). 
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of what was either pedantic on the one side or 
rhetorical on the other, the same desire to clothe 
1 
his thoughts in an agrees,ble literary dress •••• " 
This similarity, in fact, is more than mere 
agreement; it reflects the influence of Descartes 
on English literary style, a matter to which 1Iiss 
·2 
Nicolson has called attention. 
To proceed ·with the comparison, it 
may be noted that both Descartes and Berkeley 
were admirers of Plato and placed him above 
3 
Aristotle in their estimation. Again, both 
received a religious education, were devout Christ-
ians, and engaged in a polemic for the Christian 
faith. Both were careful observers and were 
extremely inquisitive. Berkeley not only asks 
hundreds of questions in economics and politics 
( Querist ), but he also pries into the origin of 
4 -5 
volcroiic eruptions and the variation of winds. 
Descartes' range of interests was so wide, as cen 
be seen from the table of contents of the 
Principles, that his friends actually expected him 
1. Balfour, op. cit., loc. cit. 
2. M. Nicolson, op. cit. 
3. Compare Descartes, IX,1-20 with Siris 
and Stock, op. cit., p.38. 
4. Stock, op. cit., p.68. 
5. Ibid., p.143. 
I 
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to knovv everything. Each of the :philosophers had 
such a magnetic and influential. :personality that 
the men who knew him could speak of him only in 
superlatives. The points of agreement between 
Descartes and Berkeley, f'urthermore, tend to 
increase as the :Philosophers grow older and their 
outlook on.life becomes more serene and mellow, 
while the differences between them gradually 
vanish. The :Berkeley vrho returned from .America 
sounds strangely like the Descartes of the 
Discourse. "The care of my heal th, n he writes, 
"and the love of retirement have :prevailed over 
whatsoever ambition might have come to my share". 
He declines to be considered for the Primacy, for 
he is "not in love with feasts and crowds, and 
visits, nnd late hours, end strange faces, and a 
·3 
hurry of affairs often insignificant". It was 
these things that Descartes also, after having 
2 
had his 11Wanderjahre", sought .to escape. The 
words, fin.ally, which :Berkeley wrote a year before 
he died, when he was making :preparations to leave 
his bishoprLc and go to Oxford, express exactly 
1 0 Haldane, op. cit., p.382. 
2. Stock, op. cit., :pp. 119-120. 
3. Ibid., p.185• 
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what prompted Descartes to leave Paris and to 
settle in quiet Endegeest 'Within three miles of 
the Unive~sity of Leyden, in Holland. These 
words, which convey the true meaning of Descartes' 
"paresse", are: "The evening of life I choose to 
pass in a quiet retreat. Ambitious projects, in-
trigues, snd quarrels of statesmen, are things 
I have formerly been amused with; but they now 
l 
seem to me a vain, fugitive dream." 
II. General Similarities i£ Trend. In 
passing now from a comparison of Descartes and 
Berkeley as men to a consideration of their 
philosophy, certain obvious similarities of trend 
may first be noted. The most salient of these is 
the fact that both are idealists in two meanings 
of that term: ( 1 ) They hold that ide 8_s are the 
sole objects of knowledge. ( 2 ) They impugn the 
existence of things outside the cognitive relation-
ship. The epistemologicp,1 problem thus assumes 
primary importance for both philosophers, and it 
will be necessary to devote a considerable portion 
of our study to it • .Another common feature is the 
1. Ibid., p.185. 
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trend. of thought known in German as "Innerlichkei t" 
• I 
and in French as "l'1nneisme 11 , a term for which 
there is no exact philosophical equivalent in 
English unless it be "internality" or "inwardness". 
This quality, resulting from a recognition of the 
primacy of self-certainty in k..Ylowledge, is better 
described by the terms used above than by the term 
"subjectivism" with its loose and misleading 
connotations. When with the preservation of the 
integt~ty of the knowing self is combined. a 
recognition of the element of externality in 
regard. to the world known by the self, there 
results a dualistic strain which likewise runs 
through both philosophers. With Descartes this 
has a metaphysical counterpart in the dualism of 
mind and matter. With both, the search for the 
essence of the thinking self leads to voluntarism, 
i.e., an emphasis on the will. Still another 
obvious similarity is the importance of the concept 
of God both in epistemology and in metaphysics. 
Vfnen it is noticed further that the earliest scien-
tific interest of each philosopher was in 
mathematics, that each sought a new method that 
-· --.,.-
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would yield the same certainty as mathematics, 
and that each made the first application of his 
method in the specific psychological field of 
vision, it becomes evident that the thought of 
nescartes and that of Berkeley ran largely in 
the same channels. The main differences to be 
reckoned with enter in ( l ) the appraisal of the 
significance of mathematics in philosoIJhy as a whole, 
( 2·) the problem of mechanism and teleology, ( 3 ) 
the interpretation of the thinking subject as 
conceptual or perpetual, and ( 4 ) the interpre-
tation of the world of extension as quantitative 
or qualitative. 
III. Common Historical .Antecedents. 
Before one can study intelligently the connections 
between Cartesian and Berkeleian thought it is 
necessary to look backward for a moment and see 
the historical antecedents which constitute their 
common matrix0 The main development of European 
philosophy before Descartes may be roughly outlined 
as follows: ( l ) Greek philosophy, ( 2 ) Christian 
theism, ( 3 ) the union of these two in Scholasti-
cism, ( 4 ) the Renaissance, a disruption of this 
. 85 
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union, with emphasis upon Greek philosophy alone, 
( 5 ) the Reformation, a disruption of the union, 
with emphasis on Christian theism alone. It is 
unnecessary for us to be long detained by Greek 
philosophy or with the forms, chiefly Aristotelian, 
in which it crune to be retained in Scholasticism. 
Suffice it to say that both Descartes and Berkeley 
revolted against old authorities arid especially 
against the Aristotelianism of the Schools. Both 
had a high regard of Plato, ~.nd Berkeley in his 
older days leaned toward Plotinus as well. Descartes 
1 
on the other hand, as Gilson has shovm. conclusively, 
was less successfUl in throwing off the influence 
of Thomas Aquinas. Both felt the liberating 
influence of the Renaissance and both contributed 
to the modern scientific movement which followed 
in its wake. But both reacted in the interest of 
the Christian religion against the spirit of 
libertinism and scepticism that accompanied the 
fall of ancient authorities and the beginning of 
free scientific inquiry. The one stream of 
thought which influenced both most strongly was 
I 
1. E.Gilson, La Liberte chez Descartes 
et la TheOlogie (Paris: Alcan,1<313), 
pp. 2l5 ff., p.441, et passim. 
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Christian theism. Both were Christian :philosophers 
and both· were C.irectly interested in the new 
developments of Christian thought occasioned by 
the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. 
Berkeley was a :Protestant bi shop. Des c e.rte s was 
educated in a Jesuit college which had just been 
established to promote the Counter-Reformation, 
and Jesuit Fathers were his most intimate friends 
throughout his life. These denominational 
differences, of course, have also their significant 
aspects, but they matter very little as regards 
the present study. The attitude of Descartes towards 
:Protestants and the attitude of Berkeley towards 
Catholics was in each case such as to reflect 
credit upon a great philosopher. And conversely, 
the Catholics respected and admired Berkeley, while 
the :Protestants claimed Descartes so vigorously. 
that sixteen years after his death his works were 
placed on the Index. In a sense at once broad and 
profound, both Descartes and Berkeley were 
philosophical interpreters of the Christian 
consciousness. 
It is important to recognize that the 
87 
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most important of the similarities in the thought 
of Descartes and that of Berkeley, viz., the primacy 
of self-consciousness, the tendency to proceed from 
the self with greater assurance to God than to 
the material world, a.nd the consequent emphasis 
on inwardness and will, are firmly rooted in th 
philosophy of Christianity. Before taking up 
Augustine, the greatest of the Christian philosophers, 
whose authority is gladly accepted both by Descartes 
and Berkeley, it will be worth while to notice one 
or two significant Cartesian and Berkeleian 
anticipations even in earlier Fathers. Athanasius 
( 293 - 373 ) in defend mg Christianity 11 c.ontra 
Gentes" writes as follows: "The way of truth will 
aim at reaching the real and true God. But for 
its knowledge and accurate c.anprehension, there 
is need of none others save of ourselves. Neither, 
as God himself is above all, is the road to Him 
afar off or outside ourselves, but it is in us, 
and.it is possible to find it from ourselves, in 
the first instance, as Moses also taught, when 
he said: 'The w,ord' of faith 'is within thy heart 1 
( Dent. 30: 14). Which very thing the Saviour 
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declared and said: 'The Kingdom of God is within 
you.' (Luke 17:12 ). And let not the Greeks, 
who worship idols, make excuses, nor let anyone 
else simply deceive himself, professing to have 
no such road, and therefore finding a pretext for 
his godlessness. For we all have set foot upon 
it, and have it, even if not all are willing to 
travel by it •••• .And if any one were to ask, 
what road is this? I say that it is the soul of 
each one of us, and the intelligence which resides 
there. For by it al.one can God be contemplated and 
perceived. Unless, as they have denied God, the 
impious men will repudiate having a soul •••• It 
is necessary then, for the sake of the simple, 
to show briefly that each one of mankind has a 
soul, and that soul rational.; especially as certain 
sectaries deny this also, thinking that man is 
. 1 
nothing more than the visible form of the body." 
Here is Christianity, at a very early stage and 
drawing upon its fundamental. resources, protest-
ing against the Aristotelian distinction of 
matter and form and pointing out to sceptics, in 
1. Athanasius, "Contra Gentes", in Nicene 
and Post-Nicene Fathers, second 
series;-edited by P.Schaff and H. 
Vlace (New York: Christian Lit. Co., 
1892), Volo IV, Po20.' 
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almost the same language that a:ppears on the 
title-page of Descartes' Meditations and o~ 
Berkeley's Dialogu.es, and on the same genereJ. 
lines of reasoning, a sure vray to truth by means 
of a demonstration of God and the soul. Athanasius 
goes on to distinguish sharply the human soul from 
the life of the brutes and to argue for the 
immortality of the soul on the ground that it is 
completely distinct from the body. Gregory of 
Nyssa ( 332 - 398 ) in a similar passage speaks 
of the soul as "immortal and s:piri tuaJ. being", 
"an essence created, and living and intellectual", 
and indicates his theory of Jr..nowledge as follows: 
"When we look to our inner world, we find no slight 
grounds there •••• in the known, for conjecturing 
the unknown; and the unknown there •••• is that 
which, being the object of thought and not of 
1 
sight, eludes the grasp of sense." 
But it is to Augustine, above aJ.l, that 
one must attribute that stream of thought which 
, 
stresses the inner life and which runs through 
the Middle Ages into the modern period parallel. 
1.. Gregory of Nyssa, "On the Soul. .and 
the Resurrection" in Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers, Vol. V, p. 433. ~ 
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with en opposed Aristotelian line of thought. 
Descartes end Berkeley both stand squarely in the 
Augustinian tradition. I use the indeterminate 
word "tradition" advisedly, for the relat;i.on 
of Descartes and of Berkeley to Augl1stine is one 
of long historical heritage rather than of 
direct influence. Berkeley quoted Augustine 
only to support views which he had already devel-
· 1 
oped on other grounds. The connection between 
Descartes and Augustine is a moot question. The 
similarity between Augustine's "Si fallor, sum."2 
and Descartes' "Cogi to ergo suni" is so 
striking that one is tempted to regard theone 
as only a recension of the other. Yet neither 
Espinas nor Blanchet who have studied the 
problem most carefUlly have discovered any facts 
that would establish a direct dependence. 
Descartes seems to have worked out his "Cogito" 
quite independently, and when Arnauld and Mersenne 
later pointed out to him his Augustinian connection, 
he was pleasantly surprised: "J'ai tres gre.nde 
, 
satisfaction de· ce que mes pensees s'accordent 
l~ II, 203; III, 240,279. 
2. De Civ. Dei, XI, 26. 
-- -
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avec celles d 1un si sainct et si excellent 1 . 
:r;>ersonnage". Descartes did not wish, any more 
than Berkeley, to be considered as a 11 setter-u:r;> 
of new notions"; he was concerned with a self-
evident truth discoverable by any one who cares 
to reason: 11 C1 est une chose qui de soy est si 
\ I 
simple et si naturelle a inferer, qu 1 on est, de 
ce qu 1 on doute, qu'elle aura.it pu tomber sous la 
2 
plume de qui que ce soi t 11 • Hence De.scartes 
''las not a.mazed that it hs.d been n sous la plume" 
of Augustine. 
Beside "Si fallor, sumn, other Cartesian 
anticipations in Augustine-may be listed and 
topically arranged as follows. Some of these 
passages I have gathered from the Objections of 
A.rnauld, the Augustinian scholar whom Descartes 
esteemed more highly than any other of his critics; 
others I have found in my own study of Augustine; 
still others have been pointed out by Blanchet, 
Gouhier, Gilson, Loewe, and Smith. ( 1 ) The 
"Cogi to" ( primacy of self-certainty, and error 
as the basis of truth ): De Trinit. IX, 3,5; IX, 
1. IV, 113. 
2 0 III, 248. 
-.. 
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7,10; IX, 8,11: XV, 21. De libr. arbit. II,3. 
De quant. anim. XIV. De anim, et ejus orig.IV, 
6-7. Solil.I,2. ( 2 ) Self-knowledge as basis 
for the knoi:1ledge of God: Conf. X; De Trini t.X,10. 
( 3 ) Untrustworthiness of the senses: Solil. I,4. 
De quant. anim. XIV - XV. ( 4 ) Importance of the 
will in knowledge: De ~· rel.33,61. De Trinit. 
XI, 10,17. De util.cred. XV. ( 5 ) Reason and 
authority as parallel sources of knowledge: De Civ. 
Dei X,18. ~ ~· rel.51,100. Cont.VII, 20. De 
. . . 
Ordine II, 19,51. De ~· eccl. I, 17,31. 
The fifth group of texts is included 
here because, as a matter of fact, Descartes, 
like Augustine, acknowledged .and abided by the 
principle of scriptural and ecclesiastic~i authority. 
What prompted him to do so is not of concern at 
present. There is a real difference, however, in 
the attitude of Augustine end of Descartes ~oward 
revel a ti on. Augustine considered anything as· p_roved 
if he could quote the Bible in support of it. Descartes, 
while gladly ~sing the Bible to corroborate his · 
]. 
views, asserts that revelation is not to be used 
1. IX, 230 ff.; IV, 698; III, 296; V, 169. 
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as philosophical proof snd hence never draws 
upon the Bible for proof-texts. Yet Descartes 
·2 
strongly condemns the theory of ndouble truthn 0 
He believes that reason snd revelation csn be 
harmonized snd tries to show that such a harmony 
actually exists, e.g., be tween his physics snd 
·3 
Genesis. When hard pressed on these problems he 
4 
either puts faith before reason or claims that 
5 
his knowleu..ge of theology is limited. His own 
practical attitude, as he confidently stated it 
to his friend Mersenne, was: "croysnt tres ferme-
I 
ment l'infaillibilite de 1' Eglise, & ne doutsnt 
point aussi de mes raisons, ie ne puis craindre 
6 
qu' une verite' soit contraire ~: 1 1 autre". 
Berkeley's attitude on this matter is curiously 
similar to that of Descartes. Berkeley also refuses 
to draw proof-texts from the Bible and yet seeks 
·7 
to harmonize his philosophy with Genesis. .And 
when in a quandary, Berkeley's way out is the same 
as that of Descartes: nI speak of matters of 
l~ II, 347-348; V, 54; 178; IX, 197. 
2~ III, 258-259; VIII, 353 •. 
3. III, 296; IV, 698; V, 169. 
4~ II, 347-348. 
5~ IX, 230. 
6. III, 259. 
7 0 I, 471-478; II, 293-294. 
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Reason and Philosophy, not Revelation. In this 
I think an humble, implicit faith becomes us 
( when we cennot comprehend. or understand the 
proposition ), such as a popish peasant gives to 
1 
propositions he hears at mass in Latin." This 
attitude, thus bn.ldly stated in the Commonplace 
Book is characteristic of the defense of religion 
2 
in Alciphron. 
In concluding this historical retrospect 
it may be said then, that ·when Descartes, in the 
midst of a sea of doubt, finds in the self a rock 
of safety, or when Berkeley, to use the expression 
of Royce, makes a "rediscovery of the inner life", 
they are both following in the Christian tradition. 
of Athanasius and Augustine. The conception of 
the soul as purely spiritual, and. not a "form of 
the bod.y", comes likevd se from this source, and 
with it comes the close kinship between the 
demonstration of the soul and the demonstration 
of God. Berkeley, the bishop, is indeed truer to 
the tradition in developing the soul as "perceiving, 
3 
active being", a living thing rich in qualities, 
1. I,42. 
2. II, 311 et passim. 
3. I, 258. 
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whereas Descartes, the mathematician, stresses the 
aspect of :pure abstract thought. Yet the position 
of Descartes as a Christian philosopher must not 
be underestimated. The true estimate was given 
by an acute German scholar decades before the 
1 
recent Cartesian "hagiography" was begun by the 
French Nee-Scholastics. J.R.Loewe wrote in 1854 
• 
on the Chris ti an element in Descartes: "Denn 
.. 
erstlich ·ware immerhin verdienstlich genug, dass 
er eine Fackel, die mehr als ein Jahrtausend 
hindurch ±:Ur die Philosophie so gut wie erloschen 
war, wieder angeziindet und den im Dunkeln 
Irrenden vorgetragen hat. Zwei tens war er jedenfaJ.ls 
der Erste der sie an die einzig rechte Stelle die 
ihr eingeraumt werden muss, wenn sie ihre volle 
Wirkung thun soll, n~lich an die Spi tze eine s 
Systemes setzte. Da endlich diese historischen 
Pracedentien das von Descartes gewatlte Fundament 
aJ.s ein in der Lehre des Christenthums wurzelndes 
darthun, so kann, mindestens·mit RU.cksicht auf 
diesen Pu.net, der christliche Charakter seines 
speculativen Systemes nicht in Abrede gestellt werden". 
1. This is the term which critics, e.g., 
Cantecor, have applied to the 
Cartesian writings of Es:pinas, 
Gilson, .Gouhier, et al. / 
2. Article, nJJas speculative System Rene 
Descartes, seine Vorzuge· und Mangel," 
Sitzungsberichte, Kaiserliche Akademie 
der Wi ssenschaften, Vienna, 1854. 
Band nv, :p. 2'75. 
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IV. General Attitude of Berkelel toward 
Desccrtes. Before coming to grips with the 
particular phases of the subject, there remains a 
consideration of a general nature, namely, a 
statement of the evidence of Berkeley's ovm attitude 
. l 
toward De.scartes. Now Des~artes, as Fraser asserts, 
"was a familiar classic in Dublin" at the time 
when BerJceley vms a student there. Berkeley's 
acquaintance with Descartes has alreacly been 
discussed on the basis of the evidence afforded 
by the Common:place Book. We have seen there that 
Berkeley was familiar with the :Meditations , the 
Objections of Eobbes, and with the Discourse on 
Method. The Description Ef the Cave of Dunmore, a 
very early writing found appended to the Commonplace 
Book, shows :f'urther that Berkeley was already in 
his student days sufficiently acquainted also with 
Descartes' Principles to be able to quote from its 
2 
Part IV on the origin of mountains. In addition 
to these works, later references reveal an 
3 
acquaintance with the Dioptrique and with the 
4 
Passions of the ~· One mf!.,Y thus conclude, on. 
l. A.C.Fraser, Berkeley (Edinburgh: 
Blackwood,1881) p.'7. 
2. IV, 82. . 
3. I, 20'7-208. 
4. Cpmpare I, 421-422 with Passions , 
sections 30-34. 
" 
- " 
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the strength of internal. evidence that Berkeley 
was fairly well versed in the main works of 
Descartes. But owing to a recent fortunate 
discovery by a French scholar in Berkeley-research, 
R.Maheu, this evidence is corroborated by some new 
information. In 1928 Maheu found in the British 
Museum a document which Fraser had sought in vain, 
namely, a catalogue of the books in Berkeley1 s 
library. Maheu published this discovery in the 
Revue d 1 histoire de la Philosophie 3 ( 1929 ), 
180 - 199. The catalogue, which represents 2,300 
volumes, i.e., Berkeley1 s entire library at the 
time of his death, and tells us the dates when 
Berkeley acq_uirecl the books, supplements admirably 
previous information concerning Berkeley's interest 
in other authors. In regard to the later period of 
the philosopher's literary activity it plays a role 
somewhat comparable to that of the Commonplace Book 
in the early period, for it reveals the literary 
sources which he drew upon at a time when he he.d 
apparently no access to books outside his own 
library. 
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The catalogue reveals strikingly the 
comprehensive range of Berkeley's interests and 
the independent character of his philosophical 
thought. While Berkeley had 600 works in modern 
languages, travel, history and politics, end 28 
in mathematics, astronomy, and physics, he had 
36 works in ancient philosophy and only 26 in 
modern philosophy. The rest are chiefly in religion 
and the classics. Now it is significant that while 
only one sixtieth of Berkeley's books were 
properly philosophical, he possessed Descartes' 
full Opera Philosophica and, in a separate volume, 
• 
the tract De Romine. This fact assumes particular 
importance when one notes that the only other 
modern philosophers whose Opera were in Berkeley1 s 
library were Boyle and Bacon. Berkeley posse sseo., 
in addition, Newton's Principles and O;pticks, 
Pascal's Pens~es, Norris' Jvli3cellanies, and Rener1' s 
Tabulae Motuum Coelestium. Of these authors, 
, 
Norris and Reneri were acknowledged Cartesians, 
and Pascal, too, was strongly influenced by Descartes. 
Berkeley's library also contained many of the works 
I 
of Fenelon, a writer who combined Cartesian principles 
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with a deep religious mysticism, end !or whom 
·1 
Berkeley expressed high esteem. Three books by 
Cambridge Platonists complete the list of works 
which Berkeley regarded as worth keeping in his 
library. The absence of Malebranche end Locke 
would cause some surprise were it not known 
2 
from another list that Berkeley made a present 
of their works to Yale College. To give away 
these authors while keeping Descartes, is 
suggestive. Of Hobbes, Spinoza, or Leibniz there 
is no trace. Berkeley seems to have been content 
with the knowledge he obtained of these 11 atheists" 
at the library of Trinity College in his earlier 
days. 
This survey of Berkeley's library leads 
to the conclusion that when Molyneux recommended 
Descartes to nai1 ingenious Enquirers after 
truth and Learning" end encouraged them to "a 
diligent Perusal of the Works written by this 
3 
Excellent Authorn, his words were well received 
by Berkeley. Thus Maheu, who considers Berkeley 
as representing a type of philosopher altogether 
1. : IV, 166-169. 
2. D.G.Gilman, 11Bishop Berkeley's Gifts 
to Yale Collegen 1n Papers of the 
New Haven Colony Historical Societl 
(New Haven: Stafford, 1869) Vol. I, 
pp. 162-165. 
3. Op. cit., loo. cit. Vide supra,pp. 45-48. 
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different from the Cartesian type, infers from the 
nature of Berkeley's interests as reflected in 
/ 
the library: "l' auteur de la Siri s et du Trai te 
des principe s de la connai ssance humaine ai t 
t . / ' ermine avec Marcile Ficin sa carriere philo sophique, 
I ' ' si l'origine est rapportee a Bacon et non a 
1 
Descartes". 
It is clear, then, that Berkeley possessed 
the philosophical works of Descartes, that he was 
well acquainted with them and quoted from them, 
and that he valued them highly. Berkeley, who was 
not given to praising other philosophers, refers 
2 
to Descartes as "the celebrated.Des Cartes". 
But let us note more specifically the tone of his 
references to Descartes and the Ca.r'tesi:ans. The 
following passage is most illuminating: "Locke is 
in ye right in those things wherein he differs 
from ye Cartesians, and they cannot but allow of 
his opinions, if they stick to their own principles •••• " 
This statement is significant in two respects: ( 1 ) 
It shows that Berkeley acknowledged an affiliation 
with Locke as over against the current Cartesianism. 
1. R.Maheu, op. cit., :p.196. 
2. I, 207. 
3. I, 51. 
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( 2 ) It shows that Berkeley drew a distinction 
between the current Cartesie.nism and the original 
principles of Descartes. His references to the 
Cartesians are a.I.most entirely in the spirit of 
adverse criticism, whereas he does not hesitate 
to appeal to Descartes as an authority for his own 
views. In his polemic against Hobbes Berkeley 
reverses the procedure of the above quotation and 
takes sides with Descartes against Locke. When in 
the Commonplace Book Berkeley speak:S of Descartes 
as "owning" the truth of this or that proposition, 
it is plainly an appeal of a youthful thinker to 
corroboration by an established authority. E.g., 
"Dea Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately 
by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject 
of several acts", 1 and a.gain, "Des Ca.rtes, in answer 
to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct from 
2 
thought as a thing from its mod us or manner." The 
most significant instance of such an appeal to 
Descartes occurs in section 30 of ~ Motu where 
Berkeley lists Descartes with Anaxagoras and 
Aristotle as an authority for the unlikeness of 
1. I, 49. 
2. I, 50. 
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mind and matter. Berkeley adds that other modern 
philosophers have served only to obscure this 
distinction which Descartes had rendered a "rem 
1 
sati s claram". In the same passage Berkeley 
adopts the exact Cartesian terms o:f "res cogi tans" 
and "res extensa" to de sign ate spirit and ideas • 
. 
Since the distinction between active spirit and passive 
inert ideas is :flindamentaJ. in the system o:f Berkeley 
it c~ be seen readily that the conscious 
alignment here of his position with that of Descartes 
is of greatGst importance. The extent of Berkeley's 
knowledge of Descartes and the profoundness of his 
respect for Descartes' opinions on most varied 
subjects appears when one notes that he appeals to 
Descartes not only in such strictly philosophical 
matters as those mentioned above but also in 
2 3 4 5 
psychology, mathematics, physics, and geology. 
But if Berkeley was deeply influenced 
by Descartes, he nevertheless nowhere accepted 
uncritically the views of his predecessor. With 
characteristic enthusiasm and self-confidence he 
1. I,511 .. 
2. I, 128,146,164,172, 207-208. 
3. III, 70; IV, 61. 
4. III, 238,240. 
5. IV, 82. 
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declares in the Commonplace Book that his definition 
of God is much clearer than that of Descartes, and 
characterizes Descartes' demonstration of God as 
"absurd" •1 He also takes pains to indicate minor 
2 inconsistencies in Descartes' discussions. Moreover, 
having already formulated his new "principle", 
Berkeley resolves "effectually to confute what Des 
Cartes sa.ith11 , 3 This antagonistic determination is 
evident in Berkeley's attack on the Cartesian 
theory of vision, on the distrust of the senses in 
knowledge, and on the ontological proof for the 
existence of God. That Berkeley carried his attack 
to the point of unfairness is clearly pointed out 
by Johnston4 and by Metz. 5 Taking advantage of the 
a.mbigui ty in the English word rridea" as signifying 
either perception or conception, Berkeley attacks 
on perceptual grounds Descartes' ontological argument, 6 
al though he knows we 11 enough what he means by "idea.". 7 
Such procedure as this on the part of Berkeley of the 
Commonplace Book is reminiscent of certain portions 
1. I, 48. 
2. I, 48, p.776. 
3. Op. cit., p. 7;0. 
4 .. I, 49. 
5. Op. ci. t., P• 129. 
6. I, 48. 
7. I, 52. 
8. E.g., Met a:E!!l sics, 987b. 
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of Aristotle's criticism of Plato, 1 and suggests 
that the pupil goes out of his way to establish 
his independence of his master. In such cases, 
as Geil ob serves, th ere is more psycho logica. l 
''Nichtsgemeinhabenwollen" than actu?.l philosophical 
difference: "Die Philosopben stellen sich gelegent-
lich in ihren Sy stemen einand er gegenu'.ber und wollen 
bei ihrer Polemik in ihren Systemen nichts mit 
einander eemein haben, gehen dann in ihrern polernischen 
:!£if er oo wei t, dass sie, ohne es zu wissen oder 
zuzugeben, einen Philosophcn oder ein System als 
gegnerisch bekampfen, mit dem sie in sehr v:ichtigen, 
105 
ja. vielleicht den grundlegenden l?unkten ubereinstimmen. n2 
Vie are now prepared to study this 
" 
"Ubereinstimmung" as regards Descartes gnd Berkeley, 
"in den grundlegenden Punkten". 
1. E.g., Metaphysics, 987b. 
2. G.Geil, 11 Uber die .J.bh~ngiekeit Locke's 
von DescarteS"TStrassbuxg: Heitz, 
1887)' p. 7. 
CHAPTER IV. 
APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY 
Descartes and Berkeley are at one in the 
importance which they attach to a methodological 
inquiry that must precede the construction of any 
philosophy. Neither wants to be considered as a 
great and original philosopher, but both claim to 
have found the way to truth. And both think that 
this way is so simple and clear that any ordinary 
man, without requiring much education, can by fol-
lowing it soon surpass in knowledge the professional 
philosophers who employ the wrong approach. "Un 
honnes te homme,n 
/ 
says Descartes, 11 n 1 est pas oblige 
d 1 avo1r veu tous les livres, ni d 1 avoir appris 
soigneusement tout ce qui s'enseigne dans les 
escholes; & mesrne ce seroit une espece de deffaut 
I 
en son education, s 111 avoit trop employe de temps 
1 
en 1 1exercice des lettres." But a man does need to 
have his search after truth aimed in the right 
direction: nee que je tascheray de vous faire voir 
icy par une suitte de raisons si claires & si 
communes, que chacun jugera que ce n 1estoit que faute 
/ 
de jetter plus tost les yeux du bon coste, & d 1arrester 
I I 
l.Recherche de la Verite, X, 495. 
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sa pensee sur les mesmes considerations que j'ay fait, 
s'il ne remarquoit pas les mesmes choses; ~ que je ne 
I 
merite point plus de gloire de lea avoir trouvees, 
que feroit un passant d 1avoir rencontr~ par bonheur 
' a ses pieds quelque riche tresor, que la diligence 
I 
de plusieurs auroit inutilement cherche long temps 
1 
auparav:;nt. 11 Berkeley introduces his philosophy in 
precisely the same fashion. As opposed to the 
philosophers who "have first raised a dust, and then 
2 
complain they cannot see", Berkeley calls a tten ti on to 
truths that 11 are so near and obvious to the mind that 
3 
a man need only open his eyes to see them". By point-
ing out these self-evident truths Berkeley, like 
Descartes, proposes to "abridge the labour of study, 
and make human sciences more clear, compendious, and 
4 
attainable than they were before". It is true that 
the emphasis on method, and the utilitarian 
considerations connected with it, were common in the 
age of Berkeley, being quite as conspicuous in 
Spinoza's De Emend.a tione and in the "Epistle to the 
Reader" and the "In trduc tion" of Locke's Essay as 
in Berkeley. But it must be remembered that these 
1. Ibid.,X,497. 
2. Principles, I,238. 
3. !,260. 
4. I,354. 
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writers, as well as Berkeley, here reflect the in-
fluence of Descartes' Discourse on Method. And if 
• it be argued that the methodological emphasis in 
Berkeley may be due to Bacon rather than to ·Descartes, 
it is necessary to call to mind that Berkeley refers 
to Bacon only once and in an insignificant piece of 
1 
writing, while in the Commonplace Book he quotes 
directly from the Discourse on Method. 
There is a striking similarity be~Neen these 
two works of Descartes and of Berkeley. 'lhe Discourse, 
like the Commonplace Book, is a mental autobiography 
which long lay hidden among the private papers of 
the author and was originally not intended for pub-
lication. The former, it is true, was published dur-
ing the life-time of the author, thanks to the impor-
tunings of his friends, and hence appeared in a more 
elegant literary drss than the latter, which did not 
see print until a hundred years had elapsed after 
the death of its author. Were it not for Berulle 
and Mersenne, however, the substance of the Discourse 
might have been preserved only in such rough notes as 
the Cogitationes Privatae, kindred material which 
resembles the Commonplace ~ even in form. 1his 
youthful philosophizing by Descartes, like the entries 
1. In "De Ludo Algebraico11 , Miscellanea 
Mathematic a, IV, 61. There Bacon and 
Descartes both are cited as authorities 
recommending the study of mathematics. 
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in Berkeley's diary, shows the workings of a keen 
and impetuous mind that is determined to throw off 
all previous authorities and to develop an independent 
approach to reality. When Dascartes says that with 
the logic of the Schools it is as difficult to separate 
the true from the false as it is to extract Diana or 
Minerva from a rough block of marble, resolves never 
to accept anything for true which he does not clearly 
know to be such, and claims that no one is fit to 
philosophize unless he has once in his life made a 
thorough intellectual house-cleaning, he is setting 
the precedent for Berkeley's attitude: 11 ! do not pin 
my faith on the sleeve of any great man. I act not 
1 
out of prejudice or prepossession. 11 And Descartes' 
metaphor of the towering palaces of previous philosophy 
built on sand and mud, and of his own simple structure 
reared on the strong and solid foundations of math-
ematics, is exquisitely matched by this figure from 
Berkeley: "If a simple clumsy man knows where the 
109 
game lies, he though a fool shall catch it sooner 
2 
than the most fleet & dexterous that seek it elsewhere. tt 
'lllis attitude toward philosophers who preceded them 
led both Descartes and Berkeley consciously to avoid 
1. I, 14 •. 
2. I, 21. 
l 
quotations, and although Descartes in writing his 
Meditations, had the Summa of St. 'Ihomas Aquinas at 
his side, and although the philosophy of Berkeley 
would have been impossible without Locke and Descartes, 
yet the philosophers themselves are loth to make these 
connections explicit. The acknowledgements come in 
an indirect and general way, as when Descartes in the 
closing paragraphs of the Discourse says that he does 
not boast of being the first to present the principles 
he has discussed but only of having adopted them on 
the strength of reason and not of authority, or when 
Berkeley does not "pretend to be a setter-up of new 
2 
notions". Such begrudging of tribute to one's 
philosophical forbears may be partly condoned by not-
ing tha~ in each case there is not only a youthful 
impetuosity but a real element of originality and a 
sincere desire to "remove the mist and veil of words" 
occasioned by faulty formulations in the past. At 
any rate, this attitude toward authority. must lead 
one to attach more than ordinary importance to 
every direct appeal Berkeley makes to Descartes. 
3 
Spurning the support of other philosophers, 
both Descartes and Berkeley seek a single and absolute 
explanatory principle from which to develop a system 
1. Descartes reveals this in a letter to 
Mersenne, II,260. 
2. I,484. 
3. Berkeley, I,33. 
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of philosophy. Both feel, to use the phrase of a 
1 
recent writer, 11 the lure of metaphysical simplici ty11 , 
i.e., they endee.vor to encompass in a single act of 
mental apprehension the basic factors of all reality. 
Philosophy becomes from this point of view, as Dewey 
mainta~ns in his Quest for Certainty, a "search for the 
immutable", an effort to lay hold of the definite 
unchanging structure of being. Berkeley finds this 
11 ease" in 11 percipere" and 11 percipi11 , while the 
significance of Descartes' "cogito" is that it leads 
to "sum", i.e., to "ease" in the first person. There 
is more than mere facetiousness in Huet's reduction 
of the 11 cogi to" to 11 Si sum, sum; sum au tern; ergo sum." 
Now Berkeley makes his contact with reality in sense-
perception with all its varied:qualities, whereas 
Descartes' 11 cogito11 is at i:ts best in the realm of 
2 
mathematics, in which sense is stripped of its qualities 
and reduced to pure quantity. But the very precedent 
of constructing a system of philosophy by means of 
a simple formula, a procedure in which Descartes was 
followed by other great metaphysicians such as Spirioza, 
Leibniz, and Hegel, but which is vehemently condemned 
by philosophers of the type of Dewey, must have had 
1. 'Ihis is the title of an article by W.F. 
Cooley in Studies in the History of 
Idees (New York:Columbia University Press, 
~"5},pp.161-182. 
2. Quoted by D.Cochin, Descartes (Paris:Alcan, 
1913) ,p.111. 
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its effect on Berkeley. It is hardly by mere chance 
that "Cogito ergo sum" of the seventeenth century was 
followed by "esse is percipi" in the eighteen th. 
To whatever estimate our further study may 
lead concerning these two formulae, it would be a 
grave error from a methodological point of view to 
regard them as mere catch-words or even as starting-
points that may be abandoned, once philosophy is on 
its way. They are the concentrated expressions c£ 
philosophical method, and for Descartes and Berkeley, 
no less than for Kant, in mapping out the procedure 
and limits of knowledge and showing the inner workings 
of the mind, method is a revelation of reality itself. 
Hence the discovery of true method was accompanied 
in each case by an inner crisis comparable and closely 
akin to religious conversion. 
The account of Descartes' e~perience has 
been preserved not only in the rationalized description 
given in the Di~~ ( sections II and III ) but 
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more vividly in the sketch entitled Olympica in his 
posthumously edited diary. It was on November 10, 1619 , 
when Descartes, then twenty-three years of age, was 
alone in his stove-heated room in Neuburg, Germany, where 
the wars had carried him, that the Olympic peaks of 
truth glowed before him and he was filled with ecstatic 
joy. Descartes' description of this experience, 
according to Baillet 1 s transcript; is: 11 cum plenus 
forem enthousiasmo, & mirabilis scientiae fundamenta 
1 
reperirem. 11 Both Baillet and Leibniz agree tha:t 
Descartes also wrote: 11 intelligere coepi fundamentum 
2 
inven ti mirabilis. 11 Three dreams followed. In the 
first Descartes felt as if, crippled and lame, he 
were driven by a storm to seek shelter in a church. 
In the second he heard thunder and saw sparks around 
him. In the third he opened at random a poem by 
Ausonius and his eyes rested on the words, 11 Quod vitae 
sec tabor i ter?" 'lliis experience, which Descartes 
regarded as a visit from the Spirit of Truth, made a 
deep impression µpon him. He was now rid of the 
doubts that had troubled him, and, like a good 
Catholic, he vowed a pilgrimage to our Lady of Loretto. 
The dreams he interpreted in a philosophical way: 
113 
"Sensibilia apta concipiendis Olympicis: ventus spiritum 
significat, motus cum tempore vi tam, lumen cognitionem, 
3 
calor amorem, ac ti vi tas ins tan tanea ere a tionem. 11 
The most significant points in Descartes' 
interpretations may be briefly summarized as follows: 
1. X,179. 
2. Ibid. and X,216. 
3 • x,21s. 
__ , ___ """'I 
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( 1 ) All ~nowledge is one. On this point Hamelin 
\ 
makes the important comment: "A ce moment il a une 
id~e de 1 1unite de savoir, qu' il a peut-;tre laiss~e 
I 
s'attenuer plus tard, et qui pourant fait seule bfen 
comprendre ce qu' 11 y a de plus propre et de plus 
I I 1 
carac teris tique dans sa me thode. 11 ( 2 ) All knowledge 
is derived from one source, and this source is of 
an active and moral nature. "Una est in rebus activa 
2 
vis, amor, charitas, harmonie. 11 ( 3 ) Sense-knowledge 
consists in symbols whereby we communicate with ·t~ 
unseen source of all knowledge. Gouhier, commenting 
on the above-mentioned statement of Descartes, 
11 Sensibilia apta concipiendis, etc.," points out the 
important idea here implied:"On peut traduire des 
3 
choses non-sensibles au moyen de choses sensibles." 
( 4 ) In this passing from sensible to spiritual 
things, the mathematical symbols of the philosopher 
and the imagination of the poet have a common innate 
root and a common objective. 11 Mirum videri possit, 
quare graves sententiae in scritis poetarurn, magis 
quam philosophorum. Ratio est quod poetae per enthusi-
asmum & vim imaginationis scripsere: aunt in nobis 
semina scientiae, ut in silica, quae per rationem a 
' 1. O.Hamelin,Le Systeme de Descartes (Paris: 
Alcan,19!!),p.44. ~ 
2. X,218. / 
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3. H.Gouhier, La Pensee ~eligieuse de Descartes 
(Paris: J.Vrin,1924 ,p.48. ~ 
philosophis educuntur, per imaginationem a poetis 
1 
excu tiun tur magisque elucent. 11 
This material appears to me to be exceedingly 
important for understanding the bearings pf Descartes' 
thought and I shall draw upon it in later connections. 
Here it must suffice to remark that it shows how 
115 
Descartes came by his precious method and what momentous 
implications that method had from the beginning. It 
also shows how emaciated is the usual interpretation 
of the epoch-making experience of Descartes' youth 
as being merely his discovery of analytical geometry, 
and of his method as being simply the universal 
application of this discovery. Such an interpretation, 
based only on the· account in the Discourse, leaves 
out the intense emotional and spiritual side of 
Descartes' discovery of the "mirabilis scientiae 
fundamenta 11 , above all, the fact that mathematical 
symbols were deemed to be of value only in so far as 
they enabled one to lay hold of spiritual reality. 
Berkeley was not a Frenchman, and his 
philosophical conversion was attended with less of 
the dramatic and the emotional than that of Descartes. 
But he too was 11 distrustf.ul11 from early childhood and 
[ 
-------------------" -·--·-··~-" 
"consequently by nature disposed for these new 
1 
doctrines". And there came a time, when he was 
between twenty ond twenty-three years of age,, the 
time spanned by the Commonplace ~" when the "new 
principle" revealed itself to him. UnliV:e the record 
of Descartes' experience,, the exact day of this 
revelation is not known, nor is there as graphic a 
description of it. Johnston has the following 
account of the birth of the "new principle": "No 
hars.h Socratic maieutic was needed to bring it to 
the birth; it came to light easily and almost im-
perceptibly,, and as we scan the sentences in which 
Berkeley indicated the process,, it is easy to sympathise 
with his joy and surprise as he gaze~ at the child 
2 
of his mind - :r the obvious tho' amazing truth"'. 
The same author goes on to indicate that the whole 
process of evolution takes place in a single page, the 
3 
first page of the properly arranged Commonplace Book. 
Berkeley opens with a consideration of "e terni ty1' and 
the "succession of ideas in the Divine intellect". 
He then proceeds to call this succession of ideas 
time or duration. Presently he identifies duration 
with "existence". But since time is not "common to 
1. I,79. 
2. Op. cit.,p,20. 
3. I,58-59. 
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all intelligences", Berkeley is troubled because of 
the implied disappearance of an objective standard 
of existence. Yet he cannot escape the conclusion: 
11 Time a sens a ti on; therefore onely in ye mind." But 
since time and existence have already been identified, 
the suggestion presents itself that all existence 
is mind-dependent, and that 11 Epicurism and Hobbism" 
which are "expounded by material substances" can be 
overthrown. Berkeley applies this insight first to 
extension: "Extension a sensation, therefore not 
without the mind." In the very next entry he calls 
this discovery "the immaterial hypo thesis", and with 
11'7 
it he then proceeds to destroy the Cartesian distinction, 
borrowed by Locke, of primary and secondary qualities. 
But no sooner is this done than the system of 
idealistic philosophy emerges, complete in its 
essentials: "World without thought is nee quid, nee 
quantum,~ quale, &c •••• Nothing properly but Persons, 
i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other things 
are not so much existences as manners of ye existence 
of persons." In this mental evolution, compressed 
within a single page of a diary, we see the dawn of 
a momentous philosophical insight comparable to 
Descartes' experience on November 10, 1619. But is 
it out of place to observe, in view of the important 
role here played by Descartes 1 distinction betvveen 
primary and secondary qualities, that the vision of 
the young Frenchman, which led him to look upon 
sense-objects as symbols of the non-sensuous and 
consequently to draw the above-mentioned distinction, 
prepared the way for the 11 immaterial hypothesis" of 
the young Irishman? Berkeley's philosophy, in its 
very inception, while it makes a significant advance, 
builds upon and supplements that of Descartes. 
The most salient resemblance, however, of 
these two experiences is that both occur 11 sub specie 
aeterni ta tis" and lead to significant religiru s 
._. --
consequences. Descartes is visited by the spirit of 
eternal truth, he dreams of the Church as his shelter 
when the storm rages, he finds the way of life, and, 
in conclusion, makes a long pilgrimage to a religious 
shrine to express his gratitude. Afterwards he writes 
to a friend: 11 Or i 1 es time que to us ceus a qui Dieu 
/ / 
a donne 1 1usage de cete raison, sont obliges de 
1 1 employer principaleman t pour tascher a le.' connois tre 
& a se connoistre eus-mesme. C1est par la que i 1 ay 
, 1 
tasche de commencer mes estudes". Berkeley is engaged 
1. I,144. 
._· ___ -.ii 
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in meditation on eternity and ideas in the divine 
intellect when he comes upon his "new principle11 , 
which he immediately applies as a weapon to combat 
1 
11 1dolatry ••• Epicurism and Hobbism". It is important 
to note this religious factor in the approach to 
philosop~y by both thinkers. As regards Berkeley it 
is unnecessary to adduce other proof of this fact 
than to point to the title-pages of his works and to 
affirm that his whole philosophy is a polemic against 
the enemies of religion. Now the title-page of 
Descartes' Meditations, as well as various portions 
of his works, avow a similar apologetic purpose, but 
( 
Descartes' word in this matter has not been taken as 
seriously as that of Berkeley. In fact, only very 
recently a two-volume work appeared entitled Descartes 
le Philosophe ~ Masque ( Paris: Rieder, 1929 ), in 
which the author, Maxima teroy, making use of a 
statement of Descartes i~ the Cogitationes Privatae, 
viz., 11 1arvatus prodeo11 • tries to lift the mask and 
to expose the real Descartes as completely emancipated 
from the beliefs of the Roman Catholic Church. If 
this hypo the.sis is true, it tends to invalidate the 
present thesis of essential unity in the thought of 
1. I,59. 
2. x,212. 
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Descartes and that of Berkeley. It is necessary therefore 
to discuss in some detail the religious aspect in 
Descartes' approach, already touched upon from other 
points of view but here assuming peculiar significance 
in a consideration of central philosophical incentive 
and aim. 
It must be admitted that there are facts 
in Descartes' life which lend themselves to Leroy's 
hypothesis. His long residence in Protestant Holland, 
his studied reserve in addressing theologians, and 
his desire to avoid at all costs a conflict with the 
Church, all these things, when viewed in the light 
of the naturalistic side of his philosophy, seem to 
point to a mask. Descartes works for years on a very 
comprehensive philosophical work, ~ Monde, and then, 
upon hearing of the fate of Galileo at the hands of 
the Inquisition, he immediately suppresses its 
publication, for it contained the condemned docErine 
of the motion of heavenly bodies. When afterwards, 
in the Principles, he states his views on the subject, 
he mediates between Copernicus and the Church by what 
appears to be a sophistical device of explaining 
that while each body is moved by a whirl of ethereal 
liquid, it is actually motionless in relation to the 
I 
t 
L 
liquid i taelf. Considering the importance which 
Descartes attached to his mechanical philosophy of 
mature, critics are tempted to believe that he was 
at heart a naturalist and mechanist, and that his 
discussions concerning God, so totally separated from 
peICeptual reality, were a mere supplement in tended 
to keep at bay the authorities of whom he was afraid. 
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But is this all that can be said of Descartes' 
attitude toward the Church? It must be mo ted first 
of all, that Descartes was neither physically nor 
morally a coward, one who would hide behind a mask 
all his life because he was afraid to come into the 
open. Baillet tells us of an incident in the early 
life of Descartes when by sheer courage he saved 
himself from death at the hands of a group of ruff~ans. 
And the vehemence with which he attacked both the 
Jesuit Bourdin and the Protestant theologian Voetius 
shows no lack of virility. The charge against Descartes 
must, then, in any case, be modified into one of undue 
prudence, in which practical consideration lead him 
too often to regard discretion as the better part of 
3 
valor. Now this charge, which, to be sure, hardly 
1. This is the view of C. Adam, Descartes' Oeuvres, 
Vol.XII,p.57 et passin; also of H.A.P. 
Torrey, The Philosophy of Descartes(New 
York:Holt;I892),pp.329f1:° 
2. E.g.,III,244. 
3. 'Illis view is advanced by Blondel, "Le 
Christianisme de Descartes" in~· de Met. 
et de Mor.,4 (1896),551-567. 
---
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reflects credit upon either philosopher, is one that 
1 
has been made also against Berkeley. In the Commonplace 
Book Berkeley resolves 11 To use the utmost caution 
not to give the least handle mf offence to the Church 
2 
or Churchmen11 and seeks carefully to avoid conflict 
3 4 
with the doctrines of Trinity and Transubstantiation. 
When in Alciphron Berkeley argues for religion on 
the ground of utility, there are passages in which 
one is led to believe that the philosopher's own 
true view is to be found in the mouth of the free-
5 
thinker. 'lhis compromising attitude toward 11 the powers 
that be" is not a trait in which the two philesophers 
we are studying have a monopoly; 1 t is::common among , 
the contemporaries of both, e.g., it can be seen even 
in Galileo. In philosophers who have but one short 
life to live, this attitude bespeaks-; preference to 
give that life to philosophy nather than for it, but 
scarcely proves anything more. 
But there is more to be said in reply to 
th6se who attack the sincerity of Descartes' religious 
faith. It may be true that ·Leroy serves as an ant-
6 
idote, as a recent critic alleges, to an overemphasis 
1. Johnston,op. cit.,pp43Z2ff. 
2. I,41. 
3. Ibid. 
4. I,87. 
5. II,155,157. 
6. Cantecor,op. cit.,26n. 
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on the religious side of Descartes. Yet it is 
si~nificant that Leroy in trying to prove his case 
is forced to commit himself to such an obscure and 
entirely unp~oved hypothesis as Descartes' affiliation 
with the Rosicruciana, whereas Espiµas, Boutroux, 
Gouhier, and others, who defend a positive religious 
interpretation, can summon an almost endless array 
of clear statements from Descartes' works, especially 
from his correspondence, to estrblish his devotion 
to the Church. When a man, especially a great 
philesopher whose life is devoted to a passionate 
search for the truth, unequivocally affirms a con~ 
viction toward such a value as religion, and consist-
ently carries it out in his conduct, it is hardly 
fair to cast reflections upon him and to suspect 
him of harboring ulterior motives. There is much 
stronger proof for the depth of Descartes' religious 
consciousness than there is for his cleverness in 
masquerading. Milhaud, who studies Descartes as a 
" man of science, says that Descartes has "une ame 
/ 
plus naivement religieuse, plus simple, moins complique 
I ' I ' 1 qu' on est generalement dispose a le croire." This 
quality in Descartes' religious faith is manifest 
1. A. Milhaud, Descartes Savant (Paris: 
Alcan,1921j,p.63. 
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when he tells us that his religion is that of his 
1 
nurse; when he berates the Scholastic theologians 
for obscuring with their fruitless disputations the 
simple truths of revealed religion which lead men 
2 
to heaven: when he affirms that true theology, as 
represented by the Popes and the Councils, is 
3 
dependent upon special divine inspiration; and when , 
in consequence, he describes himself as 11 croyant tres-
, 4 
fermement l'infaillibilite de 1 1Eglise. 11 In the 
light of such statements it is quite unnecessary to 
look farther for explanations of Descartes' conduct 
in the suppression of L~ V~_nda and in the effort to 
circumvent the Copernican ·theory. For if Descartes' 
own words are at all to be taken seriously, one 
cannot escape the conclusion of a recent French writer 
' on Descartes' religion: 11 S 'il avai t a choisir en tre 
, 
sa physique et son eglise, nous croyons bien qu'il 
\ 
n'hesiterait point a abandonner - et sincerement -
' 5 la premiere." But apart from the incident we have 
noted, Descartes was not called upon to choose be-
tween these alternatives, for the simple reason that 
1. 
2 • 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Baillet,op. cit.,II,515. 
v ,176. 
VI,8; IX,230. 
III,259. , 
M.Koyre, Essai sur L' Idee de Dieu et les 
Preuves de son Ex1stence-chez Descartes 
TParis:Lerowr;,1922),p.5. ~ 
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"pour Descartes fonder la vraie physique et defendre 
" " 1 la cause de Dieu sont une seule et meme tache. 11 
And this leads us to a further consideration, one 
which establishes a fundamental agreement between 
Descartes and Berkeley. Not only was Descartes' 
personal religious faith sincere, but the initial 
motivation of his philosophy, as with Berkeley, was 
a defence of the Christian religion. He writes to 
his friends: "c 'est la cause de Dieu que j 1 ay entreptis 
2 3 
de deffendre" and 11 ie soustiens la cause de Dieu". 
In a letter to Mersenne he defines the purpose of 
" his first published vmrk, the Discourse: "ie tache 
\ I 
a demonstrer 1 1existence de Dieu & de 1 1 ame separee 
4 
du corps". When Mersenne thinks that the treatment 
of these subjects in the Discourse is defective, 
Descartes promises to supply more comprehensive 
5 
demonstrations in the Meditations. The purpose of 
the latter work is announced ten years in advance 
of its publication as follows: "les principaux points 
sont de prouuer 1 1exiitence de Dieu & celle de nos 
/ 
amea, lorsqu' elles sent separees du cors, d 1 ou suit 
, 6 
leur immortalite. 11 And in the dedication of the 
1. Gouhier,op. cit.,p.191. 
2. III,238. 
3. III,240. 
4. I ,339. 
5. I,350. 
6. I,182. 
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Meditations Descartes says he intends to demonstrate 
God and the soul so convincingly that atheism will 
1 
henceforth be inexcusable. 
The background and motivation of Descartes' 
task as a Christian apologist have recently been 
established by a series of brilliant researches begun 
by Espinas, and continued by Blanchet, Gilson, and 
Gouhier. The cardinal importance of a similar 
11 Ausgangspunkt11 in Berkeley, as well .as the light 
which these studies shed incidentally on some difficult 
portions of Descartes, e.g., his doctrine of automatism, 
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make it worth while to take notice of these investigations. 
I 
Espinas, in his article "Pour 1 1h1stoire du cartesianisme," 
2 
Rev. de Met. et d~ Mor., May, 1906, portrays vividly 
the historical setting of Descartes' philosophical 
activity. In the wake of the Renaissance and the 
Reformation, with the overthrow of old authorities, 
came a movement known as 11 libert1nism11 , comparable 
to the "free-thinking" of Berkeley's day. During the 
fime of Descartes, the chief representatives of this 
movement, which received its greatest impetus from 
Montaigne, were Charron, La Mothe de Vayer, Gabriel 
I 
Naude, Saint-Evremond, and Gaston, the Duke of Orleans. 
1. VII,1-2; IX.,4. 
2. Cf. A.Espinas, Descartes et la Morale. 
Paris: Editions Bossard,-r925. 
'l'hough professing ou~vardly to be Christians, these 
men were sceptics. Espinas points out that when 
Aristotelian scholasticism proved to be incapable 
of checking the tide of libertinism, the champions 
of religion had recourse to Augustine and to Plato. 
/ 
Such was the spirit of the men of the Oratory, Berulle, 
Gibieuf, Condren, de la Borde, and others, who 
exerted great influence on Descartes. These men were 
thoroughly versed in Augustine, upon whose works the 
controversies with the Protestants had drawn so much 
attention that within a few years they passed through 
five editions. And while the Oratorians were busy 
trying to reclaim Augustine from the Protestants, 
they also fostered the spirit of Platonism as against 
I 
the Aristotelianism of the Schools. Berulle, the 
founder of the Oratory, who exerted great personal 
influence on Descartes, is best described as an 
I' 
Augustinian Neopla tonis t. In a later article, "L 1 idea 
ini ti ale de la philosophie de De scar tes0 , Rev. de Met. 
et de M£!:~1 May, 1917, Espines claims that Descartes~ 
point::of departure was the theory of the automatism 
of animals, which served the apologetic purpose of 
confounding the li~ertins, who minimized the difference 
between man and the brutes and questioned the existence 
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of the soul. Descartes glorifies the human soul 
at the expense of depriving the animals of rational 
mentality. 
Blanchet, in his scholarly study of~ 
/ I 
Antecedents Historiques du "J~ Pense, ~ Suis 11 
(Paris: Aleen, 1920 ), though differing from Espinas 
in certain particulars, develops his central thesis: 
I 
"La vocation que le cardinal Berulle lui Descartes 
I I 
a presque imperieusement indiquee est une vocation 
1 
d'apologiste. 11 While Descartes' interest in the 
apologetic later became limited as he had to defend 
his physics, ye:t the "cogito" originally appears as 
an implement of war against the infidels. Blanchet 
shows that the similarity in the thought of 
Augustine and that of Descartes is to be accounted 
for largely by the similarity in the situation which 
each confronted. Augustine defended the existence 
of truth against the sceptics, God the Creator against 
the pagans, and the spirituality of the soul against 
the Manichaeans. Descartes defended the same positions 
against the same kind of enemies. 
According to Gilson, the spirit of Descartes' 
metaphy~±~si like tha:it of the Oratory, is 11 d 'une 
1. op. cit.,p.72. 
. ----, 
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theologie neo-platonicienne renouvelee elle-meme 
' 1 des Peres et surtout de Sa.int-Augustin. 11 The 
Augustinian influence is manifest especially in 
I 2 111 1 inneisme 11 • But Gilson's m!rl.n contribution has 
been to point out the Thomistic elements in Descartes. 
I . I 
In "La. Liberte cbez Descartes et la Theologie" (Paris: 
Aloan, 1913), he maintains that Descartes, under the 
influence of the Oratoria.n Gibieuf, transformed the 
ThomLstic doctrine of sin into his ovm theory of the 
' voli ti ona.l basis of error. "La Quatrieme Medi ta.tion 
' tout en ti ere, 11 says Gilson, "est un tissu d 1 emprunts 
' I ' fa.it a en theologie de saint Thomas et a celle de 
I I 
l'Oratoire. Il n'est pas exa.gere de dire qu'elle 
ne contient rien d'origina.1, si ce n'est l'ordre 
salon lequel ces mat:riaux sont dispose~. 113 Gouhier, 
who gives us in a single comprehensive volume the 
results of all the previous investigators, follows 
Gilson most closely and claims_ that the Augu.stini9.Il 
influence has been overemphasized at the expense of 
the Thomistic. Descartes was not motivated only by 
the spirit of Christianity, as expressed in Augustine, 
but he also fought hand in hand with the Jesuits 
for the Thomistic system of religion against innovators. 
I 
1. E. Gilson, La Liberte, etc., p. 160. 
2. E. Gilson, '"L'1 inneisme cartesien et la 
th,ologie" in Rev.de Met et de Mor, 
July, 1914. ------
3. Op. cit., p. 441. 
··---., 
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Gouhier gives a detailed account of Descartes• re-
lations with the Jesuits, of his activities in the work 
of the Cowiter-Ref ormation, and of the attacks made 
upon him by the "libertins". 
It is a matter of history, emphasized by the 
above-mentioned writers and acknowledged by all, that it 
I 
was Cardinal de Berulle who actually started Descartes 
on his career as a philosophical writer. Descartes had 
already, following his experience of November 10, 1619, 
developed the main principles of his philosophical 
system, but his aristocratic contempt for the business 
of writing books kept him from publishing, s.o that at 
130 
the age of forty he had an esoteric philosophy consist-
ing entire!y in private papers and letters to bis friends. 
I 
It was then that Berulle, who had bec;ome acquainted 
with Descartes' speculations and been impressed with 
their religious value, laid upon the philosopher a 
solemn obligation, thus described by Baillet: "Il lui 
11 
en fit meme une obligation de conscience. Il lui fit 
entendre qu 1 aiant recu de Dieu une force & une penetra-
L 
tion d'esprit avec des lumieres sur cela qu'il n'avoit 
I point accordees a d'autres, il lui rendroit un compte 
exact de l'emploi de ses ta.lens & seroit responsable devant 
ce juge souverain des hommes du tort qu'il feroit au 
genre humain en le privant du fruit de ses meditations. 11 1 
1. Baillet, op. cit., IIt P• 160. 
That this appeal to Descartes' conscience had its 
effect we know from the fact that shortl.y afterwards 
he published the Discourse, in which he explicitly 
affirms as the reas,on for ma.king his thought public 
the c onsidera.tion empha.si zed by Berulle: 11 1 1 ay creu 
I qua ie ne pouuois les tenir cachees, sans pecher 
grandement centre la. loy qui nous oblige a procurer, 
a.uta.nt qu'il est en nous, le bien general de tous lea 
i· hommes." From the point of view of consequences it 
is not amiss to place the incentive furnished by 
Berulle as second in importance only to the discovery 
of the "ftmd a.manta scientia.e mirabilis". The latter 
led Descartes to make a pilgrimage to Loretto, the 
former led him to publish philosophical w:orks 
demonstrating God and the soul. And the man who 
assisted him in carrying out his resolve, the man 
with whom he was most intimately associated through 
almost his whole philosophical career, was Father 
Mersenne, himself a stalwart antagonist of infidels 
and sceptics. From this background there emerges a 
new Descartes, too little known, in fact, scarcely 
knovm at all in the li tera.ture which deals with him 
in English. He is no longer the gentle and fawning 
little man who is afraid to pit against tradition 
1. VI, 61. 
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a.nd authority the truth he has fowid. He is not the 
naturalist a.nd the mechanist who uses religion only 
as a camouflage. Religion is with him the paramount 
issue, and his mechanical views in physics and 
physiology are put forth with a purpose to guarantee 
the supreme significa.nce of God and the soUl. With 
characteristic vivacity he writes: "Car ie suis en 
colere quand ie voy qu'il y a des gens a.u monde si 
auda.ci eux: & si impudens que de combattre contra Dieu. n 1 
Like the Irish bishop who followed him half a century 
later, he fights for his vision of the divine against 
those who are content to be "minute philosophers". It 
was in such a struggle against one whom Berkeley had 
come to regard as a philosophical arch-enenw, namely, 
Hobbes, that he first saw Descartes and was attracted 
by him. According to Dewey, philosophy emerges as a 
response to a problem-situation. We have seen that 
the profound thought of Augustine was called forth 
by attacks on the religion in which he had found the 
wa:y of truth. We have seen that modern philosophy in 
the person of Descartes entered the field of history 
in response to a similar situation. And Berkeley was 
led t,o f ,ormulate the system of idealism in order to 
1. I, 182. 
• 
meet the challenge to his re~gious principles by 
the deists and free-thinkers of the early eighteenth 
century. In each case the approach t,o philosophy 
is by wa;y of "apologia pro fide~, a.nd in each case 
the answer is drawn ultimately fr.cm Christian 
consciousness. 
To the points discussed in this chapter, 
the emphasis on method, the rejection of external 
authority, the use of a single explanatory principle, 
and the motivation afforded by religious apologetic, 
must be added one other consideration, already often 
anticipated and later to be d isc.ussed more fully, but 
included here because of its methodological signifi-
cance, viz., that both Descartes and Berkeley have 
the self as the starting-point in knowledge. Descartes 
stands on the threshold of modern philosophy as the 
great exponent of introspective method, who directed 
thought to the human mind itself a.rd away from the 
rather naive realism of Bacon. Berkeley betrays un-
mistakable Cartesian influence when he sa;y s: "Men 
choose to hunt for truth and knowledge anywhere rather 
than in their own understanding, where 'tis to be 
founa." 1 The introspective nature of his approach led 
1. I, 21. 
·-·-,.,., 
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Descartes to become a psychologist as well as a 
meta.physician. He identified the Stoul with 
consciousness as such. By so doing he became the 
precursor of an empirical psychology, free from 
subordination by metaphysics. In the Passions 
of the SoUl he set a noteworthy precedent for the 
---. 
study of isolated psychological facts. Berkeley follows and 
improves the Cartesian method. Hies metaphysical 
"new principle" led him to study carefully the data. of 
visual perception, with the result that in his Essa,y 
towards ~ ~ Theory of Vision he presents a 
classical example of fruitful scientific method in 
psychology. As with Descartes' study of the passions, 
and even more so, Berkeley's theory of vision continues 
tb be studied even when the underlying metaphysics is 
rejected. 
But Descartes, too, had made the initial 
application of his method to the problem of vision and 
was, at the time when Berkeley wrote, an established 
authority whom Berkeley had studied a.nd toward whom he 
had to define his attitude. The consideration of this 
matter carries us beyond a discussion of method into 
the field of a specific psychological inquiry, which 
forms the content of the next chapter. 
• 
CHAPTER V 
PSYCHOLOGY OF VISION 
Descartes' interest in the problem of 
light an:i vision is indicated not only by the fact 
that historically the first application which he 
gave of his method is ~ Dioptrique but also by 
the title of the fragment which he left of his 
lost systematic work in cosmology, Le Monda .£!! 
I ' Trai ta ~ la Lumiere. In addition to these w,orks 
the subject is treated also in Parts III and IV of 
the Principles. The aim of the present chapter is 
to give a brief smimary of Descartes' thought in 
this matter and then t~ indicate its bearing on 
Berkeley's theory of vision. 
The sole stimulus in vision, according 
to Descartes, is light. The extremities of the 
optic nerves, composing the covering of the eyes 
and called the retina, are not moved by the air 
nor by any other material object but only by the 
"globules" of light ( Prine iples, IV, 195 ) • The 
transmission of light to the eye may be illustrated 
- ---,--, 
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by the way in which a blind man feels his way with 
a stick. The pressure or resistance afforded by 
any object is communicated along the stick to his 
hand and from there to his brain, with the result 
that he has a perception of the object. In the 
same way, there are no material corpuscles passing 
from the seen object to the eye but only a pressure 
or motion transmitted by the rays of light. Light 
is pure motion and can be instantaneously trans-
mitted. V'fhen passing through· a transparent medium, 
the rays of light are straight, but if obstruction 
is encountered they are refractea. 1 Vision thus 
depends on the communication of motion, externally 
originated, to the optic nerve and thence to its 
terminus in the brain. The result of this physical 
process is an image. The act of vision itself, how-
ever, is not constituted by this image but by a 
complementary process which acts upon it from within. 
Descartes insists that it is the mind that sees and 
not the eye. 2 And the mind sees, not intervening 
"species~', but colors and only colors. Distance is 
1. Descartes in his Dioptrigue was the 
first to publish the law of refraction. 
2. Dioptrigue, Oeuvres VI,140. 
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not "imm edi at ely perceived. It is knoV'ln "Par le 
l 
rapport qu 'ont le deux yeux 1 •uri a l •autre. 11 
The size and distance of an object can be explained 
partly by the angle produced by the convergence of 
optical axes, but "l 'axiome de 1 'anciene Optique, 
qui dit que la grandeur apparente des obiets est 
proportionnee a celle de l'angle de la vision, 
n'est pas tousiours vray. 11 2 The magnitude of an 
object is measured solely by its distance from the 
eye. Distance depends physiologically on such con-
ditions as the size of the pupil and the movements 
of the eye. The perception of distance is largely 
an inference from past experience, depending on 
signs such as the faintness or the vividness of objects. 
The senses, however, often deceive us, as when the 
moon. appears 1 arger on the l:Drizon than in the mer id-
ian. 
Descartes' theory was widely accepted 
and its main principles were fully developed by 
his followers. Mal ebranche proceeded to emphasize 
the element of judgment in the perception of distance 
l. Dioptrigue, Oeuvres VI,137. 
2. Ibid., VI, 145. 
ft'SJ' TC"W&t!B ______ _ 
and to _give a more comprehensive list of the signs 
from which distance is inferred ( Recherche I, 
chapter 9 ) • Gl anvill speaks of a "secret de-
duction" whereby we "spell out" distances and mag-
nitudes from motions that we immediately perceive 
( Scepsis Scientifica, chapter V ). Molyneux 
affirms that distance is 11 rather the act of our 
judgment than of sense, 111 and that "distance 
itself is not to be perceived, for •tis a line pre-
sented to our eye with its end towards us, which 
must therefore be only a point. 112 Molyneux then 
proceeds to judge distance by "the turn of the 
eyes or by the angle of the op tick axes. 113 
It is beside the point to inquire here 
into the Cartesian elements in these and numerous 
other writers of the period, although one cannot 
but note in the Commonplace Book the great influ-
ence of Mal ebranche and Molyneux in the pro bl em of 
vision. A direct correlation must now be made 
between Descartes' theory and that of Berkeley. 
The whole matter is disposed of by 
1. W. Molyneux, Treatise of Diop tricks, 
(London,1690),p.113. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
138 
r .... _._ ... -.. ·---.. · 
I~ 
~ 
M~haffy in his work on Descartes in the following 
manner: "How far he was in advance of his day may 
be seen from the sixth Discourse, 1 in which he 
explains the perception of distance, arx:l lays down 
explicitly all the· arguments and illustrations 
used long afterwards by Berkeley in his Theory of 
Vision. It is impossible that he can have been 
ignorant of Descartes' Dioptric, and yet how he 
could claim any originality whatever on the subject 
is passing strange. The convergence of the optical 
axes, and how this may be supplied by successive 
observations with a single eye, the varying colour 
of the objects, the greater dimness, the number 
and kind of intervening objects, the uncertainty 
of all these various indices, - all this, which 
Berkeley urged, is found in Descartes' Discourse; 
nay, even the illustration of the moon looking 
1 arger near the horizon than when high in the 
heavens. 112 
What is "passing strange" is how any one 
who has made a serious comparison of Descartes' 
r. _Dioptrigue. 
2. J.P. Mafaffy, Descartes (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1881), p.161. 
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pioptrigue and Berkeley's Essay towards ~ New 
Theory of Vision could so underestimate Berkeley's 
theory, which has come to be considered in the 
history of psychology as 11 the most significant 
contribution to psychology produced in the eight-
eenth centuryn, 1 and which owes its uniqueness pre-
cicely to its advance beyon~ Descartes. Yet 
Mahaffy's abrupt and erroneous statement does serve 
to call attention to some important contributions 
by Descartes to the view which Berkeley developed. 
The origins of Berkeley's Essay must be 
sought in the Commonplace Book, where the young 
philosopher, in developing his 11 new principlen, 
wrestles with the problem of vision. There we see 
the evolution of the essential features of the 
theory propounded in the Essay: the visual world 
as a mental construct ( I, 62, 66, 72, 87 ); the 
heterogeneity of visual and tactual extension ( I, 
59, 60, 61, 63, 68, 78 ); the arbitrary and empirical 
nature of the connection between touch and sight, 
~ith Berkeley's favorite illustration of the born-
1. G.s. Bre,tt, History of Psychology (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1921), Vol. II,p.265. 
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pl ind made to see ( I, 54, 59, 60, 61, 65, 82 ) ; 
the consequent irrelevancy of the geometrical 
method ( I, 7, 11, 22, 30, 43, 68, 70, 72, 74, 79, 
82 ). 
Now upon a study of the Commonplace Book 
I find no evidence that Berkeley, at the time he 
was making these annotations, was either acquainted 
with or directly influenced by Descartes' Dioptrigue 
or with other portions of Descartes' writings deal-
ing with vision. The indirect influence of Descartes 
through Malebranche ( I, 77, 78, 79, 81 ) and 
Molyneux ( I, 60, 61, 72 ), whose writings on the 
subject were among Berkeley's main sources, is un-
mistakably evident. Thus Berkeley has much to say 
on optic axes ( I, 7, 11, 68 - 74, etc., ), convex 
and concave lenses ( I, 71, 72 ), "globules" of 
light ( I, 12, ), and the horizontal moon ( I, 70, 
76, 83 ) • Berkeley also shows the influence of the 
Cartesian mathematical method, although he learns 
to rule it out as irrelevant in an empirical study 
of Vision. Thus he is once tempted to ask 11 If 
there be not two kinds of visible extension - one 
perceiv'd by a confus'd view, the other by a distbct 
141 
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~uccessive direction of the optique axis to each 
point? 111 How well Berkeley has grasped from his 
secondary sources the essence of Descartes' con-
tribution to the current discussion of vision is 
evident from the following entry in which he 
states in a single brief sentence almost a com-
plate summary of Descartes' views on magnitude: 
11 1.:en judge of magnitude by faintness and vigor-
ousne ss, by distinctness and confusion, with some 
2 
other circumstances, by great & little angles." 
But the use of the word "men" rather than of the 
name of the man who had introduced these explana-
tions into the discussion suggests an ignorance of 
Descartes' writings. Other references to Descartes' 
views are equally vague allusions to "opticians", 
"dioptricians", etc. Twice, in dealing with the 
problem of vision, Berkeley mentions the 11 Cartesians" 
( I, 50, 80 ). In the first of these references, 
curiously enough, he attacks the idealistic side of 
Cartesianism: "I dit'f er from Cartesians in that I 
mal'>:e extension, colour, &c, to exist really in 
1. I,7. 
2. I,73. 
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~odies independent of our mind."1 In this mis-
leading statement Berkeley accuses the Cartesians 
of holding precisely the view that constituted his 
own "new principle", i.e., the abolition of the 
distinction between primary and secondary qual-
ities and the interpretation of all reality as 
mind-dependent. In numerous other places Berkeley 
expou·1ds as his own the view that both color and 
extension depend on the mind. 2 Here he unwit-
tingly makes another revelation of the Cartesian 
derivation of his central principle. In the other 
reference to the Cartesians Berkeley remarks that 
the Cartesian theory of light and color is con-
sidered orthodox, and asks: 11 Why may not mine also? 113 
The conclusion, then, is that the inception 
of Berkeley's theory of vision in the Commonplace 
Book shows a strong Cartesian influence, both posi-
tive and negative, but that this influence is in-
termediate rather than direct. In the formal 
exposition of .his theory, however, in the Essay, 
Berkeley shows that he has tal<:en pains to acquaint 
l. I,50. 
2. E.g.,I,59,62,66. 
3. I, 80. 
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himself with Descartes' Dioptrigue. He has not 
only an indirect reference to Descartes through 
Barrow, 1 but refers directly to Descartes' famous 
example, in Part VI of the Dioptrigue, of a blind 
man judging distance by means of the angle formed 
2 by crossing two sticks, one held in each hand. 
Berkeley refers to the s~ne section in another 
connection when he mentions Descartes as one of 
the "learned men" who have discussed the phenom-
enon of the horizontal moon. 3 Finally, in the 
Appendix to the Essay, in discussing perception 
by angles and optic axes, Berkeley quotes at con-
siderable length from Dioptrigue VI, and concludes: 
"I might amass together citations from several 
authors to the same purpose, but, this being so 
clear in the point, and from an author of so great 
4 
note, I shall not trouble the reader with any more." 
Inasmuch as in the context of the quotation,Descartes 
does not consider the geometrical method as in-
fallible in explaining the perception of distance 
and is willing to all ow the matter to rest on inf er-
1. I,136. 
2. I, 146. 
3. I,164. 
4. I,207-208. 
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ence from experience, this quotation does not 
answer fully the purpose to which Berkeley 
employed it. More appropriate quotations would 
have been available from contemporary dioptricians 
such as Iliolyneux. The appeal to Descartes here 
is of more significance in indicating Berkeley's 
esteem for Descartes than in proving the matter 
in question. 
It is unnecessary to enter into a dis-
cussion of Berkeley's theory of vision except in 
so far as it bears evidence of the influence of 
Descartes. Having noted the external relations 
between the two philosophers on this problem, it 
remains to point out the Cartesian elements em-
bodied in the final content of Berkeley's theory. 
This purpose can best be attained by a concise 
summary of Descartes' contributions and of the 
points in which Berkeley advanced beyond him. 
Berkeley in his theory of vision, as 
Johnston shows, did not, strictly speaking, 
1 
"discover any previously unknown truth". His 
1. Op. cit.,p.101 
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originality was in purging the prevailing view 
of excrescences and rendering it self-consistent. 
His new insight was one of correlation rather 
than of a discovery of new data. Now the ele-
ments which Descartes had contributed to the 
established view and which Berkeley retained 
were the following: ( 1 ) The importance of 
motion for a theory of extension. In the 
Analyst Berkeley states in the form of. a pointed 
question this consideration, which is implicit 
in the Essay, "Whether it be possible that we 
should have had an idea or notion of extension 
prior to motion? Or whether, if a man had never 
perceived'motion, he would ever have known or 
conceived one thing to be distant from another?111 
( 2 ) The impossibility of an immediate percep-
tion of distance. ( 3 ) The observation that 
distance is suggested by signs, such as the 
faintness or vividness of color, and the motion 
of the eyes. ( 4 ) The untrustworthiness of 
these signs in Descartes, reflected in their 
1. III,53. Cf.Essay,I,195-196. 
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a,.rbitrariness in Berkeley. ( 5 ) Previous ext-
perience as the basis of the inference of dis-
tance. ( 6 ) The use of tactual data, e.g., 
Descartes' example of the blind man judging 
distance by using sticks, an illustration which 
seems to have impressed Berkeley and may have 
suggested Berkeley's own correlation. 
The most important of Berkeley's inno-
vations were: ( l ) The use of only empirical 
data in solving the problem of vision as a psy-
chological problem; physics and mathematics 
ruled out as irrelevant. ( 2 ) The use of only 
visual data in explaining vision; tactual and 
other data irrelevant. ( 3 ) A careful separate 
study of tactual data and a corral at ion of visual 
and tactual data in the explanation of the per-
ception of distance. ( 4 ) A study of magnitude 
independently of distance. ( 5 ) A more adequate 
correlation of vision with a complete theory of 
reality. 
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.CHAPTEH VI 
l'HEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
~he nature of truth is a basie inquiry 
.for both Descartes and Berkeley. Jungmann 's de-
scription of the former applies with equal strength 
to the 1 atter: "Er ist I·.Ietaphysiker nur insofern 
und insoweit er Erkenntnistheoretiker ist. 111 
When in the present study method, theory of knowl-
edge, and theory of reality are discussed in 
sep·arate chapters, this is only for the sake of 
expediency, for the philosophers themselves did 
not draw these distinctions. Inasmuch as the 
method of the study requires at some points a new 
examination of certain key-texts, already familiar, 
in which Berkeley refers to Descartes, the reader's 
patience must be implored for the resulting un-
avoidable repetition. But, first of all, it is 
necessary to recall clearly the salient features 
of Descartes' theory before his bearing on the 
1. Op. cit.,p.146. 
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thought of Berkeley can be understood. 
I. Descartes' Theory. 
The Discourse 2..9. Method has already been 
studied as philosophical autobiography. Epistemol-
ogically, the significance of the Discourse is 
that in it Descartes avows his faith in reason 
and conceives of truth as that which is obvious 
and analytically clear, as exemplified in mathe-
matical l{nowledge. Mathematics is clearly Des-
cartes' ideal. Just as he had discovered ana-
lytical geometry by the application of algebra 
to geometry, so he seeks to discover truth in 
general by a universal application of mathematics. 
But in order to understand correctly Descartes' 
views on the problem of knowledge, it is necessary 
to go beyond the Discourse to his earlier work, 
the ?.egulae ad Directionem Ingenii. This work, to 
which I sh all ref er as Rules,represents Descartes' 
own new logic, and in it he states his principles 
of knowledge clearly and simply, without dramatic 
flourish. There we learn that the starting-point 
of knowledge is the grasping, by a direct .1..n!w!.-
i tion, of simple natures or pure essences. 
,--·-·----·----·""·.' ... 
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:intuition ( 11 intui tus" ) contains nothing sen-
suous or emotional; it is pure mental awareness, 
and is used synonymously with 11 sagacitas" and 
"lumen naturale'~ BY such awareness we apprehend, 
for example, that a triangle has three sides and 
that thought implies self-existence. But in 
order to discover these truths, we must "enumerate11, 
i.e., arrange together the pertinent facts of ex-
perience. Experience thus furnishes the occasion 
for knowledge, which consists fundamentally in 
deduction from that which is rationally self-
evident. This deduction, however, is not to be 
confused with the barren syllogistic logic of the 
Schoolman •. It is not a type of knowledge which 
is different from the intuitional, but rather a 
certain dialectic of intuition, requiring previous 
intuitions and hav~ng a greater complexity in fonn. 
In the Rules Descartes has four faculties of knowl-
edge, viz., understanding, imagination, sense, and 
memory. The funda~ental distinction is between 
understanding and imagination, for sense and memory, 
dealing as they do with corporeal images, may be 
subsumed under imagination. Descartes gives a 
____ . 
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p,urely physiological account of the process of 
imagination, which to him is equivalent to sense-
perception in general. The_ problem of knowledge 
in the Rules, as Balz points out, 1 assumes the 
form: how may intuitional self-evidence be con-
f erred upon the world of physical nature, i.e., how 
are corporeal images to be subsumed under deduc-
tions from pure essences? In the language of 
current critical realism, the problem is one of 
relating existences and essences. Descartes' 
solution is that the existential image may be 
reduced to geometrical figure, for the physical 
world consists in extension. Knowledge· is pos-
sible because the essence of sense-objects are 
mathematical forms with which pure thought can 
deal. 
So far Descartes has been a Platonist 
with unquestioned faith in the power of reason to 
obtain knowledge. The mind has, as it were, in-
scribed upon it certain directions for its use, 
innate principles which we must discover and from 
which we must deduce our world according to the 
1. A.G.A.Balz, "Dual ism in Cartesian 
Psychology and Epistemology" in Stuiies 
in the History of Ideas, ed. by the 
Dept. of Phil. of Columbia University, 
Vol. II (New York :Col um bi a Univ .Press, 1925 ), 
pp. 85-157. 
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ideal of mathematics. Or perhaps it would be moire 
accurate to hold With Natorp 1 that in the Rules 
Descartes is a Kantian criticist who explores the 
extent and procedure of knowledge and seeks to 
encompass the universality of things in the uni-
versality of the knowing mind. But in the Medi-
tations, as :fatorp has also pointed out, 2 Descartes' 
theological interests, his desire to prove God and 
the soul, invade his epistemology. Here a new 
method is proposed which transforms rational self-
evidence into psychological immediacy, and episte-
mological du al ism into metaphysical dual ism, re-
ducing sensations and images into modes of a 
thinking substance. This method involves a 
laborious process of doubt and an escape from 
solipsism only by means of the concept of God. 
The first I.iedi tat ion presents Descartes' famous 
drama of absolute scepticism. All traditional 
views, including the trustworthiness of sense-
e~~erience, must be subjected to criticism. The 
senses do not offer marks to distinguish between 
1. This Kantian interpretation constitutes 
the central thesis of Paul Natorp 's 
Descartes' Erkenntnistheorie (£arburg: 
,h;lwert, 1282). 
I ~ 2. P.Natorp,"Le Developpement de la pensee 
de Descartes depuis les 1Regul ae' 
jusqu' aux 1i1iedi tat ions'" in Rev. de 
r.;et. et de ~.4 (1896),416-432. -
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dreaming and waking; they do not guarantee the 
existence of the objects to which they refer. A 
malignant devil may have so made me that the world 
exists only in my imagination. In the second 
Meditation Descartes finds a starting-point. At 
least my doubts exist; but doubt implies a doubter, 
therefore I exist as a doubting, i.e., thinking, 
thing. I am certain, therefore, of self-existence, 
but how escape from the lonely island of solipism? 
This question is answered in the third Meditation. 
Among my ideas is the idea of God. And since God. 
is by very definition a perfect being, his veracity 
vouches for the validity of my knowledge of an 
eternal world. 
Whence, under these circumstances) arises 
error? The answer is given in the fourth Meditation. 
Error depends on the concurrence of two causes, the 
faculty of cognition and the faculty of free choice, 
i.e., on the joint action of the understanding 
and the will. There is no error in the understand-
ing, for by itself it deals only with the elements 
from which judgments are formed, and it is I my-
self that form the judgments. Neither is the will 
153 
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by itself the source of error. Error arises when 
I fail to restrain the will from judging when I 
do not conceive an idea with sufficient clearness 
and distinctness. It is important to note Descartes' 
criterion of truth: whatever is conceived clearly 
and distinctly, "cl are et distincte, 11 is true. 
In order to afford a depend able basis for deduc-
tion, a concept must be 11 clara11 , i.e., present 
and open ( "aperta11 ) to consciousness, and 
11 distincta11 , i.e., sharply defined in its rel at ion 
to the rest of reality. ,It is evident that the 
distinction between clear and confused ideas in 
the Meditations is the distinction of the Rules 
between essence and image, put into a new form 
because of the emerging metaphysical dualism of 
mind and body. A confused idea results from the 
union of mind and body. 
The teaching of the Meditations is re-
peated and developed in the Principles. The full-
blown dualisn of mind and body, with the necessity 
of defining the former more explicitly in terms of 
volition, appears in epistemology in the principle: 
''Duos tantum in nobis esse modos cogitandi, percep-
164 
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tfionem scil icet intell ectus 8c op er at ion em voluntaitis.111 
This sharp dualism, with its conception of the . ' :e mind 
as 11 act us purus11 and its identification of the under-
standing with sense and imagination, makes for an 
inescapable acknowledgment of the re pre sent ati ve 
nature of perception. But Descartes struggles 
against the. interpretation that this implies a 
"copy" theory of knowledge: "• ••• facile in eum 
errorem delabimur, ut judicemus id, quod in objectis 
vocrunus colorem, esse quid omnino simile colori 
t . 112 quern sen imus ••••• Similarly, the first chap-
I 
ter of 'the tract Le !Ji:onde is "De la difference qui 
est entre nos sentiments et las choses qui les 
produisent. 11 Our subjective sense-qualities rep-
re sent but do not reproduce the quantitative essences 
of the world of extension. 
The Passions of the Soul also throws 
light on Descartes' theory of knowledge. The states 
of the soul are divided into two main classes: 
actions and passions. The higher mental life is 
activity, the lower passivity. To the former belong 
1. Prin.I,32. VIII,17 
2. Prin.I,70. VIII,34-35. 
•• 
volition and the pure process of reasoning. In 
its active capacity the mind acts independently 
of the body, and the ideas which it thus forms 
are clear and distinct. The mind as 11 res cogitans" 
can act without the body and carry on its own 
imageless thought. Herein lies the distinction 
between image and idea. The former is a psycho-
physical event, while the latter is a mental 
object. Consciousness is pure mental awareness, 
and brain processes cannot constitute, but, at 
best, only condition mental processes. "Passions" 
are "Perturbations" of the mind caused by the body, 
and include not only the "appetites" and the "af-
fections", but also the lower processes of thought, 
such as sense-perception and memory. The ideas 
formed by these latter processes are confused and 
untrustworthy. 
The great importance of the will in the 
forming of ideas must be especially noted. It is 
the will that accepts or rejects ide~s, and it is 
always within a man's own power to reserve judg-
ment until his ideas a.re clear and di st i net. The 
soul is primarily an active agent which deals with 
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ideas that are passive. 
It remains to state concisely, on the 
basis of all of Descartes' writings, the meaning 
which he attaches to the term "idean and his clas-
sification of ideas. In his reply to the. first 
set of Objections to the Meditations Descartes 
defines most exactly what he means by idea: 
" •••• ideam esse ipsam rem cogitatarn, quatenus 
est objective in intellectu11 • 1 He goes on to 
explain ~hat objective existence is the understand-
ing means "esse in intellectu eo modo quo objecta 
in illo esse solent. 112 Thus the sun exists 
form ally in the sl{y, but, as an object of knowl-
edge, it exists by way of idea objectively in the 
understanding. In later Objeetions Descartes re-
pudiates both Gassendi's conception of idea as an 
11 effluence 11 , akin to scholastic "species", and 
Hobbes' conception of idea as 11 image 11 in the sense 
of 11 copy 11 • Idea is for Descartes a mental object; 
therefore he maintains against Hobbes that it is 
possible to have an idea of God and of the soul. 
1. VII,102. 
2. Ibid. 
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Descartes classifies ideas into three 
l groups: "innatae, adventitiae, a me ipso factae". 
Adventitious ideas are those coming from the out-
side; i.e., they signify the representative function 
of perception. The purely mind-made ideas are of 
little importance, for Descartes was unable to 
conceive of the mind as consti tu ti ve in experience, 
and spoke of the "ideae a me ipso factae" in terms 
of chimeras and hippogryphs, ideas that lead us 
into error as soon as we try to ref er them to 
external reality. Innate ideas, on the other hand, 
are of the first importance. The doctrine of in-
nate ideas was not stated in the Medi tat ions with 
enough clearness to prevent misunderstanding. 
Thus Descartes spoke of the innate idea of God as 
the "not a artificis operi suo impressa112 and 
... 
asserted: "Sed ex hoc uno quo d · Deus me creavi t, 
valde credibile est me quodammodo ad imaginem & 
similitudinem ejus factum esse, illamque sirnilitu-
dinem, in qua Dei idea continetur, a me percipi 
per eandem facul tatem, per quam ego ipse a me 
1. VII,37-38. 
2. VII,51. 
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p ercip ior, "l 
•••• These statements afforded 
occasion for the interpretation that D~scartes 
had simply carried over the Platonic notion of 
reminiscence. But in replying to the Objections 
of Hobbes, Descartes explains:: 11 
•••• cum dicimus 
idem aliquam nobis esse innatam, non intelligimus 
ill am nobis semper obversari :: sic enim null a 
prorsus esset innata; sed tantum nos habere in 
nobis ipsis facultatem illam eliciendi".2 Even a 
clearer and more adequate explanation is given in 
Notae in Programma, where Descartes corrects a 
similar misunderstanding on the part of Regius: 
11 Non enim unquam scripsi vel judicavi, mentem 
indigere ideis innatis, quae sint aliquid diversun 
ab ejus facultate cogitandi; sed cum adverterem 
quasdam in me esse cogitationes, quae non ab 
\ 
objectis eternis, nee a voluntatis meae deter-
" " minat ione procedebant, sad a sol a cogit andi 
f acul t ae, quae in me est, ut ideas si ve notion es, 
quae sunt istarum cogitationum formae, ab aliis 
adventitiis aut factis distinguerem, illas innatas 
i.vrI,51. 
2.0bj. III,10. VII,189. 
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vocavi. Eodem sensu, quo dicimus, generositatem 
esse quibusdam familiis innatam, aliis vero quosda~ 
morbos, ut podagram, vel calculum: non quod ideo 
istarum familiarum infantes morbis istis in utero 
.... 
matris 1 aborent, sed quod nascantur cum quad am 
1 disposi tione sive facul tate ad illos contrahendos." 
Descartes goes on in a remarkably Kantian vein to 
condemn the view that proceeds as though the 11 •••• 
f acultas cogitandi nihil possit per se praestare 11 • 2 
' ' 11 Quod adeo falsum est", says Descartes, "ut e contra, 
'quisquis recte advertit, quousque sensus nostri se 
extendant, & quidnam sit praecise, quod ab illis ad 
nostram cogitandi facultatem potest pervenire, 
debaat fateri, nullarum rerum ideas, quales eas 
cogitatione formamus, nobis ab illis exhiberi. Aded 
ut nihil sit in nostris ideis, quod menti, sive cog-
itandi facultati, non fuerit innatum, solis iis 
circumstantiis exceptis, quae ad experientiam 
3 
spectant". In the co.ntext Descartes explains 
further that sense affords only the external con-
dition for the activity of thought, and since 
l. VIII,357-358 • 
. 2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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thought in no way resembles sense, all ideas, e.g., 
pain, color, and sound, must be considered as 
innate. The sa~e conception of innate ideas is 
1 
stated also in a letter to Mersenne. This view, 
according to which innateness refers to the 
activity of thought that conditions all experience, 
has little, if anything, to do with Platonism, but 
it is a clear anticipation. of the Kantian "a priori". 
II. The Influence of Descartes' Theory 
on Berkeley. 
In proceeding to estimate the influence 
of this theory of knowledge on Berkeley, we must 
keep in mind that when Berkeley, during the days 
of the Commonplace Book, was developing his own 
fresh approach to the pro bl em of knowledge, he was 
acquainted, through his reading in the Discourse 
and the Meditations, with the essentials of Des-
cartes 1 theory. The latter work Berkeley seems to 
have studied carefully, for he refers to it by 
section and paragraph. 2 He even tal{es pains to 
detach indi victual sentences and to compare them 
~ 
with one another.v This minute study leads him 
1. III,418. 
2. I,48-49. 
3. I,48: n.775,n.776. 
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to notice even minor inconsistencies and verbal 
ambiguities. 1 The first impression which one de-
rives from such passages is that Berkeley is re-
pudiating Descartes, and one is tempted to draw 
the hasty conclusion that Descartes' influence was 
only negative. And Berkeley does, indeed, often 
reveal a supercritical attitude with a tendency to 
magnify his differences and to minimize his agree-
ments with Descartes. A deeper study, however, shows 
that in practically every case where Berkeley con-
siders in a critical spirit an important Cartesian 
principle, he sooner or later comes to incorporate 
it into his own thinking. The best procedure in 
the present very important comparison will be, 
first to present the apparent differences, then to 
point out, both from the Commonplace Book and from 
Berkeley's later writings, their misleading char-
acter, and finally to establish the true agreements 
and differences. 
The apparent dissimilarities may be grouped 
under four headings. ( 1 ) Berkeley rejects the 
1. I,48: n.775,n.776. 
~-·------ ---~-'"i 
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Cartesian world of pure thought and essences, re-
taining only the world of sense-perception. "By 
idea", he says, "I mean any sensible or imaginable. 
thing. 111 He maintains that there is "No reasoning 
• 112 . 
about things whereof we have no ideas; i.e., 
"ideas" in the sense defined above. Thus there 
can be no idea of the self, and Descartes' "cogito" 
must be rejected: " 'Cogito ergo sum.' Tautology. 
3 No mental proposition answering thereto." Neither 
can there be an idea of God: "Absurd to argue the 
existence of God from his idea. We have no idea 
of God. 'Tis impossible. 114 c· 2 ) As over against 
Descartes' disparagement of sense-experience, 
Berkeley believes in the trustworthiness of the 
senses in. furnishing knowledge and has no fear of 
scepticism. "Certainly I cannot err", he confi-
dently asserts, "in matter of simple perception." 5 
Hence, "I a11 the farthest from scepticism of any 
man. I know with an intuitive knowledge the 
existence of other things as well as my own soul. 116 
Little wonder that such a cocksure philosopher 
l. I,47. 
2. I,9. 
3. I,44. 
4. I, 48. 
5. I,39. 
6. I,26. 
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r:esol ves 11 In vindication of the senses effectually 
to confute what Des Cartes saith in the last par. 
of the last Med.,viz.that the senses oftener in-
1 form him falsely than truely". An echo of this 
attitude carries as far as the Dialogues, where 
the philosopher exclaims, with clear reference to 
Descartes, 11 1Tlhat a jest is it for a philosopher 
to question the existence of sensible things, till 
he hath it proved to him from the veracity of God; 
.... ( 3 ) In opposition to Descartes' basic 
dual ism, Berkeley considers seriously the abol i-
tion of the distinction between thought and its 
object, i.e., the adoption of epistemological 
monism. 11 Vain is the distinction •twixt intel-
lectual and material world. 113 11 The very exist-
4 
ence of ideas constitutes the soul." 11 Mind is 
a congeries of perceptions. 115 ( 4 ) Berkeley's 
early polemic against abstract general ideas, 
while directed primarily against Locke's idea of 
substance, refers in a broader sense to the pre-
supposition underlying Descartes' criterion of 
1. I,49. 
2. I,446. 
3. I, 23 
4. I, 27. 
5. Ibid. 
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truth, namely, that every idea which as an idea 
is clear and distinct, is on that account onto-
logically real. Thus the 11 they 11 in the following 
may refer to Descartes as well as to Locke: "They 
give good rules, tho' perhaps they themselves do 
not always observe them. They speak much of clear 
and distinct ideas, though at the same time they 
talk of general abstract ideas, &c. n1 This criticism 
of abstraction is implied in a later specific refer-
ence to Descartes: 11Des Cart es, in Med.2, says the 
notion of this particular wax is less clear than 
that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a 
little before, he forbears to consider bodies 
in general, because ( says he ) these general 
conceptions are usually confused. n2 
These contrasts between the "rationalist" 
Descartes and the "empiricist" BerkeJey stand out 
in such bold relief that one who has no time to 
look below the surf ace simply notes them, considers 
them as final, and passes on. The patient investi-
gator, however, will find that already in the 
1. I,38. 
2. I, 48. 
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Commonplace Book Berkeley oscillated between Locke 
and Descartes, and that as his thought matured, he 
steadily abandoned his original crude empiricism, 
and attached himself more and more closely to the 
position of Descartes. Let us note this modifi7 
cation in regard to each of the above-mentioned 
points qf difference. 
As regards, first of all, Berkeley's 
rejection of pure thought and his glorification 
of sense-experience, it must be noted that in his 
systematic account of the problem of knowledge in 
the Principles, in his later writings, and espec-
ially in the second edition of the Principles, 
Berkeley gradually renounced his view of the purely 
sensuous character of knowledge. With his con-
capt of "notio~" by which we know ourselves, other 
spirits, and relations, he introduced a non-sen-
suous type of apprehension which is assent ially 
what Descartes meant by imageless thoµght. But 
the origins of "notion" are to be found already 
in the Commonplace Book and show Descartes' in-
fluence. As opposed to his own first definition 
of "idea" as "any sensible or imaginable thing", 
166. r I i 
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Berkeley knew the Cartesian definition: 11 Cartesius 
per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum 
in intellectu 11 • 1 There is a passage in the 
Commonplace Boole where Berkeley accepts precisely 
this Cartesian conception: "N.B. According to my 
doctrine all things are entia rationis, i.e. solum 
habent esse in intellectum. 112 This entry is pre-
ceded by one in a similar vein: 11But it must be 
well noted that existence is vulgarly restrain'd 
to actuall perception, and that I use the word 
existence in a larger sense than ordinary. 113 But 
Berkeley saw how destructive this view would be 
to his original unqualified empiricism, and not 
being prepared to give up the latter, he adds, as 
Fraser states, on the blank page of the manu-
script: "According to my doctrine all are not 4 
ent ia rat ioni s. " 5 Another similar wavering between 
empiricism and rationalism is expressed in the 
following entry: 11 Mem. To begin the First Book 
not with mention of sensation and reflection, but 
instead of sensation to use perception or thought 
1. I, 52. 
2. I,15. 
3. lbid. 
4. I,15. 
5. I, 27. 
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in general. 111 Here, as was noted already by Fraser,2 
Berkeley clearly hesitates between Locke and Des-
cartes in regard to the fundamental terms he is to 
employ. But the clearest anticipation of the doc-
trine of "notion" is in the following query: 11 Q.u. 
Whether it were not better not to call the op era-
tions of the mind ideas - confining this term to 
3 
things sensible?" This insight Berkeley did not 
follow until the second edition of the Principles. 
lleanwhile, however, he did not return to the origi-
nal narrow sensualistic view, but followed a 
broader usage which included Descartes' view. The 
following definition from the Essay represents 
the meaning which Berkeley attached to "idea" 
throughout that work and the first edition of the 
Pri nc ipl es: "Note that, when I speak of tangible 
ideas, I take the word idea for the immediate 
object of sense, or understanding in which 1 ar ge 
signification it is commonly used by the moderns. 11 4 
Here idea stands for Descartes 1 "image" and 11 idea" 
combined. 'tli thin th is "1 ar ge signif i ca ti on 11 
1. I, 27. 
2. I, 220. 
3. I, 17. 
4. I, 149. 
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B.erkeley acknowledged more and more explicitly the 
world of the "understanding." The Cartesian ori-
entation of this development is attested by vari-
ous passages. Already in the first edition of the 
Principles we find the highly significant statement: 
"And in truth whoever shall go about to divide in 
his thoughts or abstract the existence of a spirit 
from its cogitation, will, I believe, find it no 
easy task. 111 . In De Mo tu Berkeley adopts the dis-
tinction between pure intellect and sensuous 
imagination in almost the words of Descartes and 
with the same meaning: · "Siquidem imaginatio 
nihil aliud est quam facultas representatrix rerum 
sensibilium, val actu existentium, vel saltem 
possibilium. Fugit insuper intellectum purum, 
quum facultas illa versetur tantum circa res 
spirituales et inextensas, cujusmodi sunt mantes 
nostrae, earumque habitus, passiones, virtutes, 
et similia. 112 This distinction, expressed in 
various ways, is evident throughout the later 
writings of Berkeley. Thus in the Theory of 
1. I, 312. 
2. I, 520. 
·-
0 
• 
.Vision Vindicated he vvri te s: ".... the Power or 
Cause of ideas is not an object of sense, but of 
reason", 
1 
and in Al ciphron: ".... we imagine before 
we reflect. 11 2 The doctrine of "signs", expounded 
most fully in Alciphron, is fundamentally an effort 
to do justice to the universal element of meaning, 
left unexplained in the theory of simple and immediate 
perception of sense-objects. When, finally, in the 
revised version of the Principles, Berkeley introduces 
"notion" as a definite term for conceptual knowledge, 
and adds new paragraphs to explain this new term, 3 
there is hardly anywhere a more instructive example 
of the failure of pure empiricism as. a theory of 
knowledge and of the necessity of recognizing the 
conceptual elements in the structure of knowledge. 
In the light of this development we can understand the 
otherwise altogether contradictory entry in the midst 
of the extravagant empiricism of the Commonplace ~: 
"There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with 
us. 11 4 It shows that Berkeley, in seeking rational 
1. II, 386. 
2. II,342. 
3. I,272,307,338 . 
4. I,34. 
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supplements bo his crude sense-philosoppy,consid-
ered, from the very beginning, the possibility of 
going all the way with Descartes, as against Locke, 
and of allowing the a priori element in, knowledge 
a full recognition. Thus the "later growth" 
which Berkeley in Siris dedicates "at the altar 
of truth" is implicit alneady in the "first fruits 11 • 1 
Closely allied is the second point of 
difference, the question of the trustworthiness 
of sense-experience. Here the nature of Descartes' 
scepticism must first be observed. When Berkeley 
with delightful braggadocio, so different from 
the cautious spirit of the mature philosopher in 
Siri s, asserts: "I am the fart he st from sceptl. ci sm 
of any man. I k 112 now •••• he expresses precisely 
the same attitude as that which permeates Descartes• 
Rules, where another youth points the way "ad 
certam & indubitatam cogniti~m". 3 And it is to 
the self-evident rational principles which he has 
found that Descartes clings also in the Medita-
tions in spite of his preliminary dram« of doubt-
1. III,299. 
2. I,26. 
3. X,262. 
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ing. No one who had studied the ~editations as 
carefully as Ber~eley could make the mistru<e of 
considering .Jescartes a genuine sceptic. When 
Ber:<eley called Descartes' doubts a "jest", he 
did nothine more than repeat Descartes' own ref-
1 
erence to them as "hyperbolicae et risu dignae". 
This description is in the last paragraph of 
~.:edit~tion VI, a paragraph which Berkeley knew 
particularly well, as will appear presently. 
Ber·:eley had read also Descartes' first reply to 
Hobbes, where the author of the Meditations ex-
plains thus his purpose in introducing the doubts: 
11 
•••• ut ostenderem quam firmae sint veritates 
quas postea propono, quandoquidem ab istis Meta-
physics dubitationibus labefactari non possunt. 112 
Berkeley could not but be aware, therefore, that 
Descartes' spectacle of doubt was only a part of 
his stratagem in routing the genuine sceptics. 
How flimsy the grounds are on which is 
based 3erkeley•s attack on Descartes' critique of 
sense-experience, becomes clear upon an examina-
1. VII,B3. hlolyneux•s translation: 
"extravagant arid ridiculous", op. 
cit.,p.110. 
2. VII,172. 
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tion of Berkeley's resolve 11 In vindication of the 
senses effectually to confute what Des Cartes 
saith in the last par. of the last I~ied., viz. 
th~t the senses oftener inform him falsely than 
truely". 1 Berkeley coµld never have carried out 
this resolve for the simple reason that Descartes 
in the passace quoted does not say what Berkeley 
alleges, but the direct opposite. Descartes' 
own words are as follows: 11 Uam sane, cum scia'll 
omnes sensus circa ea, quae ad corporis commoduru 
spectant, mul to frequentius verum indicare quam 
falsum, possirnque uti fere semper pluribus ex iis 
ad eandem rem exa;ninandam; & insuper memoria, quae 
praesentia cum praecedentibus connectit, & intel-
lectu, qui jam omnes errandi causas perspexit; non 
&nplus vereri debeo ne illa, quae mihi quotidie a 
sensibus exhibentur, sint f alsa, sed hyperbolicae 
sup er iorum di erur:i du bit atione s, ut ri su di gnae, 
sunt explodendae. 112 ,,Thence, then, the gross 
error in Berkeley's statement? My first suppo-
sition was that the impetuous philosopher of 
l. I,49. 
2. VII,89. 
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twenty odd years, in his overzealous "Nichts-
gemeinhabenwollen", has copied Descartes into his 
diary so hurriedly that he has read into the Med-
itations a figment of his own mind. But then I 
came upon the discovery that this misrepresent a-
tion is not the fault of Berkeley, but of the 
first English translator of the Meditations, 
Ifolyneux, Berkeley v1as simply transcribing the 
erroneous tra::lslation of Molyneux: "For seeing 
I know that all my Senses do oftener inform me 
f alsly than truely in those things which conduce 
to the Bodies advantage, etc. 111 Aside from the 
fact that vie have here conclusive proof that 
Berkeley in the Commonplace Book used !ifolyneux 's 
transl at ion of the Medi tat ions, this pas sage 
offers a striking example of the errors that 
have obscured the unity of the thought of Des-
o art es and that of Berkeley. 
What Descartes maintains in the para-
graph in question is that the isolated data of 
sense are chaotic and misleading, and need to be 
l • Op • c it • , p • 110. 
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i,nterpreted according to rational standards if 
they are to yield valid knowledge. He is clearly 
trying to establish the "coherence" criterion of 
truth, arguing that fragmentary sense-experience 
becomes knowledge only when it is viewed as "cum 
tota reliqua vita connecto 11 • 1 This same criterion 
is Berkeley's ultimate test of reality. And al-
though Berkeley stands too near Locke, and,is too 
engrossed in practical things, ever to attempt a 
systematic critique of sense-experience, yet his 
earlier buoyant statements gradually become guarded 
and critical. Thus in the Dialogues he has a good 
deal to say about the relativity of sense-qualities,2 
in much the sa'Tle strain as Descartes. And while in 
the Commonplace Book he knows reality better than 
"any other philosophers" with their "thousand 
doubts 11 ,3 in Alciphron he is content with such a 
modest opinion as "• ••• God may reveal, and yet 
reveal with a reserve upon certain remote and sub-
lime subjects, content to give us hints and glimp-
ses rather than views". 4 Finally in Siris Berkeley 
1. VII,90. 
2. I,390 ff. 
3. I, 21. 
4. II, 259. 
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virtually outdoes Descartes himself in the limits 
which he sets to sense-knowledge. "As unc;lerstand-
i ng p erce i veth not", says Berkeley, 11 that is, doth 
not hear, or see, or feel, so sense knoweth not: 
and al though the mind may use both sense and fancy, 
as means whereby to arrive at knowledge, yet sense 
or soul, so far forth as sensitive, knoweth noth-
ing. nl 
As regards the third point of difference, 
constituted by Berl--::eley's alleged epistemological 
monism, it must be observed that Berkeley gave 
full assent to this view only temporarily, and 
only with reference to sense-objects. He was in-
clined to give it up even in this restricted 
application. The monistic entries in the Common-
place Book ( "The very existence of ideas consti-
tutes the soul." 11 Consciousness, perception, 
existence of ideas, seem to be all one. 11 "Mind is 
a congeries of perceptions, 11 etc. ) follow one 
2 
another in an unbroken succession. This indi-
cates that there was one specific time when Berk-
1. III,271. 
2. I,27-28; entries 567-571. 
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eley considered the adoption of this view. But 
already then he had misgivings, for the next entry 
after this list re ads: "The having ideas is not 
the same thing with perception. 11 1 The question 
assumed acain the form of a decision between Locke 
and Descartes. Descartes held that over against 
the objects of thought was the soul, the very 
existence of which was to think, and which, there-
fore, must always think, in so far as it is a 
"thinking substance". Locke, on the other hand, 
believed in the possibility of interruptions of 
consciousness: "1.!en 2 think not always." Now the 
significant thine is that after his brief monistic 
stage, described above, Berkeley already in the 
Commonplace Book, about a hundred entries farther, 
reached a definite decision in favor of Descartes: 
"Locke's out - the case is different. We can have 
an idea of body without motion, but not of soul 
3 
without thought." The same matter came up later 
in precisely the same form in Berkeley's corre-
spondence with Johnson. Johnson wrote to Berkeley: 
1. I,28: entry 572 • 
2. Essay,Bk.II,ch.1,10. 
3. I,41: entry 697. 
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"As to the Esse of Spirits, I know Des Cartes held 
the Soul al ways thinks, but I tho •t I.Ir. Lo eke had 
sufficiently confuted this Notion."1 In his re-
ply Berkeley criticised the view of Locke as beirg 
based on abstraction and held to the Cartesian view 
in this modified fonn: "That the soul of man is 
passive as well as active I make no doubt. 112 The 
formal rejection of epistemological monism occur-
red as early as the first edition of the Princi-
ples, where Berkeley makes emphatically a dis-
tinction between the knowing subject and its 
ideas: "If I should say that 1 was nothing, or 
that I was an idea or notion, nothing could be 
more evidently absurd than either of these propo-
sitions.113 In the important sections 139 and 142 
of the Principles he stands out as a strict dualist 
not only in regard to our knowledge of other spirits 
but even in regard to our knowledge of ourselves, 
"I" and "notion" being sharply distinguished. VVhile 
in regard to sense-objects Berkeley never formally 
abandoned the monism implied in "esse is percipi", 
1. I.Woodbridge Riley,A~erican Philosophy, 
the Early Schools (New York:Dodd,1907), 
p.89. 
2. Ibid.p. 92. 
3. I, 335. 
178 
-
.-
yet he revealed plainly the trend.of his mature 
thinking by omitting from the second edition of 
the Principles such a statement as "In truth, the 
object and the sensation are the same thing, and 
cannot therefore be abstracted from each other. 111 
The fourth point of difference was the 
opposition between Berkeley's theory of abstrac-
tion and the hypo stasis implied in Descartes' 
criterion of truth. Here there is a more sig-
nificant diverbence than in the three preceding 
cases. Descartes holds that to give a clear and 
distince definition is to express an essence. 
Thus al though he can give no other grounds for the 
existence of material substance than the analyt-
ical clearness and distinctness of the concept, he 
infers the reality of matter and thereby involves 
himself in endless difficulties. Berkeley saw more 
clearly that the test of consistency must be supple-
mented by the test of coherence. He did not tire 
of stressing the fact that many of the clear and 
distinct ideas to which men have held are purely 
1. I, 260. 
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imaginary. Yet is is easy to overe st.ima te Berkeley's 
critique of abstraction by negl acting to observe 
that his e~rly extre~e nominalism was a passing 
stage and that he came later to assign an important 
functional value to abstractions. In the second 
edition of the Principles he makes the following 
significant addition: "And here it must be ack-
nowledged that a man may consider a figure merely 
as triangular; without attending to the particular 
qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides • 
.§.Q_ far he may abstr<i.ct. 111 Ueberweg correctly comments 
on this passage: 11 Dieses Zugestiindniss Berkeley's 
reicl;lt zu, um der recht verstandenen Abstraction 
" ihre volle Bedeutung fur wissenschaftliche 
Erkennt nis s zu sichern.. • • Di ese Fahigk ei -& i st in 
der That ein Vorzug des l.:enschen und auf ihrer 
hochsten Stufe ain Vorzug des wissenschaftlich 
Gebildeten.. Ohne sie gabe es keine wissenschaftliche 
Erkenntniss. 113 This emphasis on abstract ideas as 
representing a function or capacity of the mind is 
essentially that of Descartes. And when Berkeley 
1. I,249. 
2. Emphasis mine. 
3. 11 Anmerkungen" in the German translation 
of the Principles, (Berlin:Heimann, 
1869) ,pp .109-110. 
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in Alciphron develops his doctrine of "signs", with 
its recognition of the representative and inferen-
tial functions in knowledge, and its dualism of mind 
and meanings, he does not differ radically from 
Descartes' epistemology. The final stage of 
Berkeley's thought in Siris is hardly different 
from medieval realism. There a genuinely Platonic 
scale of knowing and being is posited, ascending 
from sense and the other lower functions of the soul 
to reason and finally to God. In view of these 
developments we must call the difference between 
Descartes and Berkeley even in the matter of ab-
straction an apparent rather than a real one. 
Having disposed of the apparent dissimi-
1 arities, let us now turn to the specific similari-
ties. There is an impressive resemblance, first of 
all, with regard to the ob,ject of knowledge. When 
Berkeley like Locke, made knowledge consist in ideas 
and their relations, this "new'VB.y of ideas", as Reid 
pointed out, was the way of Descartes. We must 
bear in mind Descartes' definition of idea as mental 
object and his insistence on the mind-dependent 
nature of the secondary qualities. And when Descartes 
181 
in the caption of the second 1'leditation asserts 
that the mind is "notior quam corpus", 1 and in the 
sixth 1,:edi tation inquires on the basis of the 
demonstrated existence of the mind and of God 
whether material things can exist at all, these 
considerations could hardly have failed to impress 
Berkeley. It has already been shown that Berkeley 
abandoned his early narrow empirical use of "idea" 
and made room for the Cartesian meaning of the term. 
When in the Principles he states explicitly that he 
is using the term "idea" instead of "thing" because 
he did not wish "to denote somewhat existing with-
out the mind 11 , 2 it is impossible to take seriously 
Woodbridge 's hypothesis of the "realism" of Berkeley. 3 
For Berkeley, as for Descartes, the world of knowl-
edge is constituted by the mind and its ideas and 
the problem of knowledge is to verify the validity 
of the ideas. Descartes• influence in this general 
outlook on the purpose of an epistemological inquiry 
is evident in the way in which Berkeley defines his 
problem in the Introduction of the Principles: 
1. VII,23. 
2. I ,278. 
3. F.J.E.Woodbridge, "Berkeley's Realism", 
Studies in ~History of Ideas, ed. by 
Columbia University Dept. of Phil., 
Vol.I,188-215. (N.Y.:Col. Univ. Press, 
1918) For element of truth in this view, 
see below,pp.148-149. 
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" •••• so long as I confine my thoughts to my own 
ideas, divested of words, I do not see how I can 
easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, I 
clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived 
in thinking I have an idea which I have not •••• 
To discern the agreements or disagreements there 
are between my ideas, to see what ideas are includ-
ed in any compound idea and what are not, there is 
nothing more requisite than an attentive perception 
"l of what passes in my own understanding. 
The use of "cl early and adequately" in 
the preceding quotation indicates that Berkeley fol-
lowed Descartes not only in regard to the object, 
but also in regard to the criterion of knowledge. 
In the Commonplace Book Berkeley makes one specific 
reference to 11 cle ar and distinct ideas" and remarks: 
11They give good rules, tho' perhaps they themselves 
do not al ways observe them. "2 In another pl ace he 
refers to "clear and determinate meaning". 3 The in-
fluence of the Cartesian test of ideas is reflected 
when Berkeley defines hiw own criterion as "strong, 
1. I,254. 
2. I, 38. 
3. I,33. 
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lively, and distinct 11 ; 1 "affecting, orderly and 
distinct", 2 as opposed to "faint, weak and unsteady"? 
"strong, orderly, and co her ant". 4 Like Descartes, 
Berkeley also appeals to conceivability as the test 
of truth. 5 Whatever is free from 11 repugnancy" is 
real. It must be noted, however, that the emphasis 
of Descartes is on conceivability to reason, while 
that of Berkeley is on perceivability to imagination, 
each thus stressing but one of the two aspects which, 
as Kant has shown, are inseparable in the structure 
of knowledge. We must bear in mind also that Des-
cart es' criterion represents, on the whole, analytical 
clearness, according to his ideal of mathematics, 
while Berkeley has a firmer grasp on the synthetic 
character of knowledge. 6 Berkeley does not draw as 
sharp a line as does Descartes between reason and 
experience, but learns rather to point out the con-
structive agency of reason within experience, thus 
moving gradually toward 'the synthesis of the two, 
which he achieves in Sirls. Berkeley may be said 
in this respect to mark an advance beyond Descartes 
1. I,273. 
2. I,277. 
3. I,276. 
4. I,275,292,293. 
5. I,242,269,404,440,450, et passim. 
6. The "coherence" criterion is most 
clearly employed in I,292-293,452,469. 
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t~ward the direction of Kant. 
But the synthetic character of knowledge 
requires as its basis the activity of the knowing 
subject. And it is here that a fundamental Cartesian 
conception paves the wa:y for the Berkeleian advance. 
The mind for Descartes was an "actus purus" which 
has the power to think ideas without requiring an 
external stimulus. This view had for Berkeley al-
ready in the Commonplace Book a greater faecination 
than the "tabula rasa" mind of Locke. He noted with 
approval that Descartes makes our knowledge of a 
subject dependent upon its activity, 1 and followed 
Descartes in defining spirit as 11 act us purus 11 • 2 
But if the creative character of thought was only 
vaguely apprehended by Descartes in his doctrine of 
innate and man-made i_deas, it was at first even farther 
from the min::i of Berkeley. The influence of the 
Lockean view of ready-made ideas imprinted from 
without on a passive mind takes in the following 
the form of attacking Descartes on this score: "Quoth 
Des Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me, for I 
l. I, 49. 
2. I,40,52. 
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c..an neither add to nor subtract from it. No more 
can he add to nor take from any other idea, even 
1 of his own making." When in his correspondence 
with Johnson, as has been noted, he was forced to 
choose between Locke and Descartes on the activity 
of the self, his reply was the half-hearted: "That 
the soul of man is passive as well as active I 
2 
make no doubt. 11 Yet it was Berkeley, and not 
Descartes, who made the nearer approach to Kant. 
For Descartes was less able to free himself from 
the notion of naive realism, according to which 
there is an objective external world which in 
knowledge impresses itself upon our minds. This 
notion forced Descartes into the theory of repre-
sentative perception, to the view that there are 
images that mediate between ourselves and the 
external world. Berkeley's "new principle", 
according to which ideas are at once thought and 
thing and afford a first-hand contact with reality, 
enabled him to reject Descartes' metaphysical dual-
ism and with it the theory of representative per-
1. I,50; 
2. Riley,op. cit.,p.92. 
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q..ept ion. This fact is clearly established already 
I 
in the Commonplace Book: "Say Des Cartee & Mal-
branch, God hath given us strong inclinations to 
think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that bodies 
do exist. Pray wt mean they by this? Would they have 
it that the ideas of imagination are images of, and 
proceed from, the ideas of sense? ~his is true, 
but cannot be their meaning; for they speak of ideas 
of sense as themselves proceeding from, being like 
unto - I know not wt. 111 Berkeley develops this view 
very cogently in the Principles. 11 An idea," he says, 
11 c an be 1 ike nothing but an idea. 112 Again, 110ur 
knowledge •••• has been very much obscured and con-
founded •••• by supposing a two-fold existence of 
sense - the one intelligible or in the mind, the 
3 
other real and without the mind." Berkeley's in-
sight enables him to demolish utterly the supposed 
source of representative images. Hence the entry in 
4 the Commonplace~: "Ask a man, I mean a Cartesian, 
why he supposes this vast structure, this compages 
of bodies? he sh al 1 be at a st and; he 111 not have 
1. I,51-52. 
2. I, 261. 
3. I, 305. 
4. I am here making use of Lorenz' revision 
of Fraser's text on the basis of the 
original manuscript. Vide supra, p. 24. 
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Qne word to say. Wch sufficiently shews the folly of 
l the hypothesis". And it is plainly to Descartes and 
his followers that Berkeley refers in the Principles 
when .he speaks of those philosophers who "after 
all their labouring and struggle of thought, •••• 
are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-
evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence 
of sensible things. 11 2 When matter, the unknown 
occasion of sense-images, is ruled out, the way is 
left open for a real development of the activity 
of the mind, a doctrine which Descartes affirmed 
~ut of which, embarrassed by the VYOrld of matter, 
he could not take advantage. That Berkeley, who 
was free from the embarrassment, did not make far-
ther progress than he did, was because he laid so 
much stress on the activity of the infinite mind 
that the finite was rendered passive in comparison. 
And here again Berkeley followed in the footsteps 
of Descartes, as he himself notes in the Commonplace 
Book: "Locke in his 4th Book, and Des Cart es in Med. 
6, use the same argument for the existence of objects, 
1. I,16. 
2 •. I, 306. 
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viz. that sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our 
will."1 This objective world, which we must 
accept whether we will or no, is willed by God, 
who,is the ultimate reference of both Descartes 
and Berkeley. Since Berkeley's God, like that of 
Descartes, is the sole constitutive source of 
reality-bearing ideas it is impossible for either 
philosopher to rise to the Kantian level. This 
fact invalidates the distinction drawn by Johnston: 
11 Vwh 11 e De sc art es ' subject in kn owl edge performs 
only regulative functions, Berkeley's subject is 
constitutive of experienca." 2 
Another specific agreement in the episte-
mology of Descartes and that of Berkeley is the 
identity in the meaning of the term intuition as 
used by the two philosophers. Metz in his exposi-
tion of this matter seems to me to be guilty of 
misunderstanding both Descartes and Berkeley. His 
statement is as follows: "Ganz im Anschluss an 
Descartes und Locke vertritt Berkeley die Lehre von 
der unmittelbaren Sel bstgewisshei t meines eigenEn Ego. 
1. I, 49. 
2. Johnston,op. cit.,p.8. 
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Durch einen unmittelba.ren intuitiven Erkenntnisakt 
bin ich mir meiner eigenen Existenz ala einas denken-
den, perzipierenden, und wollenden geistigen Wesens 
bewusst.n1 Now it is necesss.ry to distinguish, 
first of all, between the use of "refle~ion" by 
Locke a:zxl that by Berkeley. For Locke, all know-
ledge is of sensuous origin, and reflexion consists 
in perceiving, thinking, willing, recalling, and 
discerning, the ideas of sense. 2 Berkeley speaks 
of reflexion only in connection with "notions", i.e., 
conceptual knowledge. Reflexion thus has nothing 
to do with perception, but means simply, as its 
etymology implies, a bending back of the mind to 
view its own operations, i.e., the act of intro-
spection. Failure to grasp this difference between 
Locke anl Berkeley leads Metz to identify Berkeley's 
"intuition" with Locke's "reflexion": "Berkeley 
spricht bier von einer Art innerem GefUhl oder 
.. 
Bewusstsein das er auch einmal in Ubereinstimmung 
mit Locke Reflexion nennt."3 Just as Berkeley 
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differed from Locke in the meaning attached to "reflex.:tonn, 
1. Metz, op. cit., p. 106. 
2. Ess~, Bk. II, ch. 1. 
3 .. Meti; op. cit., p. 106. 
:1' 
,there is also a significant difference in the mean-
ing they convey by "intuition". Locke divided 
knowledge into intuitive, demonstrative, and sen-
sitive, and held that only the first kind yields 
certainty. Since for Berkeley ideas are not a screen 
between the world and our perception of it, he draws 
no such distinction between perception and intui-
tion. Intuition is simply immediate perceptual 
awareness and does not constitute a new type of 
knowledge. There is real significance in Berk-
eley 's words in the Commonplace ~, "I know with 
an intuitive knowledge the existence of other things 
as well as my own soul, 11 lfor it is by intuition that 
he claims in the Principles to apprehend his basic 
metaphysical principle, "ease is percipi 11 • 2. The 
meaning is plain enough: the "esse is percipi" is 
a rational principle, not given by any particular 
sense-datum, but accepted because of its rational 
self-evidence. Now it is precisely the same way 
that Descartes employs the term intuition. And it 
is by this means that he apprehends his main prin-
1. I,26,n.552. Cf .I,24,n.536. 
2. I, 258. . 
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ciple, the "cogito". Berkeley follows Descartes, too, 
in using the expression "light of nature" synony-
mously with this simple self-evident knowledge. 1 
The self, contrary to the interpretation of Metz 
and others, is known b.Y Berkeley, not by a 11 Gefuhl, 
but notionally, i.e., inferentially, in the same way 
as we know other minds. Berkeley's one or two unguard-
ed expressions2 in this respect are to be inter-
preted in the light of his central position, fre-
quently and clearly stated. 3 
Still another epistemological agreement 
between our tv.u philosophers is the importance 
which they both attach to the will in knowledge. 
Here again Berkeley is post-Cartesian and pre-
Kantian. I have called attention to Descartes' 
explanation of error as the free but intelligent 
use of the will. The will is the active agency in 
the acquisition of knowledge. In the last analysi~ 
it is we ourselves making use of the faculty of free 
will who accept what we consider as possessing 
truth-value and reject what is worthless. This 
1. I,475; III,296. 
2. "Inward feeling" in I, 307; "conscientia 
quaedam interna11 in I, 507. · 
3. I,258,307,336,339,341,448,450. 
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acceptance is based on immediate rational intuition 
and not on syllogistic demonstration. The strong 
voluntaristic element in Descartes is overlooked by 
those who describe him as the father of a stil tad 
rationalistic system. It is not difficult to bring 
to the fore strong value-ingredients in Descartes• 
theory of knowledge, by noting, e.g., as Owenl has 
done, the significance of "simple natures" as 
successful hypotheses, or by attending with Balz2 
to the numerous passages in which Descartes inter-
prets sensations as guides to organic welfare. Now 
although Locke had made it the fashion in philosophy 
simply to catalogue and classify ideas. Berkeley was 
quick to apprehend Descartes' emphasis on the Will. 
He approved of Descartes' view that the substantiality 
of the self consists in its being "the subject of 
several acts". 3 Consequently, he defined his own 
conception of the self in terms of will.4 In the 
Principles he makes it plain that the will is not a 
faculty distinct from the knowing subject; it "is 
the soul as it operates about ideas".5 This view is 
1. R.B.Owen, 11Truth and Error in 
Descartes" in Studies in the 
History of Ideas (NewYOrk: 
Columbia Univ. Press,1918),pp.151 ff. 
2. Balz, op. cit. 
3. I,49. 
4. I,16. 
5. I,272 
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developed in Alciphron to the extreme of pragmatism, 
truth being there conceived as mere utility.I In 
making the pursuit of truth a utilitarian affair 
Berkeley diverged temporarily from the position to 
which Descartes was always faithful, namely loyalty 
to rational truth as such, ·but in Siris he returned 
to it unreservedly. It remained for Kant, the 
patient explorer of the realm of pure thought, and 
as far removed as possible from slavery to practical 
interests, to enthrone the will and to bring about a 
due recognition in philosophy of the active and 
practical side of our nature. 
There remains to be considered one other 
significant resemblance between the Cartesian and the 
Berkeleian theories of knowledge. In order to escape 
solipsism, and in order to bridge the gulf between his 
two substances, Descartes appealed to God. I deal only 
with ideas, he cl aims, but the veracity of God enables 
me to believe that my ideas represent a world which 
really exists. Now the Bishop of Cloyne was by no 
means impervious to this example of summoning God to 
1. II,63,151,175,201 et passim. 
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assist in epistemological difficulties. Berkeley 
did not need God to join thought and thing, for 
according to his doctrine they were already joined 
in sense-perception. Hence he could regard as a 
1
'Jest" the appeal to divine veracity in matters of 
individual sense-perception.1 But the escape from 
solipsism, in the form of the problem of communi-
cation, was a genuine difficulty on his principles. 
He faces it boldly: "The same idea which is in my 
mind cannot be in yours or in any other mind. Doth 
it not therefore follow, from your principles, that 
no two can see the same thing? 112 After unsatisfactory 
attempts to answer this question, first by making it 
a mere verbalism and then by the concept of 
description, Berkeley had to be content with the 
solution that God causes the ideas in our minds to 
be similar. How near Berkeley's general position was 
to that of Descartes is plain when we compare the 
Cartesian principle that the knowledge of all other 
things depends on the knowledge of God ( most 
9oncisely stated in Principles, I, ·13 ) with Berkeley's 
assertion: "To me, I say, 1 t is evident that the being 
1. I, 446. 
2. I,466. 
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~f a Spirit - infinitely wise, good, and powerful -
is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appear-
ances of nature. 111 
The question inevitably rises, whether 
such a solution of the problem of knowledge, 
transcending the ordinary bounds of epistemology, 
is justified. It would seem as if both God and 
truth would suffer: God is made a mere "deus ex 
machina",and truth loses.all standing in its own 
right and comes to depend on the caprice of God. 
Such a criticism has often been made of Descartes, 2 
and Hudson applies it vigorously to Berkeley: 
"Is any system, logically defenseless, yet so 
import ant that God may be called in to save it? 
This is doing too much violence to logic, - let 
alone God. 11 3 In reply to such criticism, it must 
be noted, first of all, that God is for neither 
philosopher an extraneous factor, a "deus ex 
machina", that must be "called in'!, ·but is in both 
cases from the very beginning the central principle 
·of knowledge as well as of reality. God is the 
source both of the laws of nature and of the laws 
1. I, 297. 
2. E.g.Balz,op. cit.; Owen, op. cit. 
3. J.W.Hudson,The Treatment of Personality 
by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume 
(Columbia:Univ. of Missouri Press, 
1911)p.71. 
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of thought. Descartes makes his position very clear 
in a letter to Mersenne:" •••• les verit's 
, 
mathematiques lesquelles vous nomtnes eternelles, ont 
I • 'I. 
este establies de Dieu & en dependent ent1eremant, 
aussy bien que tout le reste des creatures. C'est en 
effait parler de Dieu comma d'un Iuppiter ou Saturne, 
& 1 'assuiettir au Stix & aus destinees, de dire que 
ces verites sont independantes de luy. Ne 
I 
craignes point, ie vous prie, d'assurer & de publier 
par tout que c•est Dieu qu' a establi cas lois en la 
nature, ainsy qu• un Roy establist les lois en son 
Royausme. 111 In another letter2 Descartes says that to 
speak of God as if he were a mere name, and not to 
use him in knowledge as the cause of all truth, is to 
be an atheist and to give up the problem of knowledge 
as insoluble. There can be no doubt as to Descartes' 
meaning. In his analysis of the objects of knowledge 
he is led to look for their source, and he can 
comprehend that source only as a unified and active 
mental world-ground. He has to choose between 
complete nescience and God and he chooses the latter. 
1. I,145 . 
2. I,149-150. 
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~d if this interpretation of the source of knowl-
edge is illogical, so much the worse for logic that 
cannot give a more adequate explanation to so 
important an inquiry. Aside from this epistemol-
ogical necessity, what positive:--reasons are there 
for preferring God to nescience? The full answer 
to this question must be reserved for a later 
chapter. Epistemologically, there are two 
significant trends in Descartes' arguments for God. 
First, it is evident from the highly significant 
paragraph under Prin. I, 13 that the appeal to God's 
veracity is Descartes 1 way of stating the "coherence" 
criterion of truth. our knowledge, he explains, is 
fragmentary, i.e., it remains a broken series of 
considerations drawn from these or those premises, 
unless we can relate it with certainty to the whole 
process of knowledge at its very source. Hamelin, 
one of Descartes• profoundest interpreters, shows 
keen insight when he points out that Descartes' 
I ' 11veracite 11 means " •••• parlant a la raison et 
' I 
,autorisant la raison a etendre ses affirmations 
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aux choses de f ai t" .1 The other trend in Descartes 1 
theory of knowledge, which makes for God, is his 
tendency to identify being with value. According to 
the ontological argument, God exists because he is 
perfect, and perfection implies existence. This 
, 
thought is present in the "veracite" in the form 
that God is not only the source of all experience, 
but his perfection, including moral perfection, also 
guarantees that he is a trustworthy source. Thus 
both the relatedness of knowledge and the value-
element it implies lead Descartes to explain the 
world by reference to God rather than to give up 
the whole task of explanation. And Berkeley 
follows close on the heels of Descartes. Through-
out his writings, God is the source of ideas, the 
"author of nature". In the mature expression of 
his thought in Siris Berkeley explicitly desig-
nates by the name God the union of coherence and 
value in the universe: "The several beings vmich 
compose the universe are parts of the same system; 
they combine to carry on one end, and perfect one 
1. Hamel in, op. cit. , p. 253 • 
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whole. And this aptness and concurrence thereunto 
furnishes the partial particular idea of Good in 
the distinct creatures. Hence it might have come 
>J\ /j ~ \ C/C 
to pass that T' 11 y~ '70 Y and To L.. ¥ were regarded 
as one and the same" .1 This combination of the 
One and the Good,Berkeley, following, as he says, 
both Plato and Moses, calls God. 
I do not find, therefore, that the appeal 
to God in the epistemology of Descartes and in that 
of Berkeley violates either truth or God, so long 
as coherence has any application to truth, and 
causality has any application t.o God, and so long as 
there is any justification for seeking a unified 
ultimate explanation of knowledge. The appeal to 
God represents the thoroughness with which both 
philosophers combine their theory of knowledge and 
their theory of reality into a systematic world-
view according to the highest values they know. 
1. III,288. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
THEORY OF REALITY. 
The aim of this chapter is to compare 
Descartes and Berkeley in regard to their funda-
mental metaphysical principles. Considerable 
portions of this subject have already been antici-
pated because of the close connection in both 
philosophers between the theory of knowledge and 
the theory of reality. Certain other portions, 
such as the proofs for the existence of God, will 
be reserved for a more specific consideration later. 
The important thing to bear in mind for the present 
is that the thought of Descartes, as Berkeley knew 
it, formed an imposing and influential system in which 
both nature in general and human nature in particu-
lar were deduced directly from ontological first 
principles that were considered as entirely new and 
revolutionary. Before proceeding to the comparison 
it is necessary to sketch the outline of the entire 
structure of Cartesianism in its original for~. 
r:'" 
r' 
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I. Descartes' Theory. 
The best sources for this outline of 
Descartes• metaphysics are the Meditations and the 
Principles, not only because they afford the author's 
own most compact and authentic statements, but also 
because it was through these works that the system 
of Descartes made its impression on Berkeley. Let 
us, then, return first to the Meditations with this 
new interest. 
Having subjected to criticism all judgments 
of existence, Descartes obtains his first indubitable 
hold on reality by means of the self-evident rational 
principle: ncogito ergo sum.a But what is this •ra 
which alone is known to exist? I exist only as a 
thinking being. What about the existence of my 
body and of all other material things? By examining 
carefully a piece of wax Descartes finds that the 
existence of a material body consists in extension, 
for all its other characteristics are transitory. 
Having proceeded from the existence of the mind to 
the existence of God, and having obtained from the 
nature of God a guaranty for the reality of 
everything that is perceiv~d clearly and distinctly, 
Descartes returns in the last two Meditations to 
the problem of the existence of the external 
world. I have clear and distinct ideas, first of 
all, of the principles of math3matics. They are 
not the invention of my mind nor do they originate 
ih sense-perception. I have never seen a perfect 
triangle; yet in the concept of a triangle "···· 
est ta.men profecto determinata quaedam ejus natura, 
1 
sive essentia, sive forma, immutabilis & aeterna", 
so that I am compelled to affirm that the triangle 
is something and not a negation. The same pro-
cedure of analyzing the origin and meaning of a 
concept yields a demonstration of God. But what 
of the world of material objects the essence of 
which was seen to be extension? The existence of 
this world cannot be asserted on the strength of 
what the senses suggest. It is rationally self-
evident, however, that our sensations have an 
external source, for it is not in our power to 
determine what we perceive. Since, moreover, we 
can, in terms of extension, motion, and figure, 
form a perfectly clear and distinct idea of the 
1. VII, 64. 
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existence oi a material object, we must, trusting 
in the truthfulness of God, conclude that it 
really exists. A final analysis, however, of my-
self and of my world yields this conclusion: 11 •••• 
per naturam enim, generaliter spectatam, nihil nunc 
aliud quam vel Deum ipsum, vel creatarum coordina-
tionem a Deo institutam intelligo; nee aliud per 
naturam meam in particulari, quam complexionem 
1 
eorum omnium quae mihi a Deo sunt tributa. 11 
In the Principles Descartes gives more 
exact definitions of his concepts. Of basic im-
portance is the definition of substance: "Per 
substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam 
rem quae ita existit ut nulla alia re indigeat ad 
existendum." 2 This definition applies only to 
God, the absolute being, and not 11 univoce" to 
finite beings, which are "substantiae creatae" 
dependant on God. The latter are independent only 
in the relative sense that in order to exist they 
require nothing else than God. Finite substance 
are of two kinds: matter_ ( substantia extensa sive 
1. VII, 80. 
2. VIII, 24. 
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corpus) and mind ( substantia cogitans sive mens) • 
A substance is conceived through its attributes. 
In perceiving an attribute we must infer that there 
is something which supports it and to which it is 
related as an attribute, for to nothing no qual-
ities can belong. Each of the finite substances 
has one permanent attribute which constitutes its 
essence. The attribute of matter is extension, 
that of mind is thought. The accidental ~haracteristics 
of substance, its modes, vary. Figure, situation of 
parts, and motion, are modes of matter; understand-
ing, irr~gination, recollection, and other mental 
faculties, are modes of the mind. To the modes of 
thought belong al so the universals of logic. Having 
formed a clear conception of the attribute of a 
substance we have comprehended fully the substance 
itself. Thus we hi:l.ve clear and distinct knowledge 
of the mind as the subject of the activities that 
manifest themselves in consciousness. The existence 
of a material body, on the other hand, consists 
entirely in being extended, i.e., in filling space 
and moving according to certain mechanical laws. 
205 
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Mind and matter are direc~ly opposed to each 
other and have not the slightest homogeneity or 
resemblance. hlatter is infinitely divisible and 
passive, whereas mind is indivisible and active. 
Descartes' system is thus based on a 
very few but clearly defined principles, the 
chief of which are: mind, conceived as pure 
thought; matter, conceived as extension; and God, 
the absolute reality. Following R. M. Eatont we 
may call Cartesianism, from this point of view, 
"trialistic", rather than "dualistic." But it 
might also be called "pluralistic", for Descartes 
2 
often speaks of a whole host of "verites eter-
nelles" ( "aeternae veritates" ), comprising all 
the "simple natures" already discussed in the pre-
ceding chapter. These include mathmatical and 
moral axioms, as well as the essences of physical 
objects. But ultimately the only metaphysical 
reality is God, for he has created the world of 
"v~rites eternelles" and on his will depends also 
the distinction between essences and existences. 3 
1. R. M. Eaton, •Introduction", Descartes 
Selections (New York: Scribner, 1927), 
p. xxi. 
2. E.g., I, 320; III, 428-429; VIII, 23-24. 
3. I, 145 ff. 
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Descartes' metaphysics falls naturally 
under the ·traditional di visions of ontology, cos-
mology, and psychology, for the Cartesian first 
principles, discussed above, leave physical nature 
and mind as two s~parate realms of being. Let us 
now turn to Descartes• application of his onto-
logical principles to the philosophy of nature and 
the philosophy of mind. 
Though suppressing his Le Monde, Descartes 
gives in the Meteors and especially in the last 
three books of the Principles a detailed account of 
the world of matter and motion. His purpose is to 
eliminate.from natural science all mentalism and 
vitalism and to hand the whole physical world over 
to a mechanical explanation. As the ground of his 
cosmology he posits the laws of the conservation of 
matter and motion. Motion is defined as "translatio 
unius partis materiae, sive unius corporis, ex 
vicinia eorum corporwn quae illud immediate contin-
gunt & tanquam qui essentia spectantur, in viciniam 
aliorum. 111 It is to be noted that this limitation 
of motion to spatial "translatio 11 differs widely 
1. Principles, II~ 25. VIII, 53. 
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from Aristotle's conceptioh of motion, which in-
cludes a.11 qualitative as well as quantitative 
change. All motion is derived from the creative 
act of God and is relative to his immutable nature. 
God has created the material world to be such that 
there is a prescribed amount of matter and a pre-
scribed amount of motion in it. God, in accord 
with his own immutability, preserves the balance 
of motion in the world unchanged. Descartes may 
be said to anticipate the law of the conservation 
of energy, which was not established until the 
middle of the nineteenth century. He conceives 
quite fully, on the other hand, the law of inertia, 
Continuation of motion, he holds, does not require 
any special action any more than is required by 
remaining at rest, and a moving object tends to 
proceed in a straight line. With gravitation he 
is altogether unfamiliar. 
The material world, for Descartes, is 
colorless, soundless, scentless, t~steless, and 
intangible, for the sense-qualities of material 
objects are as·subjective as the pleasure and pain 
208 
caused by them. This view was a striking innova-
tion; it was carried over by Locke in hio theory 
of the subjectivity of the "secondary ~ualitiesn, 
and came to have a profound influence on Berkeley. 
The only characteristics which Descartes allows the 
"res extensa" to retain are geometrical figure ahd 
motion in space. Carrying out his identification 
of matter with extension, he denies the possibility 
of empty space. To say that an object expands does 
not mean that it is projected into a vacuum but 
that certain pores are created among its constitu-
ent particles, which some other matter fills, just 
as a. sponge expands when filled with water. When 
we say that something is empty, we usually mean 
that our senses do not perceive the matter which 
fills it, as when we say that a glass filled with 
air is "empty". It must be noted, finally, that 
Descartes' theory of matter is a "corpuscular" 
theory. Matter is composed of infinitely divisible 
tiny particles, "corpuscula", which vary in size 
and shape. The properties of natural objects are 
dependent on the character of the constituent 
209 
corpuscles and the speed with which they move. 
There are some especially delicate corpuscles 
which move with remarkable speed and it is they 
that fill immediately the supposed empty spaces 
left when an object moves. The composition of 
various metals, the nature of fire, and magnetic 
attraction, all these are explained by the motion 
of corpuscles. 
In Book III of the Principles, Descartes 
presents his famous theory of "vortices" or 
"tourbillons". Rejecting the Ptolemaic conception, 
he holds that the heavenly bodies float in an 
ethereal liquid matter which fills the whole 
universe. This "liquiditas" moves in large cir-
cles, "in modum cujsdam vorticis", and carries 
in its whirls the earth and the planets around the 
sun. We cannot say that the earth moves, for in 
its relation to its adjacent ether it remains 
motionless. Descartes is ever fond of considering 
the heavenly bodies. He speculates on how they 
might have been formed out of a primordial chaos 
according to fixed laws of motion. He is thus in 
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a sense the precursor of Kant and La Place. But 
since the Bible says that the world was created at 
one specific time, Descartes calls his own ex-
planation a mere fiction which is intended only 
to assist in scientific observation. 
The most significant things to remember 
from Descartes• cosmic panorama from which, as he 
1 
asserts, not a single phenomenon in nature has 
been omitted, are: ( 1 ) Matter is identified 
with space or extension. Extension is reduced to 
a mathmatical entity, and the world of corporeal 
objects becomes ultimately a mode in which they 
2 
are conceived by us. The possibility of space exist-
ing qua space is denied. ( 2 ) Time, likewise, is 
only a "modus cogitandi 11 • 3 Time is dependent on 
duration, and duration is a concept we create out 
of the concept of motion. The persistence of time 
from moment to moment is due entirely to the con-
tinued creative activity of God. ( 3 ) Motion is 
an act of mutual displacement of parts within a 
plenum and involves a continuous circular chain. 
1. Principles, IV, 199. 
2. Principles, II, 10. 
3. Principles, I, 57. 
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Motion is a relative concept deduced from God. 
( 4) Natural "force" is synonymous vrith "inertia". 
The only dynamic explanation of causality is the 
creative will of God. ( 5 ) There are no final 
causes; yet the whole world of mechanism exhibits 
a radical contingency in its relation to God. 
In turning now to Descartes' philosophy 
of mind, it is to be noted that he combines a 
strictly mechanical view of the body with a purely 
spiritual view of the soul. He rejects both the 
"vegetative" and the "sensitive" soul of Aristotle. 
The body is a part of the world of matter and hence 
a machine. Its death is due to a disorder in the 
mechanism, which causes the soul to vacate it. 
Animals are automatic and have no mental life what-
ever. If we had sufficient mechanical skill to 
build automata with structure exactly similar to that 
of animals, they would be animals, but if such a robot 
had the form of a man, it would not be man, for in-
telligence and will would still be lattking. By his 
doctrine of automatism Descartes seeks, as he ex-
plains in a letter to the Marquis of Newcastle, 1 
1. IV, 573, 575. 
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to disprove the view of Montaigne and Charron 
·that one man differs from another more than man 
differs from the animals. V/ha tever be the uses 
to which this doctrine has later been put, it was 
originally intended to safeguard the integrity of 
the human soul as a unique immaterial and immortal 
being. 
The question which arose at once and 
puzzled both philosophical opponent, such as 
Gassendi, and devoted pupil, such as the Princess 
Elizabeth of Palatine, ~as: How can the soul and 
body, these two diametrically opposite substances, 
have anything to do with each other? As a matter 
of experience, they are closely linked together, 
but how is this possible if by definition they 
have nothing in common? The answer of Descart~s 
has both a theoretical and a practical aspect. 
Theoretically, he admits that the union is a con-
tingent one and does not follow from his ·r1rst 
principles. It is simply a pµtting together of 
two things that are utterly differe:q.t, a "unio 
compositionis", depending on the "concursus" of God. 1 
1. VII, 14, 388 ff., et passim. 
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This answer was later elaborated by the Occa-
sionalists, who took up the problem left by 
Descartes. The practical explanation of inter-
action is that there is actually in the brain 
a point which mediates the connection of the 
soul with the body. This is the conarion, or the 
pineal gland. The reason v1hy Descartes chose the 
pineal gland was that it appeared to be the only 
significant portion of the brain which stood alone 
and unpaired, other portions having their equiva-
lents in the opposite hemisphere. His assumption 
of the unique importance of the gland,was, of 
course, false, for we know today that the pineal 
gland can be removed without causing any consider-
able change in the mental life. But one must 
guard against overestimating the importance of the 
explanation by means of the gland. It plays no 
part in Descartes' early writings, and is intro-
duced "de facto" in the Principles, after Descartes' 
system was already complete and interaction had be-
come the scape-goat of his thorough-going metaphysi-
cal dualism. While some such scape-goat is 
inevitably required by the trend of Descartes' 
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thought, it is well to recognize the "de facto" 
character of using the gland for this purpose. 
In accordance with the physiology 
common in his day, Descartes holds the theory of 
"animal spirits". The most agile and fiery parti-
cles of the blood arise as a thin material vapor 
into the superficies of the brain as far as the 
pineal gland which is in the center of the brain, 
and spread into the body along the nerves. Thus 
in the process of sense-perception, " •••• ce sent 
ces petites secousses, qui passans iusqu' au 
cerueau par 1 1 entremise de ces nerfs, donneront 
i ' d 1 id 1 d " 1 occas on a l'ame e conceuo r 1 1 ee es sons .• 
The soul, the agent in the perceiving process, may 
make use of its free will in such a way as to alter 
the course of the animal ~pirits and thus act upon 
the body. 
In the discussion on Descartes' theory of 
knowledge notice has already been taken of his classi-
fication of mental states into actions and passions, 
and of his teaching concerning the active side of 
the soul, viz., pure intellect and will. The 
1. De L'Homme, 36. XI, 149. 
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"passions" are psychophysical, resulting from the 
interaction of the mind and the body. They are 
defined as "Des perceptions, ou des sentimens, ou 
, 
des emotions de l'ame, qu' on raporte particuliere-
' / ment a elle, & qui sont causees, entretenues & 
fortifi~es par quelque mou~ent des esprits" •1 In 
the broader meaning of the term, passions include 
sense-perception and memory, instincts and appe-
tites, and the emotional and affective life. In 
the narrower sense passions are restricted to emo-
tions and are classified under six heads: admira-
tion, love, hate, desire, joy, and sadness. 
Descartes' treatment of passions is one of the 
most difficult portions of his philosophy and 
shows the dilemma into which his strict dualism 
involves him. He is unwilling to reduce the 
whole perceptual and affective side of man to physi-
ological prouesses and tries to link them with the 
higher forms of mental life·. On the other hand, 
being dependent on the body, the passions are to be 
explained on purely mechanical principles. 
1. Passions, I, 27. XI, 349 
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The senses are divided by Descartes into 
two groups, the outer and the inner. All modes of 
sensation express the relation of the mind, the 
external object, and the intervening nerves. 
Since objects are constituted by extension and 
motion, the relation of the object to man's physi-
cal body is that of co-extension and motion. Mo-
tion is transmitted to the inner extremity of the 
nerve, and it is this inner movement that consti-
tutes sensation. The transition from quantitative 
movement to qualitative effect is not satisfactorily 
explained. Descartes resorts to the notion of 1bor-
respondence" of the object and idea, analogous to 
the impression of a seal on wax; yet he struggles 
against committing himself to the "copy" theory. 
The inner senses are identified with the natural 
appetites and affections. They are intermediate 
states determined both from without and from within •. 
A pure spirit can feel no emotion, while, on the 
other hand, such an emotion as fear, with its accom-
panying movement of flight, may assume the nature of 
reflex action and occur independently of the soul. 
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The active side of the soul, i.e., will, can 
modify and educate the affective side in such a 
way as to produce fixed moral dispositions. 
II. The Influence of Descartes' Theory 
on Berkeley. 
Such, then, in its basic principles and 
their most significant applications, was the im-
posing metaphysical structure of Cartesianism, 
with which Berkeley had to reckon as he worked out 
his "new philosophy". What influence did this 
system exert upon him? 
It is a matter of history that of all the 
current theories of reality which were known to the 
youthful philosopher at Trinity College as he was 
constructing his world-view, the philosophy of 
Descartes was the most original, thorough~going, 
and influential. A study of the Commonplace Book 
has already revealed the truth of Fraser's state-
ment that while Berkeley had a certain degree of 
other philosophical learning, "Descartes, Malebranche, 
and Locke were his intimates". 1 Considering 
1. Berkeley's Works, I, 4. 
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Malebranche 1 s dependence on De~artes and Locke 1 s 
preoccupation with the problem of knowledge, 
Descartes remains as virtually the only modern 
metaphysician of first rank who exerted a direct 
influence on Berkeley when the thought of the 
latter was in the making. ~he Commonplace Book 
reveals, indeed, that Berkeley's first meta-
physical speculations were expressed largely in 
Cartesian terms. If in epistemology Berkeley 
would appear, at least in his earliest stage, to 
be nearer Locke, there is no doubt, upon close 
examination, that in metaphysics proper the in-
fluence of Descartes is more evident. Thus 
Berkeley seeks to maintain with Descartes, as 
against the agnostic tendency in Locke, the 
basic concept of substance: "We have assuredly an. 
idea of substance. 'Twas absurd of Locke' to think 
we had a name without a meaning. 11 1 He also im-
plicitly accepts the Cartesian dualism in the 
conception of substance: "The substance of Body we 
know. The substance of Spirit we do not know - it 
not being knowable, it being a purus actus. 11 2 
1. I, 40. 
2. Ibid. 
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'! When Berkeley defines in the Commonplace Book 
the two kinds of substance, he does it in the 
words of Descartes: "Thus the substance of any 
1 particular body is extension, solidity, figure." 
"Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, 
wills, operates ••.• " 2 Berkeley claims that the 
Cartesians of his day would be 1~n ye right", "if 
they stick to their ovm principles of causes of 
E • t 11 3 xis ence •.•• It is important to observe that 
Berkeley specifically relates his view of the 
"causes of Existence", not with what was taught 
by the contemporary Cartesians, but with their 
o\m "principles". These quotations from the Com-
monplace Book are sufficient to indicate the his-
toricity of the influence of Descartes' system as 
a whole upon Berkeley. This influence must now be 
studied more closely in each of Berkeley's funda-
mental metaphysical principles. 
Descartes' most significant contribution 
to Berkeley's theory of reality, a contribution 
which establishes an essential unity between the 
·two philosophers, is that Descartes, as the pioneer 
1. I, 20. 
2. I, 53. 
3. I, 51. 
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of modern philosophical thought, formulated 
clearly the concept of self as an independent, 
immaterial, and active being, and gave it supreme 
dignity in philosophy. The doctrine of the self1 
as the fundamental principle of reality may be traced 
to Plato and it was put forth clearly by Augustine, 
but it lay practically unnoticed until it was 
revived by Descartes with vigor and cogency. The 
idea of the self or soul in the minds of Descartes• 
contemporaries was still very uncertain and vacil-
lating. Plato had taught that the soul was wholly 
immaterial, the source of bodily motion, a link 
between two worlds. According to Aristotle, the 
soul is the 11 form" of the body, a culmination and 
function of bodily processes, completely at home 
in the physical world. A more 11 denaturalized" 
conception, to use the expression of 'Jascalevitch, 
was expounded by Augustine who defined the soul as 
"substantia quaedam rationis participens, regendo 
corporis accomodata 11 • 2 The soul is a spiritual 
substance, characterized by self-consciousness and 
1. For much of the information summarized 
in this paragraph I am indebted to A.O. 
Knudson's Philosophy of Personalism and 
to G.S. Brett's History of Psychology. 
2. De Quant. An. , XI II, 22. 
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will, but harnessed to the body. The Cartesian 
difficulty of the relation between extended 
matter and unextended soul was raised already by 
Augustine. In the l.iiddle Ages it was customary, 
on the authority of Aristotle and of St. Paul 
( I Thessalonians 5:23 ), to speak of •parts" of 
the soul, one of which was the "vegetative" soul. 
The Augustinian trend toward the uniqueness of 
the human self was counteracted by the influence 
of the Arab philosophers, Avicenna and Averroes, 
who universalized and naturalized the soul. 
Thomas Aquinas assimilated the two lower functions 
of the soul to the higher, and since the latter are 
illlL1aterial, the soul is a "separable form" and 
hence immortal. During the Renaissance period, 
Pomponazzi revived the Aristotelian conception 
and denied immortality. Telesio championed a 
hylozoism in which the human soul differed only in 
degree from the souls of the animals. Vives taught 
a physiological psychology in which the soul was 
only a principle of vitality. Hobbes and Gassendi, 
among Descartes' nearest contemporaries, represented 
222 
-----:~·-----~· ------.-~ --------------··~--
! 
I 
I 
! 
I L_ 
the naturalistic conception of the soul. 
Against this medley of opinions, which 
Francis Bacon only mirrored, Descartes presented 
clearly and cogently the view that the soul is 
identical with mind ( 11 anima sive mens 11 ), re-
moving all materiality from the conception. To 
the soul belong only the actions which we appre-
hend in self-consciousness. Descartes' doctrine 
of animal spirits is a survival of the older 
notions, but he conceives of them consistently 
as material vapors belonging to the body alone. 
That Berkeley himself was unable to shake off this 
notion is evident in the discussions in Siris 
where he not only speaks of animal spirits which 
reside in the human organism, but regards ffure as 
the animal spirit ,Of the world at large. The sig-
nificance of Descartes was that he penetrated be-
hind these physiological considerations and dealt a 
fatal blow to the Aristotelian conception of matter 
and form, which tended to destroy the uniqueness of 
mental life. He substituted for it the modern dis-
tinction of mind and matter, in which mind stands 
in its own right as a positive cognitive and 
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volitional entity. N'ow while Berkeley's critique 
of matter led him to modify this dualism into one 
of mind and ideas, yet it had served the purpose 
of keeping intact that spiritual and mental fac-
tor on the basis of which Berkeley's repudiation 
of matter became possible. It is unnecessary to 
repeat here the numerous quotations, 1 already 
drawn upon in other connections, 2 which show the 
influence of Descartes in Berkeley's definition 
of the self or "spirit" as "perceiving, active 
being", 3 as "that which thinks, wills, and per-
4 
ceives", and as "that which is meant by soul or 
spiritual substance", 5 could not bave been as 
definite as it was without Descartes• clear and 
strong formulation of "res cogitans", with which 
Berkeley once explicitly identifies it. 6 
But Berkeley does not accept uncritically 
Descartes• conception of the self. Descartes was 
dominated by the scholastic substance-attribute 
point of view. Thought is an attribute which 
1. I, 40,49,52,53,254,312. 
2. Vide supra, p. 169, pp. 1~5 ff. 
3. I, 258. 
4. I, 335. 
5. Ibid. 
6. I, 511. 
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necessarily implies the substance self. As a 
result of the assumption that by stating clearly 
and distinctly the attribut'e he has fully expressed 
the substance, Descartes failed to give an ade-
quate definition of the content of the self. From 
the elementary fact of the existence of self-con-
sciousness he drew immediately the conclusion that 
the 11 1 11 is a unified, immaterial, and personal 
being, a permanent cogitating entity. These char-
acteristics, however, are not given directly in 
consciousness. The problem of passing from a bare 
"datum-mind" to a ~·whole-mind" that is rich in 
meaning, to use the terms of E. S. Brightman in a 
recent vigorous discussion of the problem, 1 did not 
present itself to Descartes in its full importance. 
The nearest approach he made to an apprehension of 
the problematic character of the mere datum is in 
the third Meditation when he argues for the exist-
ence of God on the ground that the self cannot main-
tain its existence from moment to moment without 
the uconcursus" of God. Berkeley, on the contrary, 
faces the problem in a specific way: "Wherein 
1. E.S. Brightman, ~Philosophy of Ideals, 
( Uew York: Holt, 1928 ), pp. 13-21. 
~ 
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consists identity of person? Not in actual con-
sciousness; for then I'm not the same person I 
was this day twelvemonth but while I think of wt 
I then did. Not in potential; for then all per-
sons may be the same, for ought we know." 1 
Berkeley takes into consideration the possibility 
of the Humean view of the mind as a mere "con-
geries of perceptions~~ After an analysis of 
existence in terms of perception Berkeley returns 
t th C t . . 2 f th . d th d o e ar esian view o e min on e groun 
of the activity of the spirit as the percipient 
of ideas. Metz states this as follows: "Wenn 
also die Existenz eines Individuums aus dem 
Kontinuum der Ideen besteht, so folgert Berkeley 
hieraus, dass die Seele immer denkt, dass sie 
immer Vorstellungen hat, dass diese unau.fhorlich 
ablaufen, dass die cogitatio wie bei Descartes ihr 
wesenmassiges Merkmal bildet. 113 The self thus be-
comes for Berkeley a more deeply grounded meta.-
physical principle than it was for Descartes. 
But the actual advance which Berkeley makes is 
very slight. The self remains for him, as for 
1. I, 72-73. 
2. I, 312. 
3. R. Metz, op. cit., p. 161. 
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Descartes, largely the original datum, i. e., 
the starting-point containing the postulate that 
besides ideas there is "something which knows and 
perceives them11 .l Like Descartes, Berkeley de-
fines the self largely in negative terms, in 
terms of what sense-objects are not. Thus mind or 
spirit is for Berkeley "indivisible, because un-
extended; and unextended, because extended, fig-
ured, moveable things are ideas; and that which 
perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly 
itseif no idea, nor like an idea". 2 Berkeley's 
weak grasp of the "a priori", as Hudson has shown,3 
makes it impossible for him to give the self its 
true metaphysical sig:-iificance, and renders his 
"spiritual substance" quite as helpless before the 
onslaught of Hume as Descartes' and Locke's "mater-
ial substance 11 had been before Berkeley's own 
criticism. 
On the basis of the reality of the self 
or mind, Berkeley, following Descartes, infers the 
reality of the world of things. For Berkeley, as 
1. I, 258. 
2. I, 448. 
3. J.W. Hudson, op. cit. 
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for Descartes, reality comes to be mind-dependent. 
The influence of the Cartesian point of view here 
can hardly be overestimated. Berkeley's first 
metaphysics seems to have been the simple 11 Cogito 
ergo sum" of Descartes stated in terms of percep-
tion. He expresses it thus in the Commonplace 
Book: 11 The existence of our ideas consists in 
being perceiv'd, imagin'd, thought on. \"/henever 
they are imagn'd or thought on they do exist. 
Whenever they are mentioned or discours'd of 
they are imagin'd & thought on. Therefore you 
can at no time ask me whether they exist or no, 
but by reason of yt. very question they must nec-
essarily exist. 111 The connection with Descartes 
becomes apparent when we recall the following 
entries: "Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod 
habet esse objectivum in intellectu112 and •Accord-
ing to my doctrine all things are entia rationis, 
i.e., solum habent esse in intellectum.• 3 As we 
have seen in another connection, however, Berkeley 
soon denied this view: "According to my doctrine 
1. I, 15. 
2. I, 52. 
3. I, 15. 
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all are not entia rationis." 1 Eere, in a ques-
tion that lies at the very heart of metaphysics, 
the familiar struggle occurs between the influence 
of Descartes and the influence of Locke, with 
Descartes worsted for the time being only ~o 
return in triumph as Berkeley's idealistic world-view 
matures. It is almost startling to observe that 
Berkeley, the idealist, whose major thesis was the 
mind-dependent nature of reality, was yet so loth 
to depart from naive conunon-sense realism that he 
more than once attac.ked Descartes for holding that 
very thesis. notwithstanding the fact that the 
"immaterial hypothesis• had first dawned on him 
in the form "Extension a sensation, therefore not 
2 
without the mind", he wrote afterwards: "I differ 
from Cartesians in that I .make extension, colour, 
&c. to exist really in bodies independent of our 
mind. 113 This shrinking from any "high a priori 
road" prompted Berkeley to take particular notice 
of a passage in Descartes where the latter con-
siders the adoption of a thorough-going idealism 
1. I, 15n. 
2. I, 59. 
3. I, 50. 
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by denying the substantiality of extension: "Des 
Cartes, in Med.3, calls himself a thinking sub-
stance and a stone an extended substance; and 
adds that they both agree in this, that they are 
substances. And in the next paragraph he calls 
extension a mode of substance."1 In finding 
Berkeley in this curious business of def ending 
the reality of a stone as an "extended substance" 
against Descartes' reduction of it as a •mode" of 
the mind, one cannot but smile once more at 
Samuel Johnson's refutation of Berkeley by kick-
ing a - stone. How pertinaciously Berkeley clung 
to his prejudice for sense becomes clear when as 
late as in Siris, in the midst of the rationalism 
that abounds there, he still criticizes "the 
Cartesians and their followers, who consider sen-
sation as a mode of thinking 11 • 2 It is such state-
ments as this that contain the element of truth in 
the one-sided contention that Berkeley was a 
realist. For the present purpose, at least this 
much is plain: Cartesianism was to Berkeley, in 
1. I, 48. 
2. III, 251. 
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its fundamental metaphysical aspect, an idealistic 
system, and in so far as Berkeley was willing to 
hold that reality is ~ind-dependent, he was making 
a concession to a form of thought that he associated 
with the name of Descartes. Had Berkeley not learned 
to make such a concession, he would have remained 
an obscure Lockean epigone, just as without the 
influence of Locke to supplement the Cartesian 
point of view he could hardly have risen above 
the level of a Norris or a Collier. 
In accordance with the mind-dependent 
nature of reality, and parallel with the develop-
ment of "notions" and "signs", discussed in the 
theory of knowledge, Berkeley moves gradually 
toward a more adequate recognition of the reality 
of universals. In the Commonplace Book.he asks: 
"What becomes of the aeternae.veritates?" and 
1 
answers: "They vanish." Now it is more likely, 
in my ·opinion, that this question refers to the 
I I 
aeternae veritates ( verites eternelles ) of 
Descartes' Meditations than to Cudworth's. Eternal 
2 
and Immutable Morality, as Johnston supposes. 
1. I, 44. 
2. Johnston, op. cit., p. 74. 
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Berkeley's meaning in either case is the same: 
in the characteristic vein of the Commonplace 
Book he is attacking the reality of universals. 
But the "aeternae veritates" do not vanish. 
They come back under the name of arcl'stypes. In 
the Commonplace ~_archetypes are identified 
l 
with 11 ideas of sense~~ In the Principles_ they 
are distinguished from ideas but their existence 
2 is clearly made mind-dependent. In the DialoguesH 
they constitute a realm of their own and exist only 
in the mind of God: "Do I not acknowledge a two-
fold state of things - the one ectypal or natural, 
the other archetypal and eternal? The former was 
created in time; the latter existed from everlasting 
in the mind of God. 113 The same interpretation, 
which we saw Descartes giving to his "verites eter-
nelles 11 , appears seventeen years later in Berkeley's 
letter to the American Samuel Johnson: "I have no 
objection against calling the ideas in the mind of 
God archetypes of ours. 114 Finally, in Siris, the 
archetypes are identified with Platonic ideas and 
1. I, 52. 
2. I, 262, 281, 305, 308, 312. 
3. I, 475. 
4. I, 300 n. 
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constitute an "immovable and unchangeable in-
tellectual world" which stands over against 
1 
"sensible objects" that are "always flowing". 
But apart from the theory of archetypes, it was 
necessary for Berkeley, in any case, to supplement 
his simple "ease is perc±pi" with a more thorough-
going metaphysics of active spirits. And this 
line of development,was suggested by Descartes, 
who conceived of the self as activity, and of 
existence as comprehensible only under the form 
of thought. 
But if Berkeley accepted and developed 
the idealistic side of Descartes• metaphysics, he 
was just as emphatic, and more so, in rejecting 
the naturalistic side. His avowed purpose was to 
demolish that "stronghold of atheists and free-
thin..~ers", material substance. And along with matter 
went the mechanistic philosophy which Descartes had 
reared upon it. It was from this point of view 
that Berkeley could say: "I agree in nothing with 
the Cartesians as to ye existence of Bodies and 
Qualities." 2 A large portion of Berkeley's 
1. III, 290. Cf. III, 285-286. 
2. I, 9. 
references to Descartes fall under this head.1 
Virtually all of the adverse criticism which 
Berkeley passed on Descartes, beginning with the 
Commonplace Book and the New_ Theory of Vision and 
continuing through SirisJ was directed against 
the mechanistic cosmology and physiology of the 
Cartesian system. Berkeley rejected the char-
acteristic doctrines of Descartes• mechanism: the 
2 physical explanation of sense-perception, auto-
matism, 3 the vortices, 4 and the mathematical ex-
planation of extension. 5 Berkeley himself gives 
in the Commonplace Book an enlightening clue for 
understanding this uncompromising attitude toward 
naturalism: "Matter once allowd, I defy any man 
6 to prove that God is not Matter.a Berkeley had 
before him the example of Spinoza, who on Cartesian 
principles developed the view of "deus sive natura" 
which to Berkeley was sheer atheism. The soul was 
in like danger, especially from the applications 
made of the doctrine of automatism. Leslie Stephen 
1. I, 9, 164, 172, 207, 208, 243, 298, 312; 
III, 232, 238, 240. 
2. I, 172, 207-208, 312. 
3. I, 243. 
4. III, 232, 240. 
5. I, 312; III, 270. 
6. I, 32. 
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portrays well Berkeley's reaction to Cartesianism 
in that respect: "When all phenomena, including 
those of the human body, were explained by the 
properties of matter, which had at least certain 
mathematical attributes, the soul, which had no 
attribute at all except the attribute of thought, 
might be omitted as superfluous, or reduced to be 
a mere spectator of the vast machinery, amidst 
whose wheels it was hopelessly ensconced. To 
destroy matter, then, was to free the soul •••• 
He wished to get rid of this gigantic corpse, 
whose stifling embraces threatened the annihila-
tion of the living and percipient subject."1 
Here is the greatest divergence between 
Descartes and Berkeley. Is not this divergence so 
wide as to endanger seriously the thesis of the 
essential unity of Cartesian and Berkeleian thought? 
A more thorough investigation shows that such a 
conclusion is unwarranted. 
For we must bear in mind, first of all, 
that the purpose of Descartes in putting forth his 
l.Stephen, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
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philosophy of nature, as well as the rest of 
his philosophy, was the same as that of Berkeley, 
viz., the demonstration of God and the soul. "Le 
/ 
grande mecanique," he wrote, "n'est autre chose 
/ 
que l'ordre que Dieu a imprime sur la face de son 
/ 1 
ouvrage, que nous appelons communement la nature." 
The doctrine of automatism, as has been shown, 
arose from a desire to protect the human soul 
against the naturalists who minimized the dif-
ference between man and the brutes. If by carrying 
this design too far Descartes defeated his own 
purpose, and his weapons were taken by the enemy, 
this is neither the first nor the last time in 
history that such a thing has happened. But we 
must remember that Berkeley had learned to draw 
the line between the original Descartes and the 
materialism that later drew on him for support. 
As we saw at the beginning of the study, Berkeley 
never assigned Descartes to the camp of the athe-
ists where he placed not only Spinoza and Hobbes 
but even Leibniz. 
It must be noted, secondly, that Berkeley 
1. I, 213-214. 
l 
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is, after all, in fundamental agreement with 
Descartes as regards the position and function of 
mechanism. Berkeley does not combat mechanism in 
physical science but only the transformation of it 
into an atheistic and anti-idealistic metaphysics. 
In the very significant section 50 of the Princi~les 
Berkeley refers explicitly to the "corpuscular 
philosophy" and affirms that its "mechanical prin-
ciples" have been "applied with so much success to 
l 
account for the phenomena". His own philosophy, 
says Berkeley, retains everything that is of value 
in the mechanical explanations and leaves out only 
the unnecessary and cumbersome hypothesis of mater-
ial substance. In fact, he concludes, "they who at-
tempt to account for things do it, not by corporeal 
substance, but b~ figure, motion, and other quali-
ties; which are in truth no more than mere ideas, ••• 112 
The same attitude is clearly expressed in Berkeley's 
letter to Johnson: "The true use and end of Natural 
Philosophy is to explain the phenomena of Nature, 
which is done by discovering the laws of Nature, 
and reducing particular appearances to the~. This 
1. I, 285. 
2. Ibid. 
l 
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is Sir Isaac Newton's method; and such method 
or design is not in the least inconsistent with 
the principles I lay down. This mechanical 
philosophy doth not assign or suppose any one 
natural efficient cause in the strict and proper 
sense; nor is it, as to its u~e, concerned about 
matter; nor is matter connected therewith; nor 
doth it infer the being of matter. It must be 
owned indeed, that the mechanical philosophers 
do suppose ( though unnecessarily ) the being of 
1 
matter.n Berkeley goes on to discuss causality 
as spiritual and volitional, and adds: "But this 
doth not hinder the allowing occasional causes 
( which are in truth but signs ) and more is not 
requisite int.he best physics, i. £.•the mechan-
ical philosophy. 112 The task of the natural phil-
osopher, as dealing only with mechanical explana-
tions according to the ideal of mathematics is 
lucidly set forth also in Da Motu: "Tum nimirum dici 
potest quidpiam explicari mechanice, cum reducitur 
ad ista principia simplicissima et universalissima, 
et per accuratum ratiocinium, cum iis consentaneum 
1. Woodbridge Riley, op. cit., pp. 81-82. 
2. Ibid. 
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et connexum esse ostenditur. Nam inventis semel 
naturae legibus, deinceps monstrandum est philo-
sopho, ex constant! harum legum observatione, hoc 
est, ex iis principiis phaenomenon quodvis neces-
Enrio consequi: id quod est phaenomena explicare et 
solvara, causamque, id est rationem cur fiant, 
1 
assignare.• 11 •••• ita etiam per applicationem 
theorematum mechanices universalium, systematis 
mundani partium quarumvis motus, et phaenomena 
inde pendentia, innotescunt et determinantur: ad 
2 
quern scopum unice collineandum physico. 11 
Berkeley here makes it plain that the mechanical 
method, proceeding by mathematical principles and 
involving necessity, is the only correct procedure 
in physics. 
I have quoted this material at some length 
for I consider it important in the solution of the 
crucial problem now at hand. Berkeley affirms that 
the mechanical philosophy is •suvcessful• in ex-
plaining natural phenomena; in fact, he calls it 
theil[)est physics". Berkeley's two great authorities 
1. I, 514. 
2. I, 515. 
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in physics are Newton and Descartes. In the Com-
monplace Book_he hesitates between the Cartesian 
"vis inertiae" and the Newtonian "vis attractivae," 1 
but is inclined to reject the latter. 2 In the 
Principles, the Dialogues, and--12.!tMotu_Berkeley is 
still inclined to agree with the established Car-
tesian physics, with its ether and vortices, 
rather than the Newtonian innovation of gravita-
3 
tion or "attraction". In Siris he becomes recon-
oiled with gravitation and prefers Newton to 
4 Descartes. But a mechanical explanation of the 
physical world is involved in either case. In one 
passage in Siris Berkeley links together Newton's 
principle of gravitation and Descartes' doctrine of 
5 
motion. Berkeley is not far from Descartes' physics 
when he describes "fire" or "aether" as the vital 
e 
spirit in nature and as the ultimate natural cause, 
nor from Descartes• physiology when he says: "A 
body, either animal or vegetable, may be considered 
as an organized system of tubes and vessels, con-
taining several sorts of fluids." 7 Berkeley is no 
1. I, 31. 
2. I, 31, 88. 
3. I, 314-316, 459-460, 501-506. 
4. III, 238 ff. 
5. III, 240. 
6. III, 198 ff. 
7. III, 154. 
l 
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foe of a strict mechanical explanation of physi-
cal things. As a great scientist of today, who 
has studied Berkeley in terms of mathematical 
logic, concludes: "He left to science, as he under-
stood it, a perfectly free hand to pur6-Ue its 
investigation of phenomena on its own special 
lines •111 Berkeley .did combat the "Nihilarians" 
who failed to see the limits of the scientific 
explanation. But when the natural world with.all 
its mechanism is shown to exhibit a radical con-
tingency in its relation to its ultimate cuase, 
God, and when the mechanical laws of nature are 
shown to constitute only the "modus operandi" of 
a free and intelligent Creator, then mechanism 
loses its sting, and assumes a useful but sub-
servient place in the theistic scheme. And this 
precisely is the position of both Descartes and 
Berkeley. 
Having observed the unity in funda-
mental purpose and in the role ascribed to the 
naturalistic element, it remains to point out that 
1. C. Lloyd Morgan, "Notes on Berkeley• s 
Doctrine of Esse 11 in Proc. of Arist. 
Soc. 15 (1914-1915) 1 p. 139:--
l 
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it was Descartes who gave Berkeley the "handle", 
to use the latter's own word, for his immaterial-
ism. In section 53 of the Principles, a highly 
important passage, Berkeley a~gues from the Car-
tesian principles of the inertness of matter and 
the causal activity of God alone to the non-
existence of matter. llatter, on this basis, says 
Berkeley, "though we should allow it possible, must 
yet be a very unaccountable and extray,agant suppo-
sition. "1 The same idea is expressed in the 
passage quoted above, pp. 153-154, where Berkeley 
reconciles his philosophy with scientific mech-
anism on the ground that material substance is un-
2 
necessary and superfluous. Berkeley's insight 
was that by simply using Occam's razor, i.e., by 
applying the law of parsimony, matter may be dispensed 
with in Cartesian thought - a simple and yet in-
genious and epoch-making discovery. According to 
Descartes' own definition of substance as that 
which exists independently of anything else, mat-
ter, being dependent on the mind, is no substance. 
In the beginning of the Meditations Descartes had 
1. I, 287. 
2. I, 285. 
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argued that so long as ideas were imprinted on 
my mind, their source; for ought I know, might 
just as well be a malignant devil as a real material 
world. And to the end, the existence of material 
objects had remained under suspicion and had been 
accepted only as relative to the mind and to God. 
Berkeley drew out the implications of this position. 
Just as in the specific field of the theory of 
vision, so in the theory of reality in general, 
Berkeley's advance consisted in purging Descartes• 
thought of its irrelevant and redundant features 
and in systematizing and developing its essential 
principles. 
As a result of his immaterialism Berkeley 
is enabled to overcome the greatest of the Cartesia~ 
difficulties, viz., the dualism of mind and matter, 
which Descartes had been unable to reconcile. 
Berkeley modifies the dualism of ~wo substances 
utterly foreign to each other into a dualism of the 
mind and its ideas. A dualism remains, indeed, but 
it is actually, as Knudson describes it, "qualita-
tive monism11 • 1 Berkeley goes on to infer the 
1. Knudson, op. cit., p. 193. 
---- - ---------, 
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reality of God and of other selves, so that his 
philosophy may be called "spiritual pluralism", 
but no qualitatively foreign element is introduced. 
Hence the Ber.keleian system, unlike the Cartesian., 
is coherent. But again it was Descartes who sug-
gested to Berkeley the way of advance. Early in 
this study there was occasion to point out that 
Berkeley's "new principle" originated 6n the basis 
of Descartes• distinction, expounded by Locke, of 
primary and secondary qualities. The way Berkeley 
was to follow is revealed in the first page, i.e., 
the true first page, of the Commonplace Book: 
"Primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter; after 
the ~_manner li secondary™-~- prov'd not to 
exist therein. 111 Thus when in the opening sections 
of the Principles Berkeley raises his all-important 
metaphysical question, he does it on a Cartesian 
basis, viz., in the analysis of sense-perception. 
do we find two mutually independent substances, 
mind and matter, or may the latter be reduced to 
the former? Following Descartes' definition of 
substance, the answer is given that "there is not 
l .. I, 59. :Emphasis.mine. 
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any other Substance than Spirit, or that which 
perceives", 1 for matter depends on spirit. The 
entire discussion of the Principles is made to 
hinge on the problem of primary and secondary 
qualities. And Berkeley affirms explicitly: "···· 
after the same manner as modern philosophers 
prove certain qualities to have no existence in 
Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may 
be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities 
2 
whatsoever." "In short, let any one consider 
those arguments which are thought manifestly to 
prove that coiours and tastes exist only in the 
mind, and he shall find they ~with equal force 
~. brought .1& proye th.sL same thing .a..f._ extension, 
figure, and motion." 3 A philosophical debt could 
hardly be more openly paid. Berkeley acknowledges 
without reserve that he will begin where Descartes• 
work ended and where Locke showed its end to be. 
The problem which Descartes bequeathed 
to his immediate successors as the specific formu-
lation of his dualism was the psychological one of 
1. I, 261. 
2. I, 265. 
3. Ibid. Cf. I, 298. Emphasis mine. 
245 
] 
t 
! 
' 
' 
I L_ 
the interaction of soul and body. Man with his 
pineal gland was left to strive rather hopelessly 
in an effort to unite under one skin two substan-
ces which had nothing in common. Berkeley deals 
specifically with this problem in the second of 
the Dialogues.1 Hylas expounds the doctrine that 
outer objects set the nerves in motion and that 
animal spirits which fill the nerves carry the 
motion to the brain, ideas being caused by the 
resulting traces in the brain. Philonous has little 
trouble in disposing of this explanation, for he 
points out that the brain itself is an idea. The 
whole Cartesian difficulty is thus summarily dis-
missed: "What connection is there between a motion 
in the nerves, and the sensation of sound or 
colour in the mind?" 2 Since the total rejection 
of material substance left the problem of inter-
action non-existent for Berkeley, he is free to 
have fun at the expense of the pineal gland. Two 
of his essays in the Guardian are 11 A Visit to the 
Pineal Gland" and nThe Pineal Gland of a Free 
Thinker". In them Berkeley satirizes the "minute 
1. I, 421-422. 
2. I, 422. 
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philosophers". The form of these essays seem to 
have been suggested by the book entitled "Voyage 
to the World of Descartes", which was current in 
1 Berkeley's day and to which he refers. The 
author, an unknown Father Daniel, pretends to 
leave his body in the care of a friendly demon 
while he journeys to the land of Descartes to 
survey with him things as they are. The details 
of this journey, in the words of a recent commen-
tator, "show the impossibility of the passage from 
the simple mechanism of extension and movement and 
the abstract mathematical principles which they 
illustrate to the complex living world of actual 
human experience. 112 These criticisms are implied 
in Berkeley's jocular reference to the pineal gland. 
The philosophically important answer, how-
ever, which the Cartesians gave to the problem of 
interaction had nothing to do with the gland. It 
took the form of Occasionalism: God is the direct 
sburce of the mental event, and the physical event 
is only the occasion. for the divine intervention. 
Berkeley explicitiy rejects Occasionalism on the 
1. rv,. 148. 
2. H.W. Carr, "A Voyage to the World of 
Descartes" in Personalist 7 (1926D, p.25. 
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ground that passive, inert, unknowable, and 
hence non-existent, matter cannot act as an oc-
casion for anything.1 But if in eccasionalism 
we lay the chief emphasis on God_ as the agency 
which reconciles and adjusts events in our 
world, then Berkeley is a genuine Occasionalist, 
as Johnston would have us believe. 2 In the Com-
monplace Book Berkeley distinguishes "betwixt 
two sorts of causes - physical and spiritual" 
and adds: 11 the physical may more properly be 
called occasions. 113 In a letter to Johnson-he 
also speaks of "occasional causes" and identifies 
4 
them with his doctrine of signs. For Berkeley, 
as for Descartes, the existence of the self, as 
well as all the events in the world or the self, 
depends each moment on the creative activity of 
God. But the term interaction has also a broader 
meaning which contains a problem that was never 
directly confronted by Descartes, viz., the prob-
lem of the correlation of the private worlds of 
finite individuals. Berkeley faced the problem5 
1. I, 295-297. 
2. Johnston, op. cit., pp. 68-69. 
3. I, 55. 
4. II, 16. 
5. I, 466, 423. 
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and gave to it an essentially occasionalistic 
answer: each of us has his own world but God 
unites them all into a single system of meanings. 
"' 
We have compared the general structure of 
the Cartesian and the Berkeleian systems ot meta-
physics in. terms of the concepts of mind and matter. 
Let us now single out for specific consideration 
each of the remaining fundamental metaphysical con-
cepts in which Berkeley shows the influence of 
Descartes, viz., space, time, motion, substance, 
and causality. 
Taking up first the concept of space, let 
us recall that Descartes identified space or exten-
oion with matter, holding that the attribute of ex-
tension completely exp:-esses the essence of a mater-
ial object. Now while Berkeley, perhaps influenced by 
Sargent's Solid Philosophy, 1 considered the possibil-
ity that solidity or resistance might be the funda-
mental characteristic of the physical world, rather 
than extension, he nevertheless accepted Descartes' 
view without much questioning. Body is alreaµy in 
the Commonplace Book defined as "extended being", 2 
1. Berkeley refers to this work in I, 54. 
2. I, 57. 
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and in the Principles soldity is specifically 
subsumed nnder extension: "Without extension 
solidity cannot be conceived. 111 The constitutive 
meaning ascribed to extension led Descartes to 
deny the possibility of empty space. Here again 
Berkeley followed Descartes and fought strenuously 
against 11 absolute" space existing apart from 
spatial objects.2. Like Descartes, too, he held 
space to be inconceivable without motion. 3 Des-
cartes conceived of space as mathematical. While 
Berkeley perceptualized extension and mathematical 
terms in general, he did not break away from the 
Cartesian. view without a struggle. This is evi-
dent from such entries in the Commonplace Book as 
the following: "Extension, or length without 
breadth, seems to be nothing same the number of 
points that lie between any 2 points~ 4 and "Def-
inite determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces 
consisting of points whereby they are determined, 
are resoluble in.to those points. 115 Thus in spite of 
his vigorous polemic against the infinite 
1. I, 264. 
2. I, 187, 319, 322, 402-404. 
3. I, 195-196; III, 53. 
4. I, 88. 
5. I, 67. 
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di visibility of space ,1· Berkeley in a peculiarly 
Cartesian passage in the Principles asserts that 
infinite divisibility has been demonstrated "be-
yond all exception" and makes this very doctrine 
the basis of idealism. "Matter", he says, 11 
and each particle thereof, is infinite and shape-
less; and it is the mind that framwall the 
variety of bodies which compose the visible world, 
"2 . . . . To appreciate how thoroughly Berkeley was 
dominated by the Cartesian dualism of thinking 
subject and extended object we need but recall that 
in attacking the Cartesian view he only involved 
himself in it more deeply, e.g., "I differ from 
Cartesians in that I make extension to exist really 
in bodies independent of our mind. 113 In other pas-
sages he explains that bodies are independent of mmnd 
as being "distinct from it114 and 11 independent of our 
5 
wi11•. Once he goes so far as to call extension a 
'mode of some tangible or sensible quality11 • 6 This 
effort to externalize space can be reconciled with 
Berkeley's usual view, 7 according to which space is 
l. I, 63-64, 84, 86-88, 153, 327-334; 
III, 410-413. 
2. I, 283. 
3. I, 50. 
4. I, 56, 58. 
5. I, 58. 
6. I, 41. 
7. I, 59, 62, 66, 81, 263, 265, 269, 398-401. 
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dependent on the mind, only as expressing the 
fact that extension, as the essential character-
istic of objects, depends solely on the mind of 
God and must simply be accepted by the finite 
mind. Yet Berkeley is strongly opposed to attri-
buting extension to God. 1 His ultimate solution 
is a frank acceptance "in ipsissimis verbis" of 
the Cartesian dualism of unextended "res cogitans" 
2 
and unthinking "res extensa", the latter, however, 
being inconceivable without the former. 3 Berkeley 
does not go with Descartes so far as to resolve 
the "res extensa" into pure quantity, for he al-
lows his passive inert ideas to retain their sense-
qualities, but neither does he overcome the diffi-
culty of relating active unextended subject to pas-
sive extended object. This difficulty appears 
4 
acutely in the Dialogues but remains unsolved. 
Descartes' final answer was to regard extension as 
our "mode of conceiving", a fine antidipation of 
Kant. The best that Berkeley could do was to call 
extension a "sensation» 5 but he could never become 
1. I, 81, 82. 
2. De Motu, 21. I, 507. 
3. I, ?9, 265 et passim. 
4. I, 406 ff. 
5. I, 59. 
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quite reconciled with the view that sensation is 
a "mode o!' thinking".1 Berkeley's prejudice for 
the sensuous and the particular and against the 
a priori prevented him from approaching as near as 
did Descartes to the Kantian view of space as a 
universal and necessary form of mental activity. 
Berkeley's theory of space is a fine contribu-
tion to psychology, but it has little metaphysical 
value. Kant, in my opinion, was quite justified 
in his criticism that Berkeley made space a property 
of things-in-themselves, and failed to grasp the 
true metaphysical significance of space. 
Time was conceived by Descartes as a "modus 
cogitandi". The more fundamental concept, he held, 
is duration, which implies a persistence of events 
and is dependent on the creative will of God. 
Berkeley did not advance beyond Descartes. His very 
earliest inquiries, as the opening of the Commonplace 
Book reveals, were in this subject. His lack of an 
a priori approach, however, caused him to be "con-
2 founded and perplexed" and to be "embrangled in 
3 inextricable difficulties~. He could not form an 
1. III, 251. 
2. II, 19. 
3. I, 311. 
253 
• 
l 
abstract idea of time, for he noted: "Time a sen-
. "2 sat1on;.... Nor could he distinguish adequately 
between time and duration on the one hand, or be-
tween. duration and existence on the other. 3 Yet 
he could not understand the application of time 
4 
or duration to ideas in the mind of God. The 
co~clusion which he drew already in the beginning 
of the Commonplace Book and which he reiterated in 
the Principles was: "Time is the train of ideas 
5 
succeeding each other." As regards the relation 
of time to God, Berkeley gave the same occasional-
istic answer as Descartes: the succession of ideas 
depends ultimately on the continual creative 
activity of G~d. Neither philosopher understood 
adequately the importance of the problem of time 
nor made any outstanding contribution toward its 
solution. 
A very important concept both for Descartes 
and for Berkeley was that of motion. A great portion 
of Descartes' discussions of physics deals with mo-
tion and its laws, while Berkeley's treatise on this 
1. II, 20; I, 311-312. 
2. I, 59. 
3. I, 58-59. 
4. I, 58; II, 20. 
5. I, 58; I, 311-312. 
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subject, De Motu, is in a technical sense the 
most philosophical of all his works. Descartes, 
as we have seen, taught that motion is a pre-
scribed magnitude created by God and remaining 
constant regardless of the undulations within 
it. It is a relative concept that must be de-
duced from Gou, the source of all motion and the 
only efficient cause. What was Berkeley's atti-
tude toward this reasoning? It is significant 
that De_Motu," where Berkeley is compelled to use 
accepted philosophical terminology and to align 
himself with the philosophers rather than with the 
"mob", is the most definitely Cartesian of all his 
works. Berkeley there ranks Descartes with Anax-
agoras, Plato, and Aristotle, calling these four 
"the most learned men in all ages" ( "hominumque 
omni aevo doctissimorum111 ). According to Berke-
ley 1 s estimate, the truth on the theory of the 
origin of motion, which Descartes, of all the 
moderns, has laid down in the very best way 
( "optime" ), has only been obscured by other 
modern philosophers ( "alii rem satis claram 
1. I, 511. 
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vocibus obscuris impeditam ac difficilem 
reddideruntn ) 1 • Apart from the main topic of 
the treatise, Berkeley propounds in. genuinely Cartes-
ian terms the dualism of ttres cogitans" and "res 
2 
extensa", the division of mental facilities into 
sensation, imagination, and pure 
infinite divisibility of space, 4 
intellect, 3 
the impossibility 
5 
of empty space, the mechanical explanation of the 
6 physical world, and the subordination of the world 
7 
of mechanism to God. 
As regards the doctrine of motion itself, 
Berkeley follows Descartes in drawing a sharp dis-
tinction between the physical and the metaphysical 
meanings of the term, 8 in considering God as the 
g 
only metaphysical cause of motion, and in consid-
ering the physical laws of motion as rational prin-
ciples which are to be mathematically deduced. 10 
1. De Motu, section 30. For the sake of 
greater accuracy I am quoting from De 
Motu here and below by section rather 
than by page. 
2. Ibid., 21. 
3. Ibid., 53. 
4. Ibid., 46. 
5. Ibid., 53. 
6. Ibid., 37-38. 
7. Ibid., 69-72. 
8. Ibid., 41, 71. 
9. Ibid., 32. 
10. Ibid., 36, 38, 41. 
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Berkeley rejects Descartes' theory of a fixed 
quantity of motion 1 ·· and of transition in space 
as a definition of motion, 2 in favor of a more 
general Aristotelian view, but he accepts Des-
cartes' laws of inertia and the rectilinear 
course of motion. 3 After stµdying Berkeley's 
earlier writings, it is like discovering a new 
Berkeley to read such passages as: "Principia 
Jl.. 
mechanica legesque motuum aut natura;l; univer-
sales, saeculo ultimo feliciter inventae, et 
subsidio geometriae tractatae et applicatae, 
~ 
miram lucem in philosophiam intulerunt." and 
11 
•••• notiones et propositiones generales effor-
mandae sunt, in quibus quodam mode continentur 
propositiones et cognitiones particulares, quae 
tum demum intelligi creduntur cum ex primis illis 
5 
continue nexu deducuntur." Like Descartes, 
Berkeley lays down that the only proper method in 
science is rational deduction according to the 
example of geometry. He ins.is ts that "ex iis 
1. Ibid., 19, 48. 
2. Ibid. , 45, 48. 
3. Ibid., 33. 
4. Ibid., 41. 
5. Ibid., 38. 
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principiis phaenomenon quodvis necessario con-
sequi 111 and he speaks slightingly of those v1ho 
' 
are not satisfied \7ith this mathematical procedure 
but look for efficient causes in science. 2 This 
means, of course, a positivistic view of science 
and the necessity of finding the true meta-
physical explanation in the realm of the spirit. 
But this is precisely the view held by Descartes, 
3 
as Berkeley so emphatically acknowledges. It is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that the 
Berkeley of De l.iotu is a Cartesian pure and simple. 
The supreme metaphysical concepts of 
substance and causality have already frequently 
been touched upon, but I have advisedly refrained 
from a specific discussion of the~ until now, when 
they will serve to sumoarize and to conclude the 
chapter. Descartes' main concept is substance: 
reality is that which exists independently of 
anything else. He finds only one substance in an 
absolute sense, namely, God, and two secondary or 
created substances, mind and matter. Berkeley, 
I. Ibid., 37. 
2. Ibid., 34-35. 
3. Ibid., 30. 
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as has been noted frequently, accepts Descartes' 
definition of substance, but he shows that by 
this very definition matter is not a substance, 
for it cannot exist independently of mind. This 
leaves only spiritual substance, i.e. mind and God 
as metaphysical realities. But Berkeley's main cate-
gory is not substance but causality. Reality for 
him depends on the activity of free spirit. Des-
cartes distinguished between primary and secondary 
qualities in objects and ascribed the latter qual;... 
ities to the work of the mind. Berkeley erases 
the distinction and makes all reality depend on 
the perceptual activity of the mind. Substance, 
as distinguished from the causal principle, is re-
duced to an aggregate of ideas perceived by the 
mind. But since the mind consists in activity, 
it follows that substance, even when ideally 
defined, is not the ultimate reality. It is the 
spiritual activity from which ideas derive their 
reality that must be considered as ultimate. Des-
cartes, indeed, anticipated iri·his doctrine of motion 
a positivistic and phenomenalistic interpretation of 
phys~cal causality and had definitely asserted that 
God is the only efficient cause. But even 
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metaphysical causality remained with him largely 
identified with the logical relation of ground 
and consequence, conceived, as will appear in his 
proofs for God, in a Neoplatonic fashion. Berkeley 
brings to the fore a genuinely dynamic aspect in 
causality. Causation as it is employed in 
natural science shows simply the relation of sign 
and thing signified; it deals only with effects in 
an order of sequence but does not show what produced 
both antecedent and consequent. In ourselves we dis-
cover a true causality in the life of the spirit. 
This leads us to think of the whole universe, inas-
much as things happen in it and it manifests unity 
and coherence, as the expression of a great creative 
spirit, God. The world at bottom is a system of 
events and occurrences, and every event may, in an 
absolute sense, be traced to the volition of God. 
The contrast between Descartes and Berkeley 
here again is not, however, as marked as would seem 
at first. The main current of Descartes' thought 
points plainly toward the direction of Berkeley. 
For we must bear in mind, first of all, the total 
passivity of mind and the origin of all activity 
in the world of the spirit. Matter is mere 
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extension, a bare form of existence from which 
it is only a short step to the total phenomenality 
of matter. It is to be noted that in reducing 
matter to passive and inert ideas Berkeley was 
following Descartes as distinguished from 
Leibniz, for whom the essential element of matter 
was force. Secondly, we must remember the impor-
tance in Descartes' psychology and epistemology 
of free volition~ For Descartes, as for Berkeley, 
freedom was a basic postulate in the definition 
of spirit. Neither, however, discussed freedom 
systematically as a metaphysical problem. Des-
cartes, e.g., in replying to Hobbes, 1 asserted that 
freedom is an indisputable self-evident fact. Free-
dom in the domain of the spirit was to him as self-
evident as mechanical necessity in the physical 
world. Berkeley accepted freedom in much the same 
way, considering it absurd to inquire what deter-
mines the will. 2 A thorough-goirgstudy of the 
problem of freedom in the two philosophers lies be-
yond the limits of the present study, for there is 
no evidence that Berkeley's thought on this subject 
1. Obj. III, 12. 
2. Commonplace Book, entry 644. 
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was under the influence of Descartes. The 
similarity noted here is due rather to the same 
basic conception of spiritual substance. In 
addition to the total passivity of matter and the 
volitional activity of spirit, let us note, thirdly, 
Descartes' doctrine that both matter and mind are 
created substances and that the source of all 
efficient causality is God, the one absolute 
substance. Berkeley destroyed material substance, 
but neither could he give spiritual substance any metaphys-
ical standing in its own right. Finite spirit is for 
Berkeley, as for Descartes, so utterly dependent on_ 
1 God that he may annihilate it whenever he so wills. 
Nor must we forget that if Descartes left the relation 
between mind and matter unexplained, except for God, 
Berkeley left the relation between mind and ideas in 
much the same predicament. The essence of mind is 
activity, while ideas are entirely passive and inert. 
Matter has been reduced to ideas, but ideas form a mere 
passive perceptual content which stands in no organic 
relation to the mind. It is almost as far a cry from 
Berkeley's u1deasu as it is from Descartes• "res 
1. Compare Berkeley, I, 336 with Descartes 
VII, 14. 
I 
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extensau to such a view as that of Bovme: nAgents 
1 
only can lay any claim to existence." But both 
Descartes, in spite of his inability to rise above 
the abstraction of an inert world-stuff that 
nsupports" accidents, and Berkeley, in spite of 
his passive ideas given ready-made to the mind, 
paved the way for a conception. of reality in terms 
of the free volitional activity of the self t 
grounded in a supreme intelligent world-cause. 
1. B.P.Bowne, Metaphysics, revised e~itiont 
(New York: American Book Co~, 1898), p.94. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
PHILOSOPHY OF REIJIGION 
Both Descartes and Berkeley have cl9.imed 
to demonstrate the existence of God !llld the immortal-
i ty of the soul, and both have appealed consistently 
to God as the final arbiter in metaphysical as well 
as epistemological questions. These matters must 
now be given more specific consideration. It is 
not tho purpose of this chapter to describe the 
religious consciousness or the practical relieious 
interests of either philosopher, for this task has 
already been accomplished in so far as it is 
required by the present study. Under "philosophy 
of re Ji gi on" I propose to examine God and immortal-
ity as objects of formal philosophical reflection. 
The id ea of God is, to use the phrase of 
I 
Boutrou.x, "le pivot de la philosophie C'.lrt;sienne, 111 
or, in Descartes' ovm words, " •••• la premiere et la 
plus eternelle de toutes les veritez qui peuuent 
' , 2 
estre & la seule d 1 ou precedent toutes les autres." 
It is in the light of the content ascribed to this, 
tbe hiGhest of concepts, therefore, that the 
I ( 
1. E. Boutrou.~, Des Verites Eternelles 
chez Descartes, (J:'aris:Alcan, 1927),p.131. 
2. I, I, 150. 
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problem of the relation of Berkeley to Descartes is 
ultimately to be solved. For if in Descartes' 
dualistic metaphysics the geometrical world of 
exteneion is supreme, then the true disciples ot 
Descartes are Malebranche and Spinoza, who, in 
spite of their differences, are fundamentally at 
one in that they minimize the difference between 
God and the world of extension. Both read the 
latter into the former to the degree that God ie 
virtually the system of geometry deified~ But if 
Descartes understands supreme reality in terms of 
pure unextended mind, the thinking and volitional 
activity of the spirit, then the closer kinship 
exists between Descartes and Berkeley. 
This very question was raised during 
-Descartes' lifetime by Henry More, the Cambridge 
Platonist, who failed to see how either human or 
divine mind could exist unextended. Descartes' 
insistence on the interpretation of mind as pure 
consciousness and his uncompromising refusal to 
admit extension into God changed More from an ardent 
disciple into an enemy who derided Descartes as a 
"nullubist". Berkeley definitely aligns himself 
1 
with Descartes, rejecting More's view and 
1 . I, 82. 
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incidentally attacking also Locke, whom he suspected 
of supporting the opinion of More. Berkeley pro-
poses "to take extension out of our idea of God, 
2 
and put a power in its place." This strict limita-
tion of extension to the physical world, together 
with the relativity of the physical laws of motion 
and the general subordination of physical nature to 
God, establishes a most significant agre€ment 
between Descartes and Berkeley, for it shows 
Berkeley as a developer of the predominant thesis 
of Descartes. 
Descartes' God, then, is pure "esprit ou 
3 
une chose qui pense." A more complete definition 
is given in the Meditations as follows: "Dei 
nomine intelligo substantiam quandam infinitam, 
independentem, eumme intelligentem, summe potentem, 
& a qua tum ego ipse tum aliud omne, ei quid aliud 
~ 
extat, quod cumque extat, est creatum." In the 
Discourse God is defined as a being that is" •••• 
infini, eternel, immuable, tout connoissant, tout 
5 
puissant". The definition given in the PrinciQlee 
1. I, 82. Cf. I, 52. 
2. Ibid. 
3. IV, 608. 
4. VII, 45. 
5. VI, 35. 
-----'"'"--• l 
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is: "Videmus illUm. esse aeternum, omni sci um,. 
omni potentem, omnis bonitatis veritatisque fontem, 
1 
rerum omnium creatorem". All of Descartes' 
writings stress the thought that God is infinitely 
perfect and incapable of deceiving. Descartes' 
conception can be readily identified as the 
traditional .conception of Christian theology, 
emphasizing a rationalistic view of plenitude of 
being, causal efficacy displayed in creation, and 
moral goodness and perfection which guarantee 
human knowledge. But Descartes is not satisfied 
with a bare formal definition of God. He deplores 
2 
that there are men for whom God is only a "name". 
He identifies his God with that of the Christian 
revelation and quotes the first epistle of John 
3 
V, 2 and IV, 7 on God as love. When he is asked 
how we can love God, he draws a distinction 
between the idea of divinity and a real personal 
4 
God whom we can love. God, he asserts, becomes 
5 
the object of our love only through incarnation. 
Thus, both theoretically and practically, we must 
1. VIII, 13. 
2. I, 150. 
3. IX, 230 ff. 
4. IV, 607-608. 
5, Ibid. 
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say of Descartes' concept of God, with Gouhier, 
"Le Dieu de sa philosophie est le Dieu des 
~ 1 
Chretiens." 
Berkeley's conception of God as "the 
2 
great Creator" and "Omnipotent Spirit" with the 
\ 
attributes "One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, 
3 
and Perfect" is identical w+th that of Descartes. 
Berkeley, a Christian bishop, shows indeed the 
same attitude also toward the Christian revelation; 
in fact, his main work, the Principles, concludes 
with the assertion that "the highest perfection of 
human nature" is to know and to practise "the 
4 
salutary truths of the Gospel". There is per-
haps some significance in the difference which 
the two philosophers show in their interpretation 
of the creative activity of God. Creation for 
Descartes means that God constructed matter "ex 
nihilo" and initiated motion. For Berkeley 
creation is the act whereby the ideas existing 
5 in the mind of God become perceptible to men. 
But this difference does not touch the concept of 
1. Gouhler, op. cit., p. 231. 
2. I, 344. 
3. I, 340. 
4. I, 347. . 
5. B. Rand, The Correspondence of~­
Berkeley and Sir John Percival 
( Cambridge: University Press, 
1914 ), pp~ 83-84. 
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God itself, and for both thinkers the world, as 
known to us, is due to a fiat of God's will. The 
only important difference which I am able to find, 
and it concerns again God's relation to the world 
rather than God himself, is the one expressed by 
the terms transcendence and immanence. Descartes' 
God, who, having once made the world and placed a 
certain amount of motion in it, has left it to run 
according to fixed laws, easily develops into the 
utterly transcendent God of deism. Although our 
own existence is at every moment dependent upon 
him, yet we are not apt to meet him on the highway 
of ordinary thinking, and if we wish to get in touch 
with him, we must follow Descartes on a pilgrimage 
to Loretto. Berkeley, on the contrary, could not 
open his eyes without communicating with God in the 
act of perception. Hence he was fond of expressing 
the immanence of hie view of God in the words, "In 
1 
him we live and move and have our being". 
The grounds which the two philosophers 
Offer for their belief in God must now be examined. 
Three arguments can be distinguished in Descartes' 
1. E. g., III, 269. 
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proof for the existen~e of God. One of these is 
the ontological argument in practically the same 
form as we find it in Anselm. The other two are 
based on the principle of causality, the one 
assuming a psychological, the other a cosmological, 
character. 
The ontological argument is presented in 
the fifth Meditation. Descartes reasons as follows. 
There are· in my mind ideas that have certain 
immutable properties so that I cannot conceive of 
the idea without holding to the truth of the 
properties. Thus I cannot form the idea of a 
triangle without admitting that its angles equal 
two right angles. Now I have a clear and distinct 
idea of a most real and perfect Being. In anal-
yzing the idea of God as a most real Being, having 
every perfection, I find that existence must be 
among these perfections. I can no more conceive 
of God without existence than I can of a mountain 
without a valley or of a triangle without the 
above-mentioned property. In other ideas existence 
is not necessary, for they do not involve absolute 
perfection. Hence the idea of God implies the 
270 
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existence of God. 
The causal arguments are presented in 
Meditation III and represent Descartes' original 
peculiar formulation of the defence of theism. 
The first of these, the psychological causal argu-
ment, proceeds as follows. There are certain 
principles which the natural light of understanding 
presents to me so clearly and distinctly that I 
must accept them as self-evident. One of these is 
the law that in the efficient cause there must be 
at least as much reality as in the effect. "Nam 
quaeso, undenam possit asswnere realitatem sua.m 
effectus, nisi a ca.usa?"l Now the clearest and 
supreme idea in my mind is that of a God, a 
' 
Being infinite, omnipotent, and oniscient. But I 
myself am a weak and finite being, as my doubts 
show, and hence I could not have formed this idea 
which contains more reality than myself. I merely 
strive toward perfection, while the idea of God 
represents a Being actually perfect. It is necessary, 
therefore, to conclude that the infinite and 
1. VII, 40. 
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perfect God himself has placed the idea in me, and 
hence God must necessarily exist as the cause of 
the idea. 
The cosmological argument is presented 
in the follo_wing manner. My own existence implies 
the existence of God, for only three other hypoth-
eses are possible, each of which can be proved to 
be false. ( 1 ) I have created myself. But in 
that case I would have made myself perfect, and I 
could also preserve myself. ( 2 ) My parents or 
ancestors have created me. They may, indeed, have 
been the immediate cause of my existence, but, if 
an infinite regress is to be escaped, there must 
be a first cause for them as well as for me. ( 3 ) 
Some cause less perfect than God has created me. 
But the idea of perfection which I have and which 
must have an adequate source, is still to be ex-
plained. The psychological causal argument thus 
disposes of the last alternative. There could not, 
moreover, have been several causes, for perfection 
implies unity. Thus the one perfect God must exist 
aa._the cause of my existence as well as of the 
existence of all things that possibly may be. 
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There are three general features in 
Descartes' arguments which must be noted. ) 
Descartes believed that his demonstration of God 
was absolutely certain, that it was less open to 
doubt than such a proposition as: two and two are 
1 
four. In fact, to use Kant's categories of 
modality, Descartes' God is not only a possibility 
or an existence, but a necessity. It was at once 
objected by Gassendi, as later by Kant, that 
thought cannot impose such necessary existence on 
2 
any of its objects. But Descartes who, like 
Hegel, held to the rationality of the ~eal and the 
reality of the rational, was not to be silenced b~ 
such an objection. He replied that he was not free 
to say that the sum of the three angles of a 
triangle do not equal two right angles, nor that 
God can be conceived without necessarily implying 
3 
existence. ( 2 ) Descartes' demonstration of God 
is not syllogistic but is based on direct intuition; 
i. e., rational self-evidence. This position, 
which is entirely in keeping with Descartes' general 
" , t~aching concerning "verites eternelles", is made 
4 
plain in a letter to the Marquis of Newcastle . 
1. I, 181, 182; VII, 1-2. 
2. Objections V, section 3, 
3. VII, 320 ff. 
4. V, 134-139. 
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Descartes is thus enabled to dispose of the objec-
tion, first advanced by Arnauld and Gassendi, and 
repeated through the centuries; namely, that there 
is a vicious circle in his proof of existence by 
I 
appeal to God ( tne veracite ) and his proof of 
God by appeal to existence ( the causal arguments). 
Descartes explains that it is only knowledge by 
the senses and by memory that is dependent on divine 
veracity; intuitive knowledge needs no such guar-
antee. An intuitive knowledge of God is the basis 
of the trustworthiness of sense-knowledge. ( 3 ) 
This fact becomes yet clearer when we note, finally, 
that Descartes' three arguments, according to his 
own statement, do not constitute three distinct 
1 
proofs but only variant expressions of one proof. 
The basic idea in all of Descartes' arguments is 
perfections and its inseparability from existence. 
We approach God through the perfection and the lack 
of perfection in ourselves. Our doubt is something 
relative and implies as its absolute standard a 
Ferfect Being. In the same way physical motion is 
relative to an absolute unchanging perfection and 
1 . IV, 112; VI I, 106 . 
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I.. all the laws of nature have their basis in "lea 1 perfections infinies de Dieu." In searching for 
the cause of myself or of the world I am con-
cerned with a hierarchy of perfections rather than 
with a receding chain of causes. Even if I were 
to find a so-called "first cause", I could not 
call it God, did I not already possess the idea 
of a Perfect Being. Whenever I search for truth 
in any field, this idea of a Perfect Being is 
2 
invariably present. Now it is possible, of 
course, to say simply that Descartes unites his 
ontological and causal proofs by his peculiar 
Neoplatonic view of the principle of causality as 
a logical relation of ground and consequence in 
which the former is the source of the emanation of 
the latter and must contain a greater amount of 
reality. To my mind, it is more significant to 
observe in Descartes' view a clear anticipation of 
modern idealism; e. g., of the type of Royce, in 
which, because of the unified structure of mind, 
a Perfect Being or Absolute is implied in our 
infirmity and error. 
1. VI, 43. 
2. This view is clearly seen to underlie 
the reasoning in Meditations III 
and IV. 
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What, then, was Berkeley's attitude 
toward this argumentation? The answer must be, 
first of all, that Descartes' pure theism and his 
emphasis on the uniqueness and supremacy of the 
religious solution to the ultimate problems of 
reality constitute the very breath of life of the 
Berkeleian philosophy. As we know, Berkeley was 
deeply influenced by the Molyneux edition of the 
J..!edi ta tions, the title-page of which asserts 
"wherein it is Proved that there is a God," the 
last word being printed in extraordinarily large 
letters, implying that it is the central theme of 
the boolc. And it is precisely this work of Descartes ' 
which does contain most completely his arguments 
for God. Berkeley, like Descartes, thinks that he 
can demonstrate the existence of God with absolute 
1 
certainty, and announces this fact on the title-
page of the Dialogues. But Berkeley is also careful 
to carry out his resolution not to pin his faith 
on the sleeve of any great man, and hence he 
follows Descartes' precedent in a critical spirit. 
Thus he quotes in the Commonplace Boolr Descartes' 
1. I, 340 ff. 
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definition of God from Metl.itation III, and remarks 
2 
that his own definition is "much clearer". As a 
matter of fact, Berkeley nowhere gives a new def-
inition of God, one that would differ from that of 
Descartes or of the conservative Christian theology 
from which they both draw their formal definitions. 
On the contrary he is content with Descartes' 
2 
favorite definition, "absolute perfection". But 
Berkeley is undoubtedly referring to his general 
grounds for the idea of God, and he does, indeed, 
present an original formulation of the belief they 
held in common. Thus Berkeley rejects the ontolog-
ical proof: "Absurd to argue the existence of God 
3 4 
from his idea". As I have pointed out earlier, 
however, Berkeley is here guilty of a misrepresenta-
tion of the meaning of "idea" in Descartes. For 
Berkeley "idea" is at once sense-perception and 
. 5 
"object of thought"; for Descartes it is only the 
6 
latter, as Berkeley recognizes. In the Cartesian 
sense of idea, Berkeley could very well have made 
use of the ontological argument by substituting 
1. I, 59 · 
2. III, 278. 
3. I, 50. 
4. Vi de·· supra, p. 66. 
5. I, 51. 
6. I, 52. 
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1 
"notion" for idea, as Metz suggests~ In fact, the 
existence of God as implied in the very concept of 
God does appear in such a statement as: "Nothing 
can be more evident to any one who is capable of 
2 
the least reflection than the existence of God." 
On Berkeley's principles existence for a mind is 
the only type of existence there is, and hence if 
God can be a mental object he must exist; or, as 
Johnston expresses it, God's reality for Berkeley 
3 
follows the principle, "esse is credi". When, 
furthermore, Berkeley in Siris identifies value and 
4 
being in the conception of God, he is very near 
the substance of Descartes' ontological argument. 
But there is also an inherent connection 
between the ontological argument and Berkeley's own 
positive proof for God. The unique argument ad-
vanced by Berkeley proceeds from the necessity of 
postulating a universal percipient. "Ease" is 
"percipi" or "perclpere", and the "ease" of God is 
demonstrated from the fact that he is necessarily 
implied in "percipere". If 11 esse" is "percipere", 
.-then there must be a God, for without such a 
1 • Metz, op. cit. , p. 129. 
2. I, 342. 
3. Johnston, op. cit., p. 357. 
4. III, 285-286. 
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universal percipient, one who perceives ideas when 
neither I nor other finite selves perceive them, 
there can be no continuous meaning in "esse". The 
similarity of this reasoning to the ontological 
argument is striking. Berkeley's "percipere" like 
Descartes' "perfection" contains God from the begin-
ning. By very definition either term is such as to 
be inseparably connected with the idea of God. The 
"prima facie" i::npression derived from Berkeley's 
argument, as from that of Descartes, is that a 
"circulus in probando" is involved, the definition 
of existence being used to prove God, and the def-
inition of God to prove existence. The circle 
again disappears, however, when we remember that 
Berkeley, like Descartes, derived his original 
s'tarting-point not by means of a syllogism but 
through a direct rational insight. Berkeley's 
ultimate answer to those who would criticize this 
insight is contained in his criterion of "repug-
1 
nancy". Whatever is free from contradiction must 
be considered as real. And here Berkeley is tread-
ing on Cartesian ground. 
1. I, 404, 440, 449, 450 et passim. 
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Berkeley has also an argument which 
appears to contain nothing more than a restatement 
of Descartes' psychological causal proof; namely, 
his argument for God as the cause of ideas. In 
reflecting upon the source of my ideas, says 
Berkeley, "I know myself not to be their author, 
it being out of my power to determine at pleasure 
what particular ideas I shall be affected with 
1 
upon opening my eyes and ears." Another mind 
and 
must, therefore, exist as their source, " •.. Afrom 
the variety , order, and manner of these, I con-
clude the Author of them to be wise, powerful, and 
2 
good beyond comprehension. 11 The Cartesian affin-
ities of the first part of this argument are acknowl-
edged by Berkeley in the Commonplace Book: "Locke 
in his 4th Book, and Des Cartee in Med. 6, use the 
same argument for the existence of objects, viz. 
3 
that sometimes we see, feel, &c., against our will." 
Nor is it difficult to see the relation of the 
latter part of the argument to the Cartesian con-
tention that the reality contained in the effect 
calls for as much reality in the cause. This 
1. I, 428. Cf. I, 273, 
2. I, 428. 
3. I, 49. 
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suspicion is confirmed when we recall an entry in 
the Commonplace Book: "Quoth Des Cartee, The idea 
of God is not made by me, for I can neither add to 
nor subtract from it. No more can he add to nor 
1 
take from any other idea, even of his own making." 
All ideas thus come to us ready-made and carrying 
the imprint of the divine architect. Berkeley 
extends the application of the Cartesian argument 
from the single idea of God to all ideas. 
But the most Cartesian of all of Berke-
ley's arguments is the argument from human imper-
fection: "For, all the notion I have of God is 
obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening 
its powers, and removing its imperfections. I 
have, therefore, though not an active idea, yet 
I have a notion of Him, or know Him by reflexion 
and reasoning ...•• From my own being, and from the 
dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do, by 
an act of reason, necessarily infer the existence 
of a God, and of all created things in the mind of 
2 
God." Here in the very language of the Meditations 
Berkeley speaks of the "image of the Deity" in the 
1 . I, 50. 
2. I, 448. 
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human soul, which enables us by a process of rational 
introspection to proceed on the basis of our own 
"imperfections" and "dependency" to "infer neces-
sarily the existence of God". If Berkeley had not 
been acquainted with Descartes, this reasoning 
might be regarded as an amazing coincidence; in 
View of Berkeley's familiarity with the Meditations 
before these lines were written, it must be called 
"influence". 
Independently of Cartesian influence 
Berkeley accepts the traditional cosmological and 
1 
teleological proofs for God. In the necessity of 
having God as the cause of the spirit and in the 
continued dependence of the spirit on God there may 
be an echo of Descartes, who was saved from the 
Hwnean view of the spirit only by recourse to the 
2 
continued creative activity of God. But in his e 
emphasis on teleology Berkeley follows a train of 
thought quite different from the Cartesian. Des-
cartes would not reason from the principle of 
finality, for he claimed that finite human mind 
3 
cannot grasp the purposes of God. Descartes had a 
1. I, 340 ff., 422 ff. 
2 • Prin. I , 2 1 . 
3. I, 145-146; IV, 292; IX, 44. 
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profound sense of the "mysterium tremendum", and 
t 
his rejection of finality, as Blondel shows, has a 
religious rather than a scientific motivation. 
Berkeley, while agreeing in De Motu with Descartes' 
view of the irrelevancy of teleological explana-
tions in natural science, is fond of contemplating 
the "exquisite contrivance" and the "exact harmony 
2 
and correspondence" of all creation. On this 
ground he once gives a fine anticipation of Lotze's 
3 
argument for God from interaction. Descartes, on 
the other hand, in arguing for God on the grounds 
4 
of epistemological necessity, seems to me to 
anticipate the epistemological argument of Ulrici 
and Bowne. The desire to escape the infinite 
regress of secondary explanations and to light 
upon an objective first principle, and the neces-
sity of conceiving this first principle under the 
mental and moral attributes of human personality, 
are characteristic of Berkeley as well as of 
Descartes. No answer less than God satisfies 
either thinker as he seeks after truth. 
After what has been said of the self and 
1. Blondel, op. cit., p. 557. 
2. I, 340. 
3. I, 423. 
4. Vide supra, pp. 196-200. 
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of God, it is unnecessary to dwell on the problem 
of immortality. Descartes' proof of immortality 
consists in a demonstration of the distinction 
between mind and body. His most concise statement 
of this demonstration is as follows: "nullum 
corpus nisi divisibile intelligamus, contra autem 
nullam mentem nisi indivisibilem: •.• tum quia 
haec sufficiunt ad ostendendum ex corporis corrup-
tione mentis non sequi, atque sic ad alterius 
vitae spem mortalibus faciendam; ..• Ex quibus 
sequitur corpus quidem perfacile interire, 
1 
mentem autem ex natura sua esse immortalem. 11 
Yet Descartes admits that God, by denying our 
souls his "concursus", can annihilate them ( 11 ad 
2 
nihilum reducantur" ). Berkeley's position on 
this question is identical with that of Descartes. 
"We have shown, 11 he writes, "that the soul is 
indivisible, incorporeal, unextended; and it is 
consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer 
than that the motions, changes, and dissolutions 
which we hourly see befall natural bodies cannot 
possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded 
1 . VII, 13. 
2. VII, 14. 
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substance: such a being therefore is indissoluble 
by the force of nature; that is to say, the soul of , 
man is naturally immortal." But Berkeley, like 
Descartes, denies that II •.. they who assert the 
natural immortality of the soul are Of the opinion 
that it is incapable of annihilation even by the 
infinite power of the Creator who first gave it 
2 
being, •.• " 
For the sake of formal completeness, a 
word may be added on the relation of God to the 
problem of evil. Descartes, with his view of the 
inscrutability of divine purposes, escapes this 
problem, while Berkeley expounds the view of the 
relativity of evil in a manner similar to that of 
, 
Leibniz in the Theodicee, which was published in "the 
same year as Berkeley's Principles. 
1 . I, 337 · 
2. I, 336. 
l 
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CHAPTER IX. 
MATHEMATICS AND ETHICS 
With the study of the problem of God the 
main task of the research, the comparison of the 
philosophical system of Berkeley with that of 
descartes in the light of the explicit references 
of the former to the latter, may be said to have 
been accomplished. There remain, however, two 
fields of thought which from the point of view of 
the present study must be regarded as peripheral 
but which are nevertheless important enough to 
deserve specific notice. Forever in the back-
1 
ground of Descartes' thinking, as its 11 envelope" 
if not its foundation, to use Wallace's expression, 
was mathematics. This is the science in which 
Berkeley both began and ended his career as a 
philosophical writer. And looming on the horizon, 
as the ultimate field of application for all 
knowledge, for both writers was ethics, though 
neither wrote systematically on this subject. 
The ethical inquiries toward which Descartes was 
1. w. Wallace, article, "Descartes", in 
Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., 
Vol. VIII, p. 84. 
. , l 
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turning in his mature age were cut short by sudden 
death, while the manuscript of the second volume 
of Berkeley's Principles, containing his ethical 
theories was lost during the philosopher's travels 
in Italy. An evaluation must now be made of the 
Cartesian influence in Berkeley's mathematical 
and ethical theories. There is in the two philos-
ophers, as will appear presently, an inner con-
nection between these two branches of knowledge 
which makes it appropriate as well as convenient 
to discuss them in the same chapter. 
Descartes owes his rank as one of the 
outstanding figures in the history of mathematics 
to the following contributions. ( 1 ) He system-
atized the use of exponents to denote the powers 
of a quantity, recognizing the homogeneity of 
successive powers and preparing the way for Newton's 
discovery of the binomial theorem. ( 2 ) He stand-
ardized algebraic expression by restricting the 
early letters of the alphabet to the knovm, and the 
late letters to the unknown, quantities. ( 3 ) He 
applied algebra to geometry in such a way as to 
bring the isolated and independent demonstrations 
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of ancient geometry under a uniform and generalized 
science. He is thus the founder of analytical 
geometry. ( 4 ) In his controversy with Roberval 
and others on the question of drawing tangents to 
curves he anticipated the method of flux.ions and 
the differential calculus. ( 5 ) In pure algebra 
he "expounded and illustrated the general methods 
of solving equations up to those of the fourth 
degree, stated the law which connects the positive 
and negative roots of an equation with the changes 
of sign in the consecutive terms, and introduced 
the method of indeterminate coefficients for the 
1 
solution of equations". 
By these innovations, especially by his 
discovery of analytical geometry, Descartes revolu-
tionized mathematics and initiated the movement 
which made this branch of thought "the admired 
darling" of the age of Berkeley. Mathematical 
conceptions in Berkeley's day, as Johnston points 
2 
out, were as influential as the idea of evolution 
has been during the past six or seven decades of 
I 1. Ibid. Cf. Descartes' Geometrie, Book III. 
2. Johnston, op. cit., p. 79. 
l 
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our own time. In that sense Berkeley could, indeed, 
no more overlook Descartes than a thinker to-day 
can overlook Darwin. But just as the current phi-
losopher who is not a biologist is likely to be 
more conversant, e.g., with Lloyd Morgan than wit.an. 
the details of Darwin's investigations, so Berke-
ley's interest was in Newton rather than in Des-
cartes. Thus apart from the Cartesian application 
of mathematics to the psychology of vision, which 
has already been discussed, Berkeley in his math-
ematical discussions makes only two, possibly 
three, references to Descartes. In his Defence of 
Free thinking in Mathematics Berkeley speaks of 
what Descartes "wrote concerning ·the roots of 
1 
affected equations" as an illustration of a meth-
od that is useful but not strictly demonstrative. 
Later in the same treatise Berkeley says: " I see 
no reason why I may not as freely animadvert on Mr. 
Locke or Sir Isaac Newton as they the mathematicians 
2 
would on Aristotle or Des Cartes." Berkeley adds, 
in a vein that shows at once his great respect for 
Descartes, as well as for the illustrious men with 
1. III, 70. 
2. III, 93. 
l 
289 
- ------------- ----c ___________________________ _ 
whom Descartes is here linked, and his independence 
of their authority: "Certainly the more extensive 
the influence of any error, and the greater the 
authority which supports it, the more it deserves 
1 
to be considered." The third reference is in the 
Analyst and reveals the same attitude. Descartes 
is not mentioned by name, but the reference is 
evidently to his most important contribution to 
mathematics: "Whether, although geometry be a sci-
ence, and algebra allowed to be a science, and the 
analytical a most excellent method, in the applica-
tion, nevertheless, of the analysis to geometry, 
men may not have admitted false principles and 
2 
wrong methods of reasoning?" 
This critical attitude toward the founder 
of analytical geometry is not surprising in the 
light of Berkeley's mathematical writings in general. 
Berkeley was not a first-rate mathematician, as is 
evidenced by his lack of appreciation of the epoch-
making discoveries of Newton, which is reflected 
especially in the Commonplace Book. His mathemat-
ical thinking was dominated by his "ease is percipi" 
1. III, 93. 
2. III, 57. 
1 
290 
principle, and he was willing to cast aside any 
theory that did not conform to this principle. 
Hence the mathematical object could be nothing 
else than a sense-object, and mathematics could 
never be a pure, but only an applied, science. 
This is what led him, e. g. to consider a line as 
made up of a limited number of visible points, the 
"minima sensibilia", and to combat vehemently any 
idea of infinitesimals. The Analyst contains 
indeed some penetrating criticisms that caused 
Berkeley's opponents to examine more carefully 
the logic of their demonstrations. But that entire 
treatise was only a "tu quoque" argument against 
the mathematicians who rebelled against mysterious 
elements in religion. The most charitable estimate 
that can be placed from a scientific point of view 
on Berkeley's participation in this controversy is 
the following, given long years ago: " If the 
author of the Analyst has had the misfortune to 
enroll his name on the side of error, he has also 
had the credit of proposing difficulties of which 
I 
the complete solution is only to be derived from 
the highest improvements of the calculus." 
1 
1. Statement by Playfair, quoted by C. P. 
Krauth in his edition of Berkeley's 
Principles (Philadelphia:Lippincott, 
1886), p. 390. G. Stammler {Berkeleys 
Philosophie der Mathematik. Berlin: 
Reuther,1921}-agrees that Berkeley 
brought to liPW.t inner contradictions 
in the curren~ discussion and holds that 
Berkeley's polemic was justified. 
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But more important than actual mathematical 
theories was the Cartesian influence transmitted to 
Berkeley in the form of emphasis on mathematical 
method and its applicability to other fields of 
thought. Thus in one of his very earliest writings, 
"De Ludo Algebraico" in Miscellanea Mathematica, 
Berkeley refers to Descartes as an authority for the 
statement: "Quod vero recentiorum algebra ad ingen-
1 
ium formandum imprimis conducat ...• " Now Descartes, 
as we have seen, dreamed in his youthful days of a 
"universal mathematical science" in which an all-
embracing philosophy was to be deduced with absolute 
certainty from self-evident rational axioms. This 
project, however, became modified by a more vital 
and practical interest in God and the soul, until 
even mathematical truths were made dependent on 
the will of God. Thus while Descartes did construct 
a universal science, the mathematical element is 
less prominent in his finished work in the Prin-
ciples than in the early Rules. But Descartes left, 
at any rate, a highly suggestive and influential 
sample of a metaphysical discussion "more geometrico". 
1. IV, 61 . 
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In response to a request from the group of theolo-
gians who wrote the second set of Objections, he 
drew up the content of the Meditations into the form 
of geometrical definitions, postulates, axioms, 
propositions, and corollaries. There can be little 
doubt that this set the example for Spinoza and 
contributed to the wide-spread tendency among the 
philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries to cast thir philosophical arguments in 
mathematical form. This tendency is evident in 
Berkeley's effort to construct a universal algebra 
of nature in his theory of "signs", subordinated, 
like Descartes' system of mathematics, to God. 
It was this same Cartesian tendency, 
already definitely crystallized in Spinoza's 
Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata and encouraged 
1 
by Locke, that led Berkeley to think that "Morality 
2 
may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics." That 
Berkeley tried to carry out this youthful project 
is evident from Passive Obedience, Berkeley's most 
succinct exposition of his ethical doctrines, where 
he writes: "In morality the eternal rules of action 
have the same immutable universal truth with prop-
1. Essa3, IV, 3, 18. 
2. I, 4 . Cf. I, 76. 
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osi tions in geometry" and '"When the supreme power 
is ascertained, we should no more doubt of our 
submission to it, than vre would doubt of the way 
2 
to measure a figure we know to be a triangle". 
But Berkeley was also anxious that his theories 
3 
would "go down with the mob"; that is, that they 
would be popularly accepted. Hence he soon became 
convinced that "the short jejune way in mathemat-
iques will not do in metaphyaiques & ethiques, ... 
4 
the dry, atrigose, rigid way will not suffice". 
Thus Berkeley failed to work out a system of ethics 
conceived as applied mathematics, and we must look 
for his ethical theories in the dialogues of 
Alciphron, the sermons on Passive Obedience, and 
various other popular writings. 
A comparison of the moral philosophy of 
Berkeley with that of Descartes is outside the 
limits of the research, for there is no evidence 
of Cartesian influence in Berkeley's ethics aside 
from the reference already made to mathematical 
method. There are, however, significant agreements 
1. IV, 133. 
t.~. 2. IV, 134. 
3 · I, 69. 
4. Ibid. 
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which reflect the unity of thought which has already 
been established in other fields. The supremacy 
which both assign to the ethical interest may firs~ 
be noted. When Berkeley, in sketching his future 
system, says, "the whole directed to practise and 
morality", he does not differ from Descartes, who in 
his first published work, the Discourse, announced 
that the reason why he was at length persuaded to 
make his views public was: "i'ay creu que ie ne 
, 
pouuois les tenir cachees, sans pecher grandement 
centre la loy qui nous oblige a procurer, autant 
qu'il es en nous, le bien general de tous les hommes". 
2 
Both philosophers make happiness the end of morality, 
but both point out that true happiness comes from a 
realization of man's rational nature rather than 
3 
from sensual satisfaction, and hence both eulogize 
4 
the beauty of the rational life. Both also show 
that happiness as well as reason demands that we 
5 
seek the common good rather than private interest. 
Both stress the importance of the will and both 
postulate freedom as the basis of ethics as well 
1 • IV, 61 • 
, 
2. Descartes: IV, 252; Berkeley: I,47 & IV, 164. 
3. Descartes: IV,252 ff.; Berkeley: IV,105,172. 
4. Descartes: IV,264; Berkeley: II,139· 
5. Descartes: IV,61; Berkeley: IV,189. 
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as of knowledge, but neither succeeds in giving 
free will a sufficient metaphysical grounding. These 
agreements are all the more impressive when one notes 
that in the main Berkeley falls in line with the 
English tradition of hedonism and anticipates util-
itarianism, while Descartes was influenced most by 
the "duty" ethics of Stoicism. The most potent 
source of these agreements is to be found in the 
common religious background of the two philosophers. 
1. Descartes: Obj. III, 12 and O~j. 
VI, 6; Berkeley: II, 346-35 . 
I 
1 
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- CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
A surprisingly rich legacy of Cartesian 
ideas has been discovered in the system of Berkeley. 
Before drawing the final conclusions from this data 
it is well to consider in a general way Berkeley's 
use of his Cartesian heritage. Thia study has not 
been concerned so much with men or their rights of 
priority, aa with the evolution of philosophical 
concepts. Hence when a Berkeleian problem or solu-
ti on has been traced to Descartes, it has not ·been 
with an implication to discredit Berkeley nor to 
impugn the originality of his thought. For al-
though Berkeley disclaimed to be a "setter-up of 
new notions" and said that he simply harmonized the 
views of philosophers with ordinary common sense, 
he never took over the view of another philosopher 
without impressing upon it the stamp of his own 
incomparable genius. Thus in each case of indebted-
ness there is an inner unfolding of the original 
idea so that it comes to find its place in a vital 
and coherent system. Berkeley uses his Locke and 
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his Descartes in much the same way as Shakespeare 
' 
uses his Holinshed and his Plutarch: at the touch 
of creative thought the source-material receives a 
richer and a deeper meaning. In epistemology the 
cogitating subject of Descartes, which is at home 
among mathematical propositions but finds it diffi-
cult to effect a passage into the world of experi-
ence, gives way to a self that is rich with first-
hand content drawn from sense-perception and yet 
gradually learns to affiliate itself with the 
"aeternae veritates" of reason. And in metaphysics 
Descartes' idea of a static world of being, with 
thought and matter forming two different kinds of 
substance, is supplanted by a dynamic world-view 
of unified purposive activity. Berkeley had in a 
rare measure the gift of discerning where the sig-
nificant problems lay and of supplying those 
emphases, alignments, and eliminations which 
either solved the existing problem or raised a 
new one that served better to facilitate the 
progress of philosophy. 
One gains a clearer conception of this 
matter in the light of its general historical 
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background by pausing to consider the problems which 
each of the philosophers left to his successors. A 
hostile critic has summarized the problems left by 
Descartes as follows: "He bequeathed to psychology 
and philosophy the body-soul problem; he burdened 
the theory of knowledge with the dualism of intra-
mental ideas and extramental things; he divorced and 
isolated each individual mind alike from other minds 
and from the common world; he destroyed for psy-
chology all chance of a concrete analysis of human 
illinds by dividing the living man not only between 
a soullesa body and a bodyless soul, but by divid-
ing the soul farther between a metaphysical non-
empirical substance and an abstract self-conscious-
ness whittled down to the bare data of immediate 
1 
experience." Apart from the peculiar insinuations 
that an important problem is a chafing "burden 11 , 
that analysis means permanent "divorce", and that 
a single thinker can arbitrarily "destroy the 
chance" of all succeeding science ever to reach the 
truth, this summary is correct. The relations 
between "res cog1tans" and "res extensa" and between 
, 
1. R.F.A. Hoernle, op. cit., p. 240. 
.., 
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both and God afforded material not only for the 
Cartesians and the Occasionalists but for most of 
the great systems of the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries. Spinoza's geometrical pantheism, 
in which the created substances are absorbed in 
God, Leibniz' pre-established harmony, Male-
branche's "vision of all things in God", Hobbes' 
reduction of thought to motion, La Mettrie's 
"l'homme machine", as well as Berkeley's immater-
ialism, were all of them attempts to answer the 
questions propounded by Descartes. It is the con-
tention of this study that Berkeley developed the 
fundamental thesis of Descartes, the priority of a 
pure theistic conception of God, coupled with an 
activistic conception of the mind and a view of 
matter as passive and phenomenal. 
Of the problems left by Berkeley the 
·~... ! 
following seem to me to be the most i
1
{Ilportant. 
( 1 ) Berkeley accepted the self or mind as the 
"spiritual substance" of Descartes and gave it 
unique significance, but he failed to develop 
further the metaphysical content of this concept. 
The result was that it proved to be quite 
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as easy for Hume to destroy Berkeley's spiritual 
substance as it had been for Berkeley to dispose 
of material substance. Berkeley, like Descartes, 
could define the self largely only in negative 
terms. He left to Hume the task of abolishing the 
Cartesian conception; and indirectly to Kant the 
task of discovering the true self, one that cannot 
be explained away by empirical analysis for it is 
constitutive of experience itself. "It is mis-
leading," writes G. A. Wilson, "to call the self 
a spiritual substance, as if the term spiritual 
set it off in a mysterious world of non-spatial, 
non-temporal entities, concerning which we can 
say only that they have none of the characterist-
ics of experienceable objects. The value of the 
term 'substance' in this connection is largely 
1 
negative." It is this negative conception of 
the self as soul-substance which, when reduced 
to consciousness, becomes a mere shadow and can 
be exorcised from philosophy and psychology in 
the way William James has done. 0 2 ) Another 
problem which Berkeley inherited from Descartes 
1. G. A. Wilson, "The Search for the 
Concrete", Monist 39 (1929), p. 93. 
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and passed on without adequate solution, having 
succeeded only in making it more explicit, was 
the relationship between selves. Descartes iso-
lated finite minds and failed to reunite them, but 
the problem never became acute for him because of 
his emphasis on the universal and necessary aspects 
of thought according to his mathematical standards. 
Berkeley, on the other hand, who never could quite 
overcome his antipathy toward the a priori, found 
real difficulty in establishing a common world 
for his particular finite percipients. He could 
reason only by analo.gical inference from his own 
self to the reality of other selves and he could 
solve the problem of communication only by direct 
appeal to God. Hudson's criticism of Descartes 
applies also to Berkeley: "Descartes should have 
seen that when I think 'I' 'distinctly', I think 
in distinction to the reality of other minds.. All 
distinction implies a genus or kind, -- a background 
of kind and other species of the same kind. Ration-
ality is the kind. Every rational consciousness 
necessarily conceives itself in terms of contrast 
with other selves. Ego thinks itself in terms of 
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non-this-ego, and not 1n terms of utter non-ego. 
Logical consciousness is always generic, and means 
an intelligent community of selves recognizing each 
1 
other." It was left for later idealism, with its 
deeper synthesis, made pos~ible by the labors of 
Kant, of the empirical and the rational, to develop 
the grounds for a rational community of selves. 
( 3 ) Again, while Berkeley's thought moved steadily 
toward a more adequate recognition of the rational 
structure of knowledge, his theory of "notions" is 
but a vague and vacillating attempt in this direc-
tion. Berkeley failed to weld into a harmonious 
system his early nominalism and the Platonic 
realism of Sirls. It was left for Hegel, "the 
2 
empiricist in the realm of the spirit", to work 
out a significant doctrine of "notions" in which 
the empirical is duly acknowledged but is 11aufge-
hoben11 in the rational. ( 4 ) Berkeley failed 
also to analyze thoroughly enough the process of 
sense-perception. In a philosophy in which "esse" 
is "percipi", a most critical study of the struc-
ture and function of perception would have been of 
1. Hudson, op. cit., p. 91. 
2. This expression was used by Professor 
T.L.Haering in a lecture before 
Professor E.S.Brightman's Seminar 
in Hegel at Boston University, 
October 1, 1929. 
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special value. This task, however, would have 
required more patience and speculative detachment 
than the impetuous and practical-minded Berkeley 
possessed. It was left to be accomplished by 
Hume, "the spirit that denies", and by Kant, 11 der 
alleszermalmende". ( 5 ) Berkeley, like Descartes, 
failed to overcome the view of naive realism that 
knowledge is concerned with a non-cognitive, pas-
sive, and independent datum. It is true that he 
reduced Descartes' material substance to a succes-
sion of ideas which constitute a sign-language 
whereby God communicates the world to us. But he 
could not quite reach the level of a thoroughly 
dynamic view which renders idealism consistent and 
irrefutable, viz., that instead of communicating 
to us certain passive and inert data, the Absolute 
Mind is the source of stimulation and it is we who 
create our world in response to that stimulation. 
1 
As G. A. Wilson has cogently pointed out, the 
common object which we know is the "form of control" 
exercised by a unified mental "source of control". 
This view is implicit in the emphasis of both 
1. G. A. Wilson, The Self and Its World 
(N. Y.: Macmillan-:-T§'26). -
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Descartes and Berkeley on "God and the soul" as the 
only indubitable realities, but it could not become 
explicit before Kant and Hegel had accomplished 
their labors. 
This statement of problems establishes 
the general historical setting in which the ulti-
mate conclusions of the research may now be stated. 
Berkeley's central philosophical position, viz., 
his reduction of the world to mind and its ideas, 
the former owing its substa.ntiality to.God, the sole 
ultimate reality, and the latter being dependent on 
the perceptive activity of the mind, represents a 
development of the basic principles of Descartes' 
-
world-view. Berkeley's fundamentai insight, con-
ditioned by Descartes' distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities, was that Descartes' ideal-
istic metaphysics, unified and purged of .its 
naturalistic accompaniments according to Descartes' 
own definition of substance, c,onstitute a.n adequate 
theory of reality. That this development was not 
fortuitous or du.e only to indirect connection, but 
occurred under the direct influence of Descartes 
bas been proved from the explicit references of 
Berkeley to Descartes' works and from the contexts 
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thus involved. If this conclusion is difficult for 
the reader to accept and it appears to him, as it 
did to Cudworth, that Cartesianism has "an undis-
cerned tang of mechanic atheism" about it, which 
sets it in opposition to the deeply religious anti-
naturalistic metaphysics of Berkeley, then he must 
remember to distinguish, as did Berkeley, between 
the original Descartes and later Cartesian develop-
ments. For varied lines of thought issued from 
the tremendous impulse imparted to philosophical 
reflection by the great thinker who deservedly 
bears the name "founder of modern philosophy". It 
is as unfair to judge Descartes by La Mettrie or 
d'Holbach as it would be to judge Hegel by Feuer-
bach or Marx. Descartes himself attached supreme 
significance to his demonstration of "God and the 
soul" and subordinated his naturalistic physics to 
his theistic metaphysics. Thus he repudiated 
thoroughly his favorite disciple Regius when the 
latter overeillphasized the natural philosophy and 
reduced the soul to a form of matter. Descartes 
also attacked vehemently similar interpretations by 
Hobbs and Gassendi. I have maintained the thesis 
that Berkeley, vil10, as has been demonstrated, knew 
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and esteemed highly the t:rue Descartes, having 
learned very early to take sides with him against 
Hobbes, grasped even more thoroughly than Male-
branche the essential principles of Descartes' 
philosophy and expounded their implications. 
Berkeley followed Descartes in developing as the-
fundamental principle of reality a purely theistic 
conception of God, as inteiligence and will and as 
related to the physical world only by his free 
creative activity. Berkeley's genuinely Cartesian 
view here differs from the Platonizing interpreta-
tions of Malebranche and More, which were hampered 
by the presence in God of the properties of the 
world of geometrical extension. Both Descartes and 
Berkeley were motivated by the practical purpose 
of defending the Christian religion and both drew 
deeply from unadulterated Christian consciousness, 
the first great philosophical interpreter of which 
was Augustine. The way to God, for Descartes and 
Berkeley, as for Augustine, is through the self. 
Each of these philosophers claimed to know God and 
the self with e;reater certainty than he knew the 
material world. There resulted a quality of "inward-
ness", reflecting the unique importance of the 
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thinkine; self. Descartes rescued the self out of 
the abstractions of matter and form which were about 
to engulf it and made it the guiding principle of 
his philosophy. Berkeley adopted a similar pro-
cedure, and while he did not advance far beyond the 
"spiritual substance" of Descartes, he pointed the 
way toVlard Kant. In the light of current trends 
in philosophy this common em,l)hasis on the integrity 
of the thinking subject establishes a most signifi-
cant unity between Descartes and Berkeley. Whitehead 
in Science and the Modern World traces the errors 
of modern philosophy to the Cartesian diastasis of 
subject and object and claims that the whole "prob-
lem of knowledge" will vanish as soon as this 
unwarranted classification is abandoned. Dewey in 
Experience and Nature utters a vehement protest 
against the conception that experience must neces-
sarily be construed as "somebody's" experience, and 
allows no real significance to the distinction 
between objective conditions and subjective inter-
pretations of them. Opposition to this type of 
philosophy unites the Cartesian and the Berkeleian 
streams of thought as significantly as Descartes 
and Berkeley were at one in their opposition to 
!308 ii ! 
' 
Hobbes. 
We are thus enabled to evaluate anew the 
historical relation between Descartes and Berkeley. 
rt becomes necessary to reject as artificial and 
misleading the traditional classification which 
separates the two thinkers by making Descartes a 
Continental rationalist and Berkeley a British 
empiricist, a mere link between Locke and Hume. 
While the tremendous influence which Locke exerted 
upon Berkeley has been acknowledged, it has been 
pointed out, on the one hand, that Locke himself 
was deeply influenced by Descartes, e. g., in 
making the important distinction of primary and 
secondary qualities, and, on the other hand, that 
the influence of Descartes was present·from the 
very beginning to counteract the non~cartesian 
side of Locke. And if at first Berkeley was 
inclined to follow Locke as over against Descartes, 
yet the gradual development of Berkeley's thought 
from its original crude nominalism and ~ensuous 
empiricism toward its rationalistic realism in 
Sirls was a steady triumph of the Cartesian influ-
ence. Berkeley stands logically as well as chrono-
logically half-way between Descartes and Kant. 
.. 
Descartes formulated the significant questions of 
modern philosophy in terms of the thinking subject 
as pure thought and its objective reference. 
Berkeley analyzed the objective reference into 
the ideas of the thinking subject. After Hume 
had shown the necessity of revising the conception 
of the thinking subject, Kant followed with his 
Copernican revolution, whereby the subject , now 
conceived as unified rational activity that con-
ditions the possibility of experience, creates its 
own objective reference. Thus through successive 
stages of thought, one building upon another, was 
prepared the foundation for the idealism of to-day, 
which interprets the universe as an organic concrete 
whole revealing its structure in human intelligence. 
It was toward this unity of reason that Descartes 
was striving with his conception that reality is 
so constructed that whatever the mind conceives 
clearly and distinctly must carry reality with it. 
Berkeley embodied the same insight in his view 
that "strong, orderly, and coherent" ideas consti-
tute reality and whatever is not "repugnant" to 
thought must be accepted as existent. But both 
Descartes and Berkeley saw also that this world-view 
• 
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needs as its causally operative source and as its 
ultimate principle of validity a divine mind with 
moral attributes. Hence Descartes could not accept 
the truth even of geometrical axioms without faith 
in a God who does not deceive us in the ideas 
which our reason constrains us to believe. And 
Berkeley trusted in the evidence of sense-perception 
because he looked upon it as the sign-language 
whereby the Author of Nature was speaking to him. 
As the supreme reality and as the guarantee of the 
possibility of knowledge, Descartes, therefore, 
posits the union of perfection and being in God; 
and Berkeley's ratipnally self-evident "ease is per-
cipi" similarly implies a Universal Percipient. 
Both thinkers unite in their conception of God the 
reality of mind and the objectivity of value. 
There are minor divergences, but in the upper 
reaches of their thinking Descartes and Berkeley 
are fundamentally at one. 
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CHAPTER XI 
SUM].[ ARY 
A. Swnmary of Chapters. 
Chapter I. An or~anic conception of 
the history of philosophy prompts us to study the 
relatedness of the two epoch-makirtg thinkers, 
Descartes and Berkeley, linked together by Kant 
as representing the two main varieties of idealism, 
but separated by historians of philoso1Jhy through 
an artificial distinction between "rat.ionalism" 
and "empiricism". In concentrating research upon 
this connection, which apparently h~s never before 
been systematically studied, we aim at a new approach 
to the fund~ent~l elements in Descartes and a new 
apprais~l of Berkeley's historical position. 
While helpful secondary material is 
afforded by philosophers intervening between . 
Descartes and Berkelay, by historical studies, and 
by various special researches, the main source 
for the investigation is constituted by explicit 
references to Desc~rtes in Berkeley. These 
are to be examined critically in the light 
l 
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of the general backgrounds involved in each case on 
both sides. 
Chapter II •.. ·. Indirectly the influence of 
Descartes was mediated t·o Berkeley thra ugh Locke, 
Malebranche, the Cambridge Platonists, Hobbes, and 
Molyneux. Berkeley identifies himself, especially 
in his attitude toward Malebranche and Hobbes, with 
the central principles of Descartes against misplaced 
emphases. 
Chapter -Ill .A preliminary comparison 
reveals important agreements between Descartes and 
Berkeley as men and as writers. It als~ establishes 
common historical antecedents, especially the 
philosophical reflection originating in the Christian 
consciousness, as interpreted, above all, by 
Augustine. Hence result such similarities of trend 
as the primacy of self-consciousness, the tendency 
to proceed from the self with greater assurance to 
God than to the material world, and the emphasis 
on inwardness on will. In Berkeley's works, 
especially in the Commonplace !2Q.!£, and in the 
catalogue of his library, there is specific 
evidence that Berkeley was well acquainted with 
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Descartes and considered him a first-rate authority. 
Chapter:ry. In their approach to philosophy 
Descartes and Berkeley are at one in their emphasis 
on the importance of method, their rejection of 
external authority, and the use by each of a single 
explanatory principle, gained in a youthful 
experience of deep insight, with emotional 
accompaniments and issuing in c~nsequences of a 
religious nature. Both are motivated by a purpose 
to defend the Christian religion. Both employ an 
introspective approach and make the first applica-
tion of their method in the field of psychology. 
Chapter v,. In hie Dioptrique Descartes 
anticipates Berkeley's ~ Theory .!2.f Vision by 
showing tbe impossibility of an immediate percep-
tion of distance, by conceiving di stance as an 
inference fr,an previous experience, by pointing 
out va.ri ous signs of di stance and their untrust-
wortb iness, and by using tactual data in explain-
ing vision. Berkeley purged the Cartesian theory 
of its mathematical and other irrelevant elements, 
used a purely empirical method, and made a 
significant correlation of visual and tactual data. 
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Chapter VI •. · In the theory of knowledge, 
the "prima facie" evidence of the antagonism of 
Berkeley 1 s "empiricismn to Descartes 1 "rationalism", 
on the graund s of Berkeley 1 a rejection of pure 
r 
thought, his emphasis on the trustworthiness of 
sense, his alleged epistemological monism, and his 
polemic against abstraction, is shown upon closer 
investigation t~ be undependable. These apparent 
dissimilarities vanish with the introduction of 
Berkeley's theory of "notions" and "signs", with 
a c\Orreot understanding of the meaning of Cartesian 
doubt and "innate" ideas, and with an appreciation 
of the development in Berkeley's thinking from 
crude nominalism and sensationalism to his mature 
views in Siris. There are. in addition, specific 
similarities with regard to the object and 
criterion of knowledge, the place of the self in 
knowledge, the meaning of tntuition, the function 
of the will, and the appeal to God in epistemology. 
Chapter VII•, In the the(QI'y of reality, 
Descartes' massive system, with its rationally 
self-evident first princ.iples !lld their thorough-
gDing application to the philosophy of nature and 
to the philosophy of mind was the most imposing 
metaphysical structure with which Berkeley was 
acquainted. Berkeley was dee~ly influenced by 
Descartes' teaching concerning the mind as pure 
conscious activity and concerning the mind-depend-
ent nature of the pbysica1 world. While Berkeley 
attacked the naturalistic and mechanistic side in 
Descartes' dualistic metaphysics 9 he followed 
Descartes in accepting mechanistic physics as a 
scientific expl9Ilation and subordinating it to an 
idealistic metaphysics. By his distinction 
between primary a.nd secondary qualities, and the 
insufficient grounds which he gave for the reality 
of matter 9 Descartes prepared the way for Berkeley's 
immaterialism. Berkeley's most significant insight 
was the application of the law of parsimony to 
Cartesian thought. This enabled him to solve the 
difficulties of dualism and interaction. In such 
basic metaphysical concepts as space, time, motion, 
and subste.nce 0 Berkeley's views evolve from 
Cartesian formulations. Berkeley's greatest 
advance is in the meaning and importance attached 
tD the concept of causality. 
·"·~--·--~., 
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Chapter VJM.In the philosophy of religion, 
Descartes' theistic and specifically Christian 
conception of God, t:ogether with the supremacy of 
the re1igious solution to ultimate problems of 
knowledge and reality, set a significant precedent 
for Berkeley. Descartes' God, however, is transcend-
ent, while Berkeley's is immanent. Berkeley's proof 
of God from the necessity of a universal percipient 
is a variant of the ont,ological proof. Berkeley, 
like Descartes, argues for God as the cause of 
ideas an:l as implied in human imperfection, but 
diff era from Descartes in using the teleological 
argument. Both hold to the immortality of the soul. 
on the ground of the heterogeneity of mind and body, 
but both fail to give their view a sufficient 
metaphysical foundation. 
Chapterlx. In mathematics, it was Descartes 
with his discovery of analytica~ geometry who 
revolutionized this science and was chiefly influ-
ential in making it the most popular science of 
Berkeley's day. Berkeley's prejudice for sense 
prevented him from appreciating correctly the epoch-
making mathematical discoveries of the age, but he 
""--·--·--"-*------_, 
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was led by the Cartesian emphasis on mathematical 
method to conceive in his d;octrine of "signs" an 
- -
"algebra of nature" and t.o c.ansider the possibility 
of ethics as applied mathematics. Otherwise 
Berkeley's ethics is independent of Cartesian 
inf 1uence but manifests, nevertheless, significant 
agreements. 
Chapter x., In conclusion, Berkeley' a 
use of his Cartesian heritage is creative and 
critical, as is shown by the problems which the 
two philos,ophers left to their successors. 
Berkeley's central philosophical position represents 
a vita1 development of the essential principles of 
Descartes' w.orld-view, especially of his concepts 
of God and the self. Berkeley advanced the views 
of Descartes into the direction of the "Copernican 
revolution" of Kant and the rise of the idealism 
of today. 
B. Summary of Fundamental Propositions 
Established .Bz ~Research 
l. The influence of Descartes on Berkeley is 
greater than has been supposed. There are 63 
unmistakable references to Descartes in the VA'.>rks 
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of Berkeley. A study of these references reveals 
an important cronnection which has been obscured 
by the labels "ra. tionaliam" and "empiricism". 
2. Descartes influenced Berkeley indirectly 
through Locke and Ma.J.ebranche. Berkeley, however, 
was justi~ied in denying his dependence on 
Malebranche, for Berkeley developed the essential 
thesis of Descartes, the supremacy of the mind, 
as over against Malebra.nche's apotheosis of extension. 
3. Berkeley, who was especially well acquainted 
with Hobbes' objections to Descartes' Meditations 
and Descartes' replies, did not make the common 
mistake of confusing Descartes with Hobbes. 
Berkeley agreed with Descartes as against Hobbes 
and learned to regard Descartes as an opponent of 
atheism and materialism. 
4. Molyneux, the translate~ of Descartes' 
Meditations, directed Berkeley's attention to the 
controversy between Descartes and Hobbes, gave 
Berkeley a favorable impression of Descartes, 
and encouraged Berkeley to study Descartes. 
5. Important similarities in the thought of 
Descartes and that of Berkeley, such as the 
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primacy of self-consciousness and the emphasis on 
inwardness and will, are traceable to a common 
sDuroe in the philosophy of Christianity, as 
exemplified in Atha.nasius ani Augustine. 
6. The Commonplace Book and the catalogue of 
Berkeley's library reveal that Berkeley was 
aoqll9.inted with Descartes• philosophical works and 
considered him an important authority. 
7 •. Descartes, as well as Berkeley, was motivated 
in his a:pproach to philosq>hy by the purpose to 
defend the Christian religion. 
8. Berkeley's innovations in the theory of 
vision consisted in purging Descartes' theory of 
its irrelevant and inc~nsistent elements. 
9. Berkeley's development fr:an his original 
crude nominalian and sensationalism to his 
nationalism in Siris represents a steady tritunph 
of the influence of Descartes over that of Locke. 
10. Berkeley shows the influence of Descartes 
in his conception of the object and criterion of 
knowledge. He also follows Descartes rather than 
Locke in defining the epistemological significance 
of the seli, intuition, and wtll. 
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11. Both Descartes and Berkeley appeal to 
God as the final solution of the problem of 
knowledge 9 but this appeal, contrary t-0 usual 
criticism, violates neither logic nor God. 
12. Berkeley's theory of reality is a develop-
ment of Descartes' central thesis of the mind as 
pure conscious activity and of the mind-dependent 
nature of the physical worl.d. Berkeley• s denial of 
.. 
the ontological reality of matter results from an 
application of the law of parsimony to the thought 
of Descartes in accordance with Descartes' own 
definition of substance. 
13. The apparent disagreement between Berkeley 
and the naturalistic side of Descartes' metaphysics 
disappears when it is seen that Descartes' mechanical 
views were put forth to guarantee the supreme 
significance of God and the souJ.. Berkeley follows 
Descartes in accepting mechanistic physics as a 
scientific explanation but subordinating it to an 
idealistic metaphysics. 
14. In the .J2! Motu, the most definitely 
Cartesian of his works, Berkeley aligns himself 
with Descartes not only in regard to theories of 
·· .. · .. · ....... ., 
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motion and space but also in regard to the dis-
tinction between "res cogitans" and "res extensa" 
and the relations between scientific and metaphysical 
explanations in general. 
15. Berkeley's ma.in advance on Descartes' 
metaphysics consisted in subordinating· the category 
of substance to that of causality and in bringing 
to the fore a genuinely dynamic element in causality 
in terms of volitional activity. 
16. Berkeley's argument for God on the ground 
of the necessity of having a universal percipient 
is a variant of the ontological proof. Berkeley's 
argument for God as the cause of ideas shows the 
influence of Descartes' psychological causal proof. 
17. The influence of Descartes, whose discover-
ies revolutionized mathematics, is evident in 
Berkeley's theory of "signs" and in Berkeley's 
concepti,on of ethics as applied mathematics. 
18. Berkeley used critically and creatively 
the conceptions he inherited fran Descartes and 
developed them into the direction of Kant. 
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